History of Flight
On July 27, 2010, at about 1100 Pacific daylight time, N33CJ, a Beech 95-B55 airplane, was substantially damaged following a loss of control and impact with terrain during initial climb near the Oceanside Municipal Airport (OKB), Oceanside, California. The certificated airline transport pilot, the sole occupant, was killed. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local flight, which was operated under 14 CFR Part 91, and no flight plan was filed. The flight had departed OKB about 2 minutes prior to the accident.
Four witnesses provided statements. One witness, an FAA certificated airline transport pilot and mechanic, reported that after the airplane became airborne, the engines sounded "out of sync." He estimated the airplane's altitude at about 50 feet above ground level as it passed, and observed it yawing and drifting to the right in a wings-level attitude without gaining altitude. The airplane then rolled to the right in a descent and went out of view. Another witness heard an unusually loud engine noise and noted the twin-engine airplane was very low, barely missing power lines. She stated the engine did not sound like it had full power, almost sputtering. A third witness reported the landing gear retracted and the airplane was at about 300 feet and descending. A fourth witness observed the airplane flying low, barely missing power lines, with landing gear down as if trying to land; after missing the lines, the pilot retracted the gear and continued east still very low, then "flipped" to the right before crashing, followed by an explosion.
Personnel Information
The pilot, age 83, was retired from a major U.S. airline. He held an airline transport pilot rating for multiengine land, a commercial certificate for single-engine land, and numerous type ratings. His logbook showed a flight review on March 11, 2010, partially in the accident airplane, and a total time of 647.9 hours in make and model. His most recent third-class FAA medical was issued May 20, 2010, with no limitations; on the application he listed 33,000 hours total flight time, with 15 hours in the past 6 months.
Aircraft Information
The airplane, manufactured in 1968, was a Beech 95-B55 (T42A), serial number TC-1074, a multiengine, low-wing, all-metal design powered by two reciprocating engines. It could carry up to six occupants. It received a Standard Airworthiness Certificate on March 5, 1968, and was certified for normal category operations. Total airframe time was 2,196 hours. The last annual inspection was performed May 13, 2010, at 2,196 hours total time and a Hobbs reading of 1,929 hours.
The left engine was a Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM) IO-520-E, serial number 164269-72E, with total time at last annual of 1,929 hours and time since major overhaul of 448 hours. The right engine was a TCM IO-520-E, serial number 164268-72E, with total time 1,929 hours and time since major overhaul of 296 hours. The left propeller was a three-bladed Hartzell HC-A3VF-2, hub serial CC177; the right propeller was identical, hub serial CC178.
Meteorological Information
At 1052, the weather reporting facility at OKB, about 1 nm west of the accident site, indicated visibility 7 miles, overcast clouds at 1,500 feet, temperature 19°C, dew point 14°C, altimeter setting 29.95 inHg. Wind was not reported.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The airplane came to rest upright on a measured magnetic heading of about 275° in an open field between a school and residential area, at 33°13.307'N, 117°19.963'W, elevation 76 feet, about 1 nm east of OKB on a heading of 075°. The energy path covered about 180 feet on a heading of about 089°. The first identified point of contact (FIPC) was a ground scar with signatures consistent with a slightly right wing down and slightly nose up pitch attitude. Fragmented green lens pieces from the right navigation light were found at FIPC; red lens pieces from the left navigation light were 100 feet east. The main wreckage was about 80 feet further east. The right engine with propeller was found 155 feet north of the main wreckage.
Cockpit and cabin were consumed by fire; no instrument or switch positions could be recorded. Flight control continuity was established from empennage to aft cabin and from ailerons to wing roots; all cable separations were consistent with overload. The right wing remained attached; the inboard section sustained thermal and impact damage. The outboard section was bent and twisted up about 45°, with the extreme outboard bent and mangled. The right flap was in the retracted position. The right engine with propeller separated. The left wing remained attached; about one-third inboard sustained thermal damage. The left engine separated from its mounts and lay perpendicular to the fuselage. Both fuel tanks were breached and destroyed by thermal activity.
Empennage examination found the rudder attached and displaced to full left. Rudder trim tab actuator was extended 3.78 inches (neutral). Left and right elevator trim tab actuators were extended 1.25 inches each (neutral). The tail cone separated.
Medical and Pathological Information
The San Diego County Medical Examiner conducted an autopsy on July 28, 2010, determining the cause of death as "Blunt force injuries." The FAA's Civil Aeromedical Institute performed toxicology tests; carbon monoxide (21%) and cyanide (0.3 ug/ml) were detected in blood. Tests were negative for ethanol and drugs.
Tests and Research
Both engines were examined on August 17, 2010, under NTSB supervision by a Teledyne Continental Motors representative. The examination revealed no preimpact mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.
On November 10, 2010, a Hartzell Propellers technician examined both propellers. The technician reported no evidence to suggest blade angle at impact; no indications that either propeller was feathered. Both propellers had similar damage, relatively mild, suggesting low power or no power at impact. Left propeller blades had clear indications of rotation; right propeller blades did not have clear rotational indications. The use of fiber washers between blade butts and hub arms was noted but not believed to impede normal operation. The technician concluded no discrepancies that would preclude normal operation; all damage was consistent with impact forces.