Incident Overview
On Thursday, April 29, 2010, at approximately 1942 Pacific daylight time, a SkyWest Canadair CRJ-200 Regional Jet (registration N953SW) operating as flight 5945 (SKW5945) and an American Eurocopter AStar 350 (registration N29LW) operating as TV2 were involved in a reported near midair collision at Bob Hope Airport (BUR), Burbank, California. SKW5945 was on a left base for a visual approach to runway 33 descending through 1,500 feet, while TV2 was conducting operations two miles southeast of the runway at 1,400 feet. The crew of SKW5945 received and complied with a Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) resolution advisory (RA) directing a climb to maintain separation from the helicopter.
SKW5945 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight from San Francisco International Airport (SFO) to BUR, operating under instrument flight rules (IFR) in accordance with 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121. TV2, a news helicopter, was conducting visual flight rules (VFR) operations in the southeast portion of BUR Class C airspace under 14 CFR Part 91. The event occurred at dusk under visual meteorological conditions. There was no damage to either aircraft, and no reported injuries.
History of Flight
TV2 was operating inside the BUR Class C airspace and was already on local control (LC) frequency. At about 1941, the pilot of SKW5945 contacted BUR air traffic control tower, reporting approximately five miles southwest of the airport on a left base for a visual approach to runway 33. The local controller directed the CRJ to reduce to final approach speed and square its base to clear a departing aircraft for takeoff before SKW5945's arrival.
Approximately one minute later, TV2 called BUR tower with a request. The local controller immediately directed TV2, which had been eastbound approximately two miles south of BUR at 1,400 feet, to remain east of the approach end of runway 33 for inbound traffic. The pilot responded that he had the inbound traffic in sight, would remain east of the extended centerline, and asked to work in the area just west of the extended centerline once the traffic landed.
At approximately 1942, when SKW5945 was descending through 1,500 feet, the local controller advised the pilot of helicopter traffic off his left side, “low level at 1,400 feet.” The pilot responded that he had received a TCAS alert on that traffic and would have to go around because he had to climb in response to a resolution advisory. The local controller issued missed approach instructions and transferred the aircraft to Southern California Terminal Radar Approach Control (SCT) for vectors back to BUR. TV2 remained in BUR’s airspace for approximately five more minutes before departing toward Whiteman Airport (WHP). SKW5945 returned to BUR for a visual approach and landed on runway 33 without further incident.
Radar Data
Radar data was obtained from the ASR-9 sensor at BUR. The applicable separation standard between VFR and IFR aircraft in Class C airspace is visual separation, 500 feet vertical, or target resolution. At closest point of approach, the aircraft were separated by approximately 0.77 nautical mile laterally and 100 feet vertically. The controller did not issue any control instructions to establish and maintain separation; neither visual separation nor target resolution procedures were being applied before the incident.
ATC Facility Information
BUR was a level 7 tower with radar facility responsible for ATC services in the Class C airspace 24 hours a day, seven days a week. As of calendar year 2009, BUR averaged 110,000 operations per year. The tower was responsible for providing Class C services to aircraft operating within the charted inner ring of the Class C airspace; the remainder of the Class C area was under control of SCT.
Personnel Interviews
Front Line Manager (FLM): The FLM was in charge of the tower cab operation at the time. He assessed the tower’s workload as moderate and was aware of helicopter traffic in the vicinity. He heard the local controller clear a Southwest flight for takeoff, saw SKW5945 turning on a two-mile final but climbing, then heard traffic coordination. The FLM stated that the controller restricted the helicopter to remain east of the final approach course, which “should have worked,” but added that the LC could have exercised more positive control.
Local Controller (LC): The LC cleared SKW5945 to land and instructed TV2 to remain east of the extended final for runway 33. He believed TV2 had reported the CRJ in sight based on an earlier traffic call. After seeing SKW5945 fly through the final, he provided a traffic advisory. The CRJ pilot then reported a TCAS RA. The LC believed the helicopter’s proximity was safe because he had instructed it to remain clear of the final. In retrospect, he thought specifying a distance might have been beneficial.
Local Assist (LA): The LA controller saw SKW5945 east of the final approach course and heard the pilot say he was going around. She coordinated the missed approach with SCT, which directed a 270-degree heading and climb to 4,000 feet.
Facility Corrective Actions
As a result of this incident, BUR tower controllers received refresher training on Visual Separation (FAA 7110.65, 7-2-1), Traffic Advisories (FAA 7110.65, 2-1-21), and Safety Alerts (FAA 7110.65, 2-1-6).