History of Flight
On February 6, 2010, at 1143 central standard time, a Beech Aircraft Corporation A-36 airplane, N1085D, sustained substantial damage when it impacted terrain near Winslow, Arkansas, while on an instrument flight rules (IFR) approach to Drake Field Airport (FYV), Fayetteville, Arkansas. The personal flight was conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 with an IFR flight plan. The instrument-rated private pilot, a pilot-rated passenger, and two other passengers were fatally injured. The cross-country flight originated from Memorial Field Airport (HOT), Hot Springs, Arkansas, with a planned arrival at FYV. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the accident site.
According to transcripts of radio communications, the pilot contacted Razorback Approach Control (RAC) at 1128:01 and was instructed to proceed direct to GERTE, the initial approach fix for the LDA/DME runway 34 instrument approach. Radar data indicated the airplane was flying on an approximate heading of 310 toward GERTE at 6,000 feet msl. At 1137:30, the controller instructed the pilot to descend to 4,000 feet msl, which the pilot acknowledged. At 1139:13, the controller cleared the pilot for the LDA/DME 34 approach and advised to turn right heading 310 and maintain 4,000 feet until established. The pilot requested a repeat due to an unclear transmission. At 1140:28, the pilot was told to contact FYV tower, which he did at 1140:47, reporting 4,100 feet msl. The tower cleared the airplane to land on runway 34. After that, no further communications occurred.
Radar data showed that after passing GERTE, the airplane deviated left and right of the localizer course, with altitude varying between 3,000 and 4,000 feet msl and heading changes exceeding 180 degrees. The last radar return was at 1143:21 at 2,999 feet msl. The airplane impacted terrain 0.06 mile southeast of that point, about 3 miles outside the final approach fix at an elevation of approximately 2,000 feet. Three witnesses heard the engine running before impact; two observed the airplane in a nose-low attitude, and two reported hearing the airplane circle overhead twice.
Personnel Information
The pilot, aged 46, held a private pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land and instrument ratings. He held a third-class medical certificate issued July 20, 2009, with no restrictions. According to his logbook, he had 363 total hours, 27 hours of actual instrument flight, and 39 hours of simulated instrument time. In the 30 days before the accident, he logged 11.5 total hours and 2.4 actual instrument hours. His last flight review was on August 3, 2009.
The pilot-rated passenger, aged 57, held a private pilot certificate for airplane single-engine land. No logbooks were located, and he did not provide flight hour information on his only medical certificate application from March 3, 1981.
Aircraft Information
The six-seat, low-wing, retractable gear airplane, serial number E-2985, was manufactured in 1995. It was powered by a Teledyne Continental Motors IO-550-B engine (300 HP) and a three-bladed McCauley variable pitch propeller. The most recent annual inspection was completed on September 1, 2009, at 1,661 airframe hours. The engine logbook was not located.
Meteorological Information
At 1110, FYV reported an overcast ceiling at 1,500 feet agl with 7 miles visibility. At 1153, the report indicated broken clouds at 1,500 feet agl, overcast at 2,000 feet agl, and 9 miles visibility. The National Weather Service Surface Analysis Chart for 1200 showed overcast ceilings with no precipitation and no significant fronts. A weather depiction chart from 1000 placed most of Arkansas under marginal VFR conditions, with IFR conditions near the accident site. Pilot reports from 0900 to 1500 indicated light to moderate clear air and rime icing below 15,000 feet, with cloud bases as low as 1,800 feet agl and tops up to 6,000 feet.
Automated Terminal Information Service (ATIS) information LIMA was current at FYV, but no recordings or transcripts were found. Investigators could not determine whether the pilot obtained a weather briefing before the flight.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The airplane impacted an open, grassy area near a residence, surrounded by trees and farm buildings with partial snow cover. The wreckage was aligned on an approximate 100-degree magnetic heading. All major components were accounted for, and the landing gear was retracted. The engine and propeller blades were initially covered by debris; after extrication, one blade was vertical with no bending or gouges, while the other two had broken outer ends and leading-edge gouges. The right and left wings exhibited accordion deformation along leading edges; fuel caps and bladders separated. Flaps were retracted. The empennage was compressed between the cabin and vertical stabilizer. Flight control continuity was confirmed from elevator and rudder to aft seats; aileron cables were traced to the center carry-through, with no anomalies. Postaccident examination revealed no preimpact system or engine anomalies.
The cabin area was compressed; the instrument panel was found 612 inches below the ground surface. The airspeed indicator showed a needle slap at 149 knots, the standby compass was damaged, the heading indicator indicated approximately 140 degrees, and the altimeter read 2,140 feet with 30.05 set in the Kollsman window. Other instruments were unreadable.
Medical and Pathological Information
An autopsy on the pilot conducted February 10, 2010, determined the cause of death as multiple traumatic injuries. Forensic toxicology found no ethanol or drugs; testing for carbon monoxide or cyanide was not performed. No autopsy or toxicology was performed on the pilot-rated passenger.
Additional Information
A Garmin GPSMAP 696 unit, an Electronics International UBG-16 Engine Monitor, a Garmin terrain awareness and warning system data card, and a Jeppesen navigation data card were removed from the wreckage but yielded no recoverable data. The Beech Bonanza A36 Pilot's Operating Handbook included a warning: "Flight in icing conditions prohibited." FAA Advisory Circular 60-4A on spatial disorientation describes the phenomenon as the inability to determine which way is 'up' when visual references are lost.