Incident
On May 24, 2021, at 12:04 local time (07:04 UTC), a ground collision occurred between two aircraft at the VAECO apron of Noi Bai International Airport in Hanoi, Vietnam. The incident happened during the pushback of an Airbus A321, registration VN-A396, from Hangar 1 to parking position 6T. At the time, an Airbus A350, registration VN-A888, was parked in position 1H and could not be moved due to being in long-term storage.
Aircraft Involved
- VN-A396: Airbus A321, manufacturer serial number 5392, operated by Vietnam Airlines (Tổng công ty Hàng không Việt Nam – CTCP).
- VN-A888: Airbus A350, manufacturer serial number 16, operated by Vietnam Airlines.
Pushback Equipment
The tow tug used was a Schopf model, license plate HAN3-18-6002, manufactured in 2015 and started service on November 5, 2015. Its last maintenance was on April 22, 2021. The tug was operated by VAECO (Công ty TNHH MTV kỹ thuật máy bay).
Personnel
The pushback team consisted of five personnel: a team leader (NVKT#1), a left wing watchman (NVKT#2), a right wing watchman (NVKT#3), a tail watchman (NVKT#4), and the tug driver. The right wing watchman (NVKT#3) was a qualified mechanic but did not hold a license issued by the Civil Aviation Authority of Vietnam. All personnel had valid training in the pushback procedure (SOP 6.1). Additionally, a planning officer (NVKH) and a team leader (Tổ trưởng) from the maintenance center were involved in scheduling and assignment.
Sequence of Events
At 10:20, the planning officer (NVKH) received a request to move VN-A396 out of Hangar 1 to make room for other maintenance. NVKH checked available parking positions and found only position 6T and an engine run-up position vacant. Despite a regulation (SOP 6.1) stating that towing to position 6T is not allowed when aircraft are parked at positions 1H or 2H, NVKH proceeded to create a plan to tow VN-A396 to 6T without reporting to higher authorities.
At 10:30, the team leader (Tổ trưởng) assigned a five-person team for the pushback, which was fewer than the seven personnel required by procedure (SOP 6.1.5.1, 6.1.6.2) for towing without brakes. The team discussed the plan: because the aircraft had no electrical or hydraulic power, the brakes and intercom were unavailable. The team leader went to the cockpit to obtain ground control clearance, while the watchmen took positions at the left wing, right wing, and tail. Hand signals and voice commands were agreed upon for communication.
The tug pushed VN-A396 straight out of Hangar 1, then turned to approach position 6T, passing near VN-A888 at position 1H. As the tug rounded the tail of VN-A888, the driver slowed down, focusing on a dock behind position 6T. To avoid the dock, the driver steered the aircraft close to VN-A888 to widen the turning angle. At 12:04, when the left wingtip of VN-A396 was about 5 meters from VN-A888, the left wing watchman (NVKT#2) and the tail watchman (NVKT#4), who had moved to the left wing, signaled the tug to stop. The tug continued moving. Despite repeated hand signals and shouts, the tug only stopped after the left wingtip contacted the fuselage of VN-A888.
Damage
- VN-A888: A tear in the outer skin on the left side of the fuselage at frame 25-26 and stringer 27, measuring 74 x 140 mm. The damage exceeded the limits specified in the Airbus repair manual (Task A350-A-53-21-61-04001-661A-A).
- VN-A396: One static discharger on the left wingtip was damaged.
Investigation Findings
The Civil Aviation Authority of Vietnam classified the incident as a high safety threat (Level C) under regulations. The investigation found that:
- The tow equipment was properly maintained and within validity.
- Weather conditions were good: daytime, no rain, and unrestricted visibility.
- All personnel had valid licenses, training, and adequate rest.
- The planning officer (NVKH) knowingly created a plan that violated the regulation against towing to position 6T when an aircraft was at 1H, and did not report the issue to superiors.
- The team leader assigned an insufficient number of personnel for the pushback.
- The watchmen and the driver were aware of the regulation but subjectively believed it was safe to proceed because position 2H was empty, and they did not inform the team leader of their decision.