Incident Overview
On September 19, 2008, at 1938 eastern daylight time, an operational error occurred at Lehigh Valley International Airport (ABE) in Allentown, Pennsylvania, resulting in a near-collision on runway 6. Mesa Air Shuttle flight 7138 (ASH7138), a Canadair CRJ-700, was preparing for departure to Chicago with 56 passengers and 4 crew members. The flight crew aborted the takeoff after noticing that N736GV, a Cessna 172 with a pilot and two passengers, had landed and was still taxiing on the runway near the intersection with taxiway B. The crew of ASH7138 estimated the separation between the two aircraft as 10 feet when they passed. No damage to either aircraft and no injuries were reported. Both aircraft taxied to parking after the incident; ASH7138 had its flight cancelled for inspection, while N736GV concluded its flight.
Sequence of Events
N736GV was operating under visual flight rules from Caldwell, New Jersey, to ABE. It first contacted the ABE tower at 1929:28, approximately 8 miles east of the airport. The controller instructed the pilot to continue for the downwind and report midfield. At 1933:30, the pilot reported midfield for runway 6 and was cleared to land. Radar data indicated N736GV crossed the runway 6 threshold at approximately 1936:15.
At 1934:50, ASH7138 contacted the tower, reporting ready for takeoff and holding short of runway 6. The controller instructed the crew to hold short for landing traffic. At 1936:27, the controller told ASH7138 to taxi into position and hold on the runway. At 1936:36, the controller asked the pilot of N736GV where the aircraft would park; the pilot replied hangar 7. The controller then instructed the Cessna to turn right at taxiway A4 and taxi via taxiways A and J, and to remain on the local control frequency.
At 1937:11, ASH7138 was instructed to fly runway heading and cleared for takeoff. Between 1937:18 and 1937:32, the controller turned his attention to another Cessna in the pattern to ensure spacing. At 1937:34, the pilot of N736GV reported having passed taxiway A4 and requested to exit at taxiway B. The controller responded, "...no delay, turn immediately." The pilot acknowledged.
At 1938:16, the controller called ASH7138. At 1938:20, ASH7138 transmitted that they needed to return to the gate. The controller instructed them to turn off at the next taxiway to the right and contact ground control. At 1939:08, the controller asked if they needed to call the tower; the pilot responded that they would call on the ground. The ground controller provided the tower phone number during taxi. The crew subsequently notified the Mesa Airlines safety department.
Airport and Runway Details
The incident occurred on runway 6 near its intersection with runway 13/31. Runway 6 was 7,600 feet long and 150 feet wide. Taxiway A4 was 1,450 feet from the threshold; runway 13/31 crossed runway 6 at 2,700 feet; and taxiway B intersected at 3,100 feet. After the incident, a runway inspection revealed fresh dual-tandem skid marks from ASH7138's main gear during the aborted takeoff. The marks began at coordinates 40.65114N / 075.44382W, crossed the centerline to the left, and extended approximately 1,225 feet along the left side, ending at 40.65334N / 075.44047W. Using the painted runway number "6" as the estimated position-and-hold point for ASH7138, the skid marks began about 2,200 feet into the takeoff roll.
Radar and Communication Data
Radar data, provided by the ABE air traffic control tower (ATCT) from the ASR-8 radar, showed no coverage of aircraft on the surface. ABE lacked a ground movement radar. The last target for N736GV was at 1935:44, when it was 0.6 nautical miles from the runway 6 threshold and descending through 500 feet msl. No targets were observed for ASH7138 at any time.
Personnel Statements
Local Controller: Hired by the FAA in September 2007, he was certified on the local control position on August 12, 2008. He had 81 hours of training on local control, of which only 49 minutes were at night. He stated that he watched N736GV on final and, after it crossed the threshold, instructed ASH7138 to position and hold. He then asked the Cessna pilot about parking and directed the aircraft to taxiway A4. He thought he saw the Cessna's landing light begin to turn onto A4. He turned to locate another aircraft in the pattern, then turned back and scanned the runway, which appeared clear. He cleared ASH7138 for takeoff. After the Cessna pilot reported missing A4, the controller tried to locate it and saw it approaching taxiway B; he instructed the pilot to turn immediately. He saw ASH7138 stop on the runway but could not estimate the passing distance. He was not wearing a headset and listened through a speaker. He stated he did not make transmissions during the event because he was trained not to interrupt pilots in critical phases. When asked the cause, he said he "lost the Cessna in the lights." He did not feel rushed or pressured.
Ground Controller: Entered FAA service in 2001 and arrived at ABE in April 2007. He was certified on all tower positions including controller in charge (CIC). He first became aware of the incident when he heard an unusual transmission on the local control frequency; later, he realized it was N736GV reporting that it missed the turn at A4. He looked up and saw ASH7138's lights at an angle on the runway and thought it did not look right. He did not see N736GV. He contacted the approach control CIC to report a situation. He stated that as CIC, he was responsible for maintaining awareness, but he did not know where N736GV was at the time. He had delegated authority to the local controller to taxi N736GV to the ramp and did not confirm that it exited at A4.
Pilot of N736GV: Held a private pilot license with instrument rating, about 1,170 hours total, with 1,100 in Cessna 172s. The aircraft had required navigational lights and triple-flash wingtip strobes, which were operating during the landing roll. He stated he normally carries extra altitude at night and lands farther down the runway. After landing, he was instructed to turn off at taxiway A4, but he was going too fast to make the turn and continued. About 10 seconds later, he reported passing A4 and requested taxiway B. The controller said "turn immediately." He turned toward B and added power. Three or four seconds later, the regional jet passed on the left. He estimated the separation as possibly 30 feet. He did not hear the jet being cleared for takeoff. He taxied to parking and concluded the flight.
Crew of ASH7138: The captain reported that after being cleared for takeoff, at about 110 knots indicated, the Cessna pilot transmitted that he missed his turnoff. The first officer noticed a white navigation light to the right of centerline and called "abort." The crew performed a high-speed abort with maximum braking and reverse thrust, veering left. They passed the Cessna at about 40 knots with an estimated 10-foot separation. The first officer noted that the runway lights were set on high intensity and that the Cessna's strobes were not visible. The crew contacted the tower, deplaned passengers, and reported the incident.
Probable Cause
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