History of Flight
On January 18, 2010, at 1405 eastern standard time, a Mitsubishi MU-2B-60, N80HH, was destroyed when it impacted terrain during an instrument approach to runway 07 at the Lorain County Regional Airport (LPR), Elyria, Ohio. The pilot, the pilot-rated passenger in the right seat, and two passengers seated in the cabin received fatal injuries. The 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 flight departed the Gainesville Regional Airport (GNV), Gainesville, Florida, about 1100, and was en route to LPR. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed.
Air traffic control transcripts indicated that the airplane was approaching LPR on a heading of 325 degrees. At 1335:51, ATC informed the pilot that he could expect radar vectors for the instrument landing system (ILS) Runway 07 approach to LPR. The flight was cleared for the ILS Runway 07 approach, but radar track data showed the airplane flew through the inbound course and continued on a 055 degree heading. The pilot was instructed to turn to 090 degrees and then to 100 degrees to intercept the inbound course. After ATC asked if he wanted to continue or take vectors, the pilot elected to continue.
At 1348:27, ATC instructed the pilot to change to LPR’s advisory frequency. At 1349:33, the pilot advised ATC that he was executing a missed approach. Radar track data indicated the airplane’s altitude never dropped below 1,500 feet msl during the approach; the decision height for the ILS was 994 feet msl. ATC then provided vectors for a second attempt. At 1358:18, the pilot was cleared for the ILS Runway 7 approach again. The pilot acknowledged and later switched to advisory frequency.
Radar track data showed the airplane’s altitude increased to about 3,000 feet msl when turning inbound, then decreased. The airplane was about 1 mile from runway 07 at about 1,300 feet msl (506 feet agl). The last radar return indicated altitude about 1,000 feet msl. The heading started to drift left of centerline at about 1,400 feet msl and continued left until the last return, which was about 0.19 miles left of centerline. The linear distance from the last radar return to the initial impact point was about 750 feet.
A witness waiting at the airport reported hearing the radio transmission and seeing the airplane descend out of the clouds in a nose-low attitude, rolling to the right into a steep right turn with wings nearly 90 degrees to the ground. He stated the airplane was “definitely out of control.” Another witness saw the airplane about 150 feet agl in a 60-degree nose-low attitude with about 80 degrees of right bank.
Personnel Information
The 30-year-old pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate for single-engine land, multi-engine land, and helicopters, as well as flight instructor and instrument instructor ratings. His latest first-class medical certificate was issued November 29, 2007. On an insurance form dated April 15, 2009, he reported 2,010 total flight hours, with 1,285 multi-engine hours (1,250 in the MU-2), 231 helicopter hours, 290 hours of actual instrument conditions, and 180 hours in the MU-2 in the preceding 12 months. He had received recurrent MU-2 simulator training annually and completed a Special Federal Aviation Regulation 108 compliant MU-2 recurrent course on January 28, 2009. The airplane owner described the pilot as competent and qualified to fly single-pilot.
The pilot-rated passenger held a private pilot certificate with a single-engine land rating. At his October 10, 2008 medical exam, he reported 190 total flight hours. The airplane owner stated he was not performing copilot duties. He also held an Airframe and Powerplant mechanic rating and maintained the accident airplane.
Aircraft Information
The twin-engine Mitsubishi MU-2B-60, serial number 732, was certified for single-pilot operations with a maximum gross weight of 11,575 pounds and seating for 10. It was powered by Honeywell TPE-331-10 engines flat-rated to 715 shaft horsepower. The last annual inspection was April 3, 2009; the airplane had flown about 90 hours since, with a total time of 6,799 hours. Both engines had 2,910.4 hours time since overhaul. Airworthiness Directive 2000-09-15 (de-ice monitoring system, autopilot disconnect, trim alert) had been complied with. The autopilot roll servo was replaced with an overhauled unit on September 23, 2009. A Bendix KLN-94 GPS was installed, which automatically switches to NAV when a localizer frequency is selected.
Meteorological Information
At 1353, the surface weather observation at LPR reported: winds 240 degrees at 9 knots, 2 miles visibility, mist, overcast ceiling 500 feet, temperature -1°C, dew point -3°C, altimeter 29.93 inches Hg. National Weather Service charts showed extensive IFR conditions over the region. A sounding indicated moist low-level environment, freezing level at the surface, and relative humidity 80% or more from surface to about 8,000 feet. The Current Icing Product showed 70-80% probability of icing below 3,000 feet near the accident site. Numerous pilot reports indicated overcast layers with bases 100-1,200 feet and tops 2,200-3,800 feet, with 12 reports of light rime to mixed icing and 4 reports of light to moderate icing. A Citation pilot who landed about 10-15 minutes earlier reported flying the ILS, entering clouds at 3,000 feet, no turbulence, and observing about 1/8 inch of ice on the nose after landing. The ATC controller handling the accident airplane stated cloud tops about 3,000-3,100 feet with light rime or mixed icing, and wind 210 degrees at 30 knots at 8,000 feet.
Airport Information
The ILS or LOC RWY 7 approach plate specified: localizer frequency 111.7, runway length 5,002 feet, airport elevation 794 feet, approach course 070 degrees, glide path intercept altitude 2,400 feet msl, straight-in minimums 994 feet decision height with ½ mile visibility, circling minimums 1,240 feet msl with 1 mile visibility. Missed approach: climb to 1,400 feet, then climbing left turn to 3,000 feet via 270 degrees, then left turn direct to DJB VOR/DME and hold.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The airplane impacted a field within the airport boundary, about 2,150 feet west of runway 07 threshold and 720 feet north of the extended centerline. The wreckage path was about 194 feet long on a heading of about 100 degrees magnetic. Wings and landing gear separated; cockpit cabin partially separated but flight control cables intact; empennage remained attached. No post-impact fire. A crater 6x7 feet and 18-24 inches deep was near the initial impact point. Components including right propeller, wing tip tanks, engines, and fuselage were distributed along the path. On-site inspection revealed landing gear extended, flaps set to 5 degrees, pitch trim about 15 degrees nose up, rudder trim 1-2 degrees right, aileron trim neutral. Power levers forward above flight idle. Left condition lever forward of stop and broken, right condition lever on forward stop at Take-off/Land position. Generator and battery master switches OFF. Left engine auto-ignition in Continuous, right in Auto-ignition. The overhead anti-ice panel switches were damaged; top four lights tested functional but bottom four could not be tested. The M-4D autopilot mode selector controller bulbs showed no filament stretch. Flight control cables exhibited continuity from controls to surfaces. Spoilers were in various positions.
Medical and Pathological Information
Autopsies of the pilot and pilot-rated passenger were conducted at the Cuyahoga County Coroner’s Office. The cause of death for both was blunt force trauma to the head, neck, trunk, and extremities with cutaneous, skeletal, soft tissue, vascular, and visceral injuries. Forensic toxicology reports from the FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute were negative for all substances tested.
Tests and Research
Autopilot servos were bench tested at Autopilots Central on March 17, 2010. The pitch primary servo functioned correctly but output torque was slightly under minimum during counter-clockwise rotation. The roll primary servo velocity generator output was slightly under limit (1.77 volts vs 1.8). The yaw primary servo residual drag was slightly over limit (32 inch-ounces vs 30). The pitch trim servo did not function clockwise; technician found relay K1 faulty. It could not be determined if the fault was pre-impact or impact-related.
Teardown of the two Honeywell TPE331-10-511M turboprop engines (serial numbers P-36169C and P-36070C) on March 29-April 1, 2010, revealed similar impact damage including rotational scoring on compressor impellers, turbine blade tips, and knife seals, as well as metal spray deposits.
Inspection of the Hartzell propellers (model HC-B4TN-5-JL) on March 31, 2010, revealed left propeller blade clamps/counterweights at low or reverse pitch; piston assembly separated; blade damage and bending consistent with impact. Right propeller had separated due to fractured engine shaft; all blades in reverse pitch; blade clamp link screws missing on three blades.
Probable Cause
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