Incident Overview
On the day of the accident, Bearskin Flight 362, a Fairchild Swearingen Metro 23, departed Red Lake, Ontario, at 1300 central daylight saving time (CDT) with two pilots and one passenger. The flight was operating under an instrument flight rules (IFR) plan en route to Sioux Lookout. Air Sandy Flight 3101, a Piper Navajo PA-31, departed Sioux Lookout at 1323 with one pilot and four passengers on a visual flight rules (VFR) flight to Red Lake.
Collision Details
At approximately 1326, the pilot of Air Sandy 3101 reported clear of the Sioux Lookout control zone. No further communication was heard from that flight. At 1315, the Winnipeg area control centre (ACC) advised the Sioux Lookout Flight Service specialist that Bearskin 362 was inbound from Red Lake, estimating arrival at 1332. At 1327, Bearskin 362 called the Sioux Lookout Flight Service Station (FSS), advising they had been cleared for an approach and were cancelling IFR at 14 nautical miles from the airport. At 1328, while the FSS specialist was providing an airport advisory to Bearskin 362, an emergency locator transmitter (ELT) signal was heard on emergency frequencies. Shortly thereafter, the pilot of Bearskin 305, a Beechcraft B-99 in the vicinity, reported seeing a bright flare and a fire in a wooded area. The two aircraft collided in mid-air at 1328 during daylight hours at coordinates 50º14'N 92º07'W in visual meteorological conditions (VMC).
Aftermath
A communications search for Bearskin 362 was unsuccessful. A Search and Rescue aircraft from Trenton, Ontario, and an Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) helicopter were dispatched. The source of the fire was confirmed to be the Air Sandy aircraft. The MNR helicopter observed debris and a fuel slick on Lac Seul, a nearby lake, which was later confirmed as the crash site of Bearskin 362. All three persons on board the Bearskin aircraft and all five on board the Air Sandy aircraft were fatally injured.
Probable Cause
Neither flight crew saw the other aircraft in time to avoid the collision. Contributing to the occurrence were the inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid concept which preclude the effective separation of aircraft with high closure rates, the fact that neither crew was directly alerted to the presence of the other aircraft by the Flight Service specialist or by onboard electronic equipment, and an apparent lack of pilot understanding of how to optimize avoidance manoeuvring.