No fatalities

18 Sep 2010: BEECH 58 (N86BR) — ALBATROSS AIRCRAFT SALES INC — Rainelle, WV

Rainelle, WV, United States

On 18 Sep 2010, a BEECH 58 (registration N86BR) operated by ALBATROSS AIRCRAFT SALES INC was involved in an aviation accident near Rainelle, WV. No fatalities were reported. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The improper rigging of the fuel selector by maintenance personnel, which resulted in a total loss of engine power. This summary draws on records from NTSB; 12 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

SourcesNTSBPrimary reportUpdated 1778583330Data APIEditorial standards

A Beech 58 (N86BR) sustained substantial damage during a forced landing after total engine power loss near Rainelle, West Virginia. The pilot and four passengers received minor injuries. Investigation revealed a mis-rigged left fuel selector valve.

Accident Overview

On September 18, 2010, at 1715 eastern daylight time, a Beech 58, registration N86BR, was substantially damaged during a forced landing near Rainelle, West Virginia. The certificated commercial pilot and four passengers sustained minor injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The flight departed Morgantown Municipal Airport (MGW) at 1645 and was destined for Bluefield, West Virginia. The non-scheduled passenger flight operated under 14 CFR Part 135.

Sequence of Events

According to the pilot, while cruising at 8,000 feet mean sea level, an uncommanded right engine shutdown occurred. He attempted to move the left fuel selector to the crossfeed position to restart the right engine, but the knob would not turn clockwise. Shortly after, the left engine shut down. The pilot feathered both propellers and configured the airplane for best glide to reach the nearest airport. Repeated restart attempts during descent were unsuccessful. Due to the rate of descent, the pilot determined he could not reach an airport and executed a forced landing in the backyard of a private residence. The airplane slid approximately 60 feet before contacting the back side of a house.

On-Scene Examination

An FAA inspector examined the accident site. All major structural components were present. Flight control continuity was established to the ailerons; rudder and elevator control cables were broken with signs of overstress failure. The landing gear were extended and separated from the aircraft. Wing flaps were extended. Engine and propeller controls were jammed due to impact damage; continuity could not be established. The pilot reported no flight control or propeller anomalies before the accident.

Both three-bladed constant-speed propellers remained attached to their engines. The left propeller showed no evidence of rotation at impact and was in the feathered position. The right propeller showed no evidence of rotation under engine power and was not feathered. No flight control anomalies were noted.

Fuel System Findings

Fuel selectors indicated "On" for both tanks. The left fuel selector knob would not rotate clockwise to crossfeed. Disassembly revealed the left fuel selector valve was incorrectly rigged in the crossfeed position. When the knob was in the "On" position (indicating fuel from the left tank), fuel was actually drawn from the right tank. The right fuel selector knob showed no anomalies.

Aircraft maintenance records indicated the left fuel selector was removed, resealed, and reinstalled on September 8, 2010, and approved for return to service.

Fuel caps were found closed and locked. The right fuel tank contained no usable fuel; the tank was not breached and showed no evidence of leakage. The left main fuel tank was breached at the leading edge of the left wing, outboard of the engine, due to house contact. Fuel leakage of unknown quantity was observed on the ground near the impact point and under the left wing. Approximately 5 gallons of fuel were drained from the left tank by the FAA inspector. Left and right fuel sending units and cockpit indicators functioned correctly and indicated empty at the site; sight gauges also indicated empty to full appropriately.

Contributing factors

Causes

Maintenance personnelIncorrect service/maintenance

Other contributing factors

Inadequate inspection