Background
On 9 February 1994, a private pilot holding a valid professional pilot license arrived at La Côte aerodrome with a friend for a pleasure flight in a rented aircraft, a Piper PA-38-112 Tomahawk, registration HB-PFG. The pilot had 297 hours total flight time, with only 23 minutes on type. The owner conducted two familiarization flights with the pilot, totaling 16 minutes, followed by a solo circuit of 7 minutes. After these flights, the pilot filled both fuel tanks completely.
Accident Sequence
The pilot then taxied from the fuel station to the runway. He checked the wind sock and landing T, which indicated runway 04. The wind was weak and variable. After engine checks, he lined up for takeoff. Full throttle produced 2350-2400 rpm. The takeoff roll was longer than during the familiarization flights, which the pilot attributed to the full fuel. At 55 kt indicated, he rotated. The aircraft lifted off but the stall warning sounded. He immediately lowered the nose, touched down, then attempted another rotation, again touching down. He decided to abort the takeoff, cut power, and braked, but realized he would not stop before the runway end. He attempted to turn the aircraft but instead pulled back on the controls to clear a hedge. The aircraft cleared the road by about one meter and came to rest in bushes at the bottom of a slope, suspended about 1.5 m above the ground, nose down. The aircraft was substantially damaged; the hedge suffered minor damage. The pilot and passenger were uninjured.
Analysis
The grass runway was damp and slightly soft but usable. During the familiarization flights, the takeoff distance was about 382 m. On the accident flight, the aircraft had traveled about 466 m by the second touch-and-go, 31% longer. Takeoff weights were 741 kg (98% MTOW) for familiarization and 751 kg (99% MTOW) for the accident flight, a 1% difference that did not significantly affect distance. Weather at 1040 and 1140 UTC showed wind from 140-150° at 3 kt, almost crosswind to runway 04, with little effect. However, wind at 500 m was variable at 3 kt, so a temporary tailwind cannot be completely excluded. The pilot rotated at 55 kt as per hard-surface procedure. For a soft, wet grass runway, the aircraft manual prescribes a soft-field technique: lift off as soon as possible at lowest airspeed, then accelerate just above ground to 61 KIAS before climbing. The pilot did not apply this technique. Additionally, the pilot, recently trained on a Beechcraft King Air, used a takeoff technique more suited to that aircraft, not raising the nose adequately to clear the soft surface, lengthening the roll. The stall warning activates 5-10 kt above stall speed (48 kt for the configuration), so it was normal during initial climb. A performance check showed that even with a 5 kt tailwind, the aircraft could have cleared the hedge with a small margin. The pilot's decision to abort was correct but too late.
Cause
The accident was caused by inappropriate takeoff technique and low experience on the aircraft type.