Background
On 2 November 2015, WK006, a remotely piloted air system, was lost. The meteorological conditions on the day were a significant planning factor for the crew, Authorising Officer (AO), and Flying Supervisor, and were a key consideration in their decision to launch the aircraft. The crew were qualified on type but did not meet all stipulated currency requirements. The records kept did not allow the AO or Flying Supervisor to readily ascertain the crew's currency.
Findings
The AO did not get on headset and was unable to fully discuss the problem faced by the crew and assess the intended course of action. The AO had attended the Flight Authorizers Course (FLAC) but not the RA AO Briefing Day. The Panel found no evidence of any further training for the AO role. The absence of role-specific WK authorisation training contributed to a situation where the AO was not well equipped to effectively carry out the function during the flight.
The Flying Supervisor was not qualified on type at the time of the accident, and there were no plans to gain this qualification within six months of assignment. The Panel noted that the Flying Supervisor was unable to authorise flights on the unit due to the requirement for authorisers to be current and qualified on type. The Flying Supervisor was relatively new in post and was not actively involved in the flight of WK006 after the morning sortie brief; he was first made aware of problems when the UA crashed.
The Panel found that there was an inadequate level of flying supervision on 43 Bty. The battery did not comply with all Flying Orders and directives. The failure to keep accurate records prevented the Panel from ascertaining the flying currency of individuals.
Across the organisation, there was a limited availability of suitably qualified and experienced personnel in key supervisory posts. Although it was only desirable that certain roles hold a WK Certificate of Qualification on Type (CQT), none of the incumbents held a WK CQT at the time of the accident. The cumulative effect, combined with no plan for them to become qualified, resulted in a paucity of WK suitably qualified and experienced personnel (SQEP) across 43 Bty, 11 SR Bde, and JHC.
Recommendations
The Panel made several recommendations:
- The Delivery Duty Holder should implement a bespoke WK Authorising Officer training package.
- The Delivery Duty Holder should ensure that WK Flying Supervisors hold a WK Certificate of Qualification on Type and are in current flying practice before assuming the role.
- The Delivery Duty Holder should review pre-employment qualifications and experience for WK Flying Supervisors.
- The Operating Duty Holder should review WK qualification and experience requirements to ensure a baseline of SQEP personnel across JHC, 11 SR Bde, and 47 Regt RA. Consideration should be given to embedding personnel with manned aviation experience.
- The Royal Artillery HQ Regimental Colonel should review officer career development paths to grow UAS Troop and Battery Commanders with sufficient UAS operator experience.
The Panel concluded that while the Duty Holder organisation was proactive and orders, procedures, and the supervisory framework were in place, the limited availability of SQEP in key supervisory posts was a concern.