What happened
On 30 June 2020, an F-16CM, tail number 94-0043, assigned to the 77th Fighter Squadron, 20th Fighter Wing, was conducting a night mission qualification training flight near Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina. The mission was part of a 4-ship suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) training profile involving pre-strike air-to-air refueling from a KC-135.
During the recovery phase at approximately 2226L, the pilot attempted to land on runway 22R. During this initial attempt, the aircraft struck a localizer antenna array short of the runway threshold, causing severe damage to the left main landing gear. The pilot executed a go-around and notified air traffic control and the mission element lead of the damage.
Following a twenty-minute consultation between the pilot and the supervisor of flying (SOF), the decision was made to attempt an approach-end cable arrestment on runway 04L. During this maneuver, the aircraft's tail hook failed to engage the cable. The left wing subsequently struck the runway, causing the aircraft to veer left and sustain heavy damage. The pilot attempted to eject; however, the ejection seat malfunctioned, and the parachute failed to deploy. The pilot sustained one fatality, and the aircraft was destroyed.
The investigation
The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) examined the sequence of events leading from the initial landing gear strike to the final impact. The investigation reviewed maintenance records regarding the Digital Recovery Sequencer (DRS), noting that a required technical order (TCTO) to install a shorting plug had been delayed due to parts unavailability. The board also analyzed the decision-making process of the supervisor of flying regarding the choice of an arrestment attempt over a controlled ejection.
Findings
- The primary cause of the mishap was the pilot's failure to correctly interpret the approach lighting system and identify the runway threshold during the first landing attempt.
- A significant contributing factor was the decision by the supervisor of flying not to consult the aircraft manufacturer, which led to the choice of attempting a cable arrestment instead of performing a controlled ejection.
- A series of malfunctions within the ejection seat contributed to the fatality, specifically involving the DRS and the failure of the parachute to deploy.
- The delayed implementation of TCTO 11P2-3-502, caused by a lack of available parts, meant that known noise bias issues in the ejection seat sequencer were not addressed prior to the accident.