Casualties unknown

2005-01-29: Learjet 35A (N911AE) — Business Aviation Management Group Inc — Kansas City, MO

Kansas City, MO, US

On January 29, 2005, a Learjet 35A (registration N911AE) operated by Business Aviation Management Group Inc was involved in an aviation accident near Kansas City, MO. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The contaminated runway conditions during landing. Contributing factors were the operation of the airplane without thrust reversers, flight to the planned alternate airport not performed by the flightcrew, and the insufficient runway information. This summary draws on records from the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archive; 6 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archivePrimary reportUpdated 1781061362Data APIEditorial standards

A Learjet 35A on a positioning flight to Kansas City International Airport diverted to Downtown Airport due to closure, then overran runway 19, impacting airport property and terrain. The aircraft sustained substantial damage.

Accident Overview

A Learjet 35A operated by a commercial operator sustained substantial damage after an overrun on runway 19 at Charles B. Wheeler Downtown Airport (MKC) in Kansas City, Missouri. The aircraft was on a positioning flight to Kansas City International Airport (MCI) with a filed alternate destination of Lincoln Airport (LNK), Nebraska. The flight diverted to MKC after MCI was closed due to a McDonnell Douglas MD83 sliding off a taxiway during a taxi after landing on contaminated runway/taxiway conditions. Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

Runway and Airport Information

Runway 19 at MKC is 7,002 feet long and 150 feet wide, with grooved asphalt. MKC held a limited airport certificate that did not include a snow removal plan. In contrast, LNK, the alternate, was a certificated airport with a snow removal plan and was served by runway 17R (12,901 feet by 200 feet, grooved asphalt and concrete). About 1 hour and 5 minutes before the accident, Tapley values on runway 19 were recorded as 21-22-22 with 1/2 inch of wet snow. Approximately 17 minutes before the accident, MKC began snow removal operations. About 7 minutes before the accident, the MKC air traffic control tower (TWR) instructed snow removal vehicles to clear the runway for inbound traffic. TWR was advised by airport personnel that runway 19 had been plowed and surface conditions were 1/4 inch of snow; no friction values were taken or reported.

Approach and Landing

The Learjet 35A conducted a precision approach and landing on runway 19. The landing distance was calculated by the flightcrew as 5,400 feet. The aircraft was operated with inoperative thrust reversers as per the airplane's minimum equipment list at the time of the accident. After landing, the Learjet slid off the departure end of the runway and impacted airport property and terrain.

Braking Action Reports

While inbound, the Learjet flightcrew requested braking action reports from TWR. The first airplane to land on the same runway was a Cessna 210 Centurion. The Cessna pilot reported braking action as "moderate" to TWR, which was then transmitted as "fair" to the Learjet in response to its query. Notably, the Cessna pilot did not use brakes during landing and did not inform TWR of this during the report. The Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) states that no correlation has been established between Mu values and the descriptive terms "good," "fair," and "nil" used in braking action reports. The Airport Winter Safety and Operations advisory circular (AC) notes that pilot braking action reports often vary significantly, even on the same frozen contaminant surface. The AC also states that friction surveys are generally reliable as long as the depth of snow does not exceed 1 inch and/or depth of wet snow/slush does not exceed 1/8 inch.

Cockpit Voice Recorder

Two channels of the cockpit voice recorder, which normally contain pilot and copilot audio panel information, were blank.

Probable Cause

The source does not state a probable cause.

Investigation report by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archive. Original record: https://carol.ntsb.gov/event/20050210X00173. This page is a structured re-presentation; facts and quotes are in the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), United States.