Casualties unknown

1987-12-22: CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY 421 C (F-GAPS) — Genève Aéroport (LSGG), GE, CH

Genève Aéroport (LSGG), GE, CH

On December 22, 1987, a CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY 421 C (registration F-GAPS) was involved in an aviation accident near Genève Aéroport (LSGG), GE, CH. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: L'accident est dû au passage prématuré au vol à vue, avec des références visuelles insuffisantes pour juger de la position de l'avion sur la trajectoire. This summary draws on records from the Swiss Transportation Safety Investigation Board (STSB / SUST).

Sourcesthe Swiss Transportation Safety Investigation Board (STSB / SUST)Primary reportUpdated 1785034239Data APIEditorial standards

On 22 December 1987, a Cessna 421-C Golden Eagle (F-GAPS) conducting an ILS approach to runway 23 at Geneva-Cointrin struck antennas and then landed. The pilot was uninjured. The accident was attributed to premature transition to visual flight with insufficient visual references.

Flight History

On 22 December 1987, a Cessna 421-C Golden Eagle, registered F-GAPS, departed Avignon at 1603 hours for Geneva under instrument flight rules (IFR). The pilot, a French national born in 1927, held a valid private pilot license with IFR Category I rating. He had logged 4,120 total flight hours, including 3,000 hours on type, and 35 hours in the preceding 90 days. The aircraft was approved for IFR Category I operations and no defects were found that could have caused or contributed to the accident. Mass and center of gravity were within limits, and the ILS for runway 23 was functioning normally.

Accident Sequence

After takeoff, the aircraft climbed to FL60, then to FL120 under Marseille Control. The flight proceeded via Montélimar and La Tour-du-Pin VORs before coming under Geneva radar control. The pilot was cleared to descend to FL100 and later to 6000 feet, then 5000 feet, and finally 4000 feet while intercepting the ILS for runway 23. The approach was initially stable with the autopilot coupled. At 1612 hours, contact was made with Geneva Approach. Runway visual range (RVR) reports were transmitted: at 1624 hours, RVR 550/550 meters; at 1628 hours, RVR 750/500 meters; and later RVR 450/500 meters. The pilot was asked to report at the outer marker. At 1630:54, a final RVR of 500/450 meters was received, followed by landing clearance. The pilot acknowledged and continued the approach. Approximately at the outer marker, he disengaged the autopilot and continued the final approach visually.

Shortly before the runway threshold, the aircraft struck antennas, then landed on the runway. It taxied with difficulty to taxiway Yankee, where it came to a stop. According to the airport security chief, emergency personnel had difficulty locating the aircraft after landing due to thick fog in the area.

Investigation Findings

  • The pilot's license was valid and he was formally authorized to conduct the flight.
  • No indication of any health impairment during the flight.
  • The aircraft was airworthy and properly equipped for IFR Category I.
  • The ILS was functioning normally.
  • Weight and balance were within limits.
  • Final approach was conducted in visibility below Category I ILS minima.
  • Meteorological conditions: General situation featured an anticyclone over western and central Europe, clear skies over Switzerland, and a sea of fog over the Geneva region with a top near 700 meters. Local METARs at 1620 GMT: wind 260° 4 kt, visibility 1600 m, RVR 375 m in runway 05 and 23, weather mist and fog, 6/8 stratus at 300 ft; at 1650 GMT: wind 270° 5 kt, visibility 300 m, RVR 375 m on 23, fog, sky clear.

Cause

The accident was due to premature transition to visual flight, with insufficient visual references to judge the aircraft's position on the glide path. Contributing factors were a poor assessment of the deteriorating weather conditions and insufficient knowledge of the lighted approach and runway markings.

Probable cause

L'accident est dû au passage prématuré au vol à vue, avec des références visuelles insuffisantes pour juger de la position de l'avion sur la trajectoire.

Investigation report by the Swiss Transportation Safety Investigation Board (STSB / SUST). Original record: https://www.sust.admin.ch/inhalte/AV-berichte/1344.pdf. This page is a structured re-presentation; facts and quotes are in the Swiss Transportation Safety Investigation Board (STSB), Switzerland.