History of Flight
On September 22, 2008, at 1342 central daylight time, American Airlines Flight 268, a Boeing 757-223 registered as N197AN, overran the side of Runway 22R (7,500 feet by 150 feet) while landing at O'Hare International Airport (ORD), Chicago, Illinois. The flight was a scheduled domestic passenger operation under 14 CFR Part 121. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and the flight operated under an instrument flight rules flight plan. The flight originated from Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (SEA) at 0801 Pacific daylight time, with an intended destination of John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), New York.
Prior to takeoff from SEA, the captain observed the standby horizon had tumbled with flags and was unpowered. After cycling the Standby Power Selector and Battery Switch, the standby horizon righted and flags disappeared. Five status messages appeared on the lower EICAS screen, but the captain could not recall them. A mechanic cleared the messages and stated they were "good to go." No logbook entries were made.
During climb, at flight level 370, cockpit lights flickered, multiple EICAS messages appeared including an AIR/GRD SYS caution, the Standby Power OFF light illuminated, the autopilot disconnect warning sounded, and autothrottles disconnected. The captain reported the autopilot became "squirrely." The flight data recorder showed electrical anomalies beginning at 10:25:35 when battery voltage spiked to about 31 volts DC.
The first officer referenced the quick reference handbook (QRH) for the AIR/GND SYS message and performed the STANDBY BUS OFF procedure, placing the Standby Power selector to BAT. The QRH stated the battery would provide bus power for approximately 30 minutes. The DISCHARGE light remained illuminated. The captain noted items that might be inoperative with the standby bus unpowered. At 10:30:55, main battery discharge indicated "discharge" and voltage decreased.
The crew performed the Main Battery Charger checklist but determined it did not apply. The captain contacted American Airlines maintenance technical support (Tulsa Tech) twice and elected to continue on battery power. At 12:54:38, a master caution sound was heard on the CVR, coinciding with battery depletion approximately 2 hours 24 minutes after switching to BAT.
The first officer noted auto-throttle light illumination and disconnection, and autopilot became "squirrelly." Systems began failing. At 12:57:35, the captain stated loss of his side. The captain told the first officer to handle the airplane. At 13:15:48, the captain contacted dispatch and ARTCC to divert to ORD due to worsening electrical problems. The airplane was over western Michigan at that time.
The PA system and interphone became inoperative. The number one flight attendant slipped a note under the cockpit door. The captain informed the flight attendants of the diversion. At 13:20:39, ARTCC asked about assistance; the captain stated they were alright but backups were failing and they could not fly an ILS approach.
At 13:32:04, the captain told ORD approach they had "almost no indications in the cockpit" and emergency equipment was not required. The first officer was flying the airplane; all of the captain's instruments were inoperative. The main and alternate stabilizer trim were inoperative.
At 13:39:18, the captain reported the airport in sight. The local controller cleared the airplane for a visual approach to Runway 22R. At 13:39:53, the first officer stated they were close to an emergency due to lack of trim. At 13:40:25, the captain declared an emergency. Emergency crews were placed on standby.
The captain assisted the first officer on the controls. The captain noted systems needed to slow the airplane appeared normal. They did not perform a go-around due to flight control issues. Flap extension was stopped at 20 degrees.
The captain reported a good landing but the nose touched down "a little firmer than I cared for." Reverse thrust was selected but did not activate. Spoilers were armed but did not automatically deploy; the captain manually deployed them but was unsure if they deployed. Brakes were applied but were insufficient and did not feel normal. The captain made one smooth brake application, which performed poorly. To avoid obstructions off the end of the runway, the captain steered the airplane off the left side of the runway into the grass.
Witnesses reported the airplane appeared fast, touched down approximately 2,500 feet down the runway near taxiway Papa, and they heard loud pops upon contact. Skid marks from the left main gear began near touchdown, followed 165 feet later by marks from the right main gear, visible the entire length until the airplane left the pavement. The airplane came to rest with all three landing gear off the left side of the pavement, nose approximately 100 feet before the end of the blast pad (extending 397 feet past runway end).
After stopping, the flight crew could not shut down the engines using fuel cutoff valves or fire handles. ARFF and airline maintenance personnel boarded. The engines were shut down by depressing the fire handles and recycling the generator control switch. Passengers deplaned via L1 and R3 doors using portable stairs.
Damage to Aircraft
Damage was confined to the landing gear. Seven of the eight main landing gear tires were either blown out or deflated.
Personnel Information
The captain, age 50, held an airline transport pilot certificate with multi-engine and single-engine land ratings, type ratings for B-757 and B-767, a CFI certificate, a flight engineer certificate with turbojet rating, and an A&P mechanic certificate. He had 11,285 total flight hours, 580 in B-757. He was hired by Ozark Airlines in 1985, later worked for TWA, and joined American Airlines in 2001.
The first officer, age 49, held an airline transport pilot certificate with multi-engine rating, type ratings for B-707, B-720, B-757, B-767, CL-65, and DC-9, and a flight engineer certificate with turbojet rating. He had 11,700 total flight hours, 1,635 in B-757. He was hired by TWA in 1988 and joined American Airlines in 2001. The flight was his first trip sequence as a first officer on the B-757.
Aircraft Information
The Boeing 757-223, serial number 32391, was manufactured November 1, 2001, and added to American Airlines' operating certificate on December 3, 2001. It was configured for 197 people. Total time was 22,094 hours with 7,474 cycles. Engines were Rolls Royce RB211-53. The APU was a Honeywell.
Meteorological Information
At 1351, weather at ORD: wind from 140 degrees at 8 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, few clouds at 20,000 feet, broken clouds at 25,000 feet, temperature 26°C, dew point 14°C, altimeter 30.34 inches of mercury.
Communications
Toward the end of the flight, the cockpit had one usable radio and the PA system was inoperable. Two conversations with Tulsa Tech were recorded. In the first call shortly after takeoff, the captain reported loss of standby power, operating off battery, and asked whether to continue to JFK or divert. The technical specialist said it was the captain's discretion and verified the QRH did not require diversion. The captain stated they would continue to JFK. In the second call, the captain reported systems working fine but battery would deplete; the specialist acknowledged and said he would contact maintenance at JFK, indicating they should be okay to continue.
Survival Aspects
The Chicago Fire Department was notified of electrical problems and loss of radio. ARFF equipment was positioned. ARFF reported the airplane landed hard with heavy smoke trailing. The commander could not communicate via headset at nose gear, so used hand signals. The captain opened the cockpit window to communicate. ARFF boarded and determined no injuries to crew or passengers.