History of Flight
On March 30, 2011, at 1746 eastern daylight time, a Beech 58, N569JL, operated by Jet Logistics, Inc., was substantially damaged when it impacted trees and a residence while conducting an instrument approach to Piedmont-Triad International Airport (GSO), Greensboro, North Carolina. The certificated airline transport pilot and passenger were fatally injured. Instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) prevailed, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the flight, which departed Wilmington International Airport (ILM), Wilmington, North Carolina, and was destined for Smith Reynolds Airport (INT), Winston Salem, North Carolina. The non-scheduled passenger flight was conducted under Part 135.
On the day preceding the accident, the pilot reported for duty at 1030 after several days off. She acted as second-in-command of a Beech 90 during a two-leg trip, reporting off duty at 1830. At 2053, she obtained a weather briefing for the following day's schedule. On the accident day, she queried weather between 0437 and 0443, obtained catering at 0534, and departed RDU for INT at 0644. She arrived at INT at 0739, departed for ILM at 0840, and arrived at ILM about 1000. Between 1454 and 1551, she submitted numerous weather queries for the return flight. At 1552, she contacted a fellow pilot for help finding a legal alternate, discussing GSO among others. At 1611, she advised departure from ILM to INT.
ATC radar data showed the pilot requested an IFR clearance about 1600, departed ILM about 1622, and reported a 600-foot ceiling during departure. She was cleared on course, contacted GSO approach at 1704, and upon learning INT ceilings were below 200 feet, requested holding. At 1708, she was cleared to hold at INGON intersection. At 1711, the controller advised weather at nearby airports with ceilings at least 300 feet. The pilot held at INGON starting at 1725. At 1734, she requested to proceed to GSO if weather was good. The controller cleared her, but at 1735 described an overcast ceiling of 100 feet at GSO. After a brief exchange, she agreed to attempt the approach. At 1740, she was vectored for the ILS runway 5L. She intercepted the localizer and was cleared for the approach. At 1743, she contacted GSO tower and was advised of RVR 4,000 feet and number two behind an Embraer 145. At 1744:33, the airplane began descending from 2,500 feet, crossing the final approach fix 200 feet below the intercept altitude. Over two minutes, it descended to 1,300 feet, remaining below the glideslope. At 1745:42, a low altitude alert was issued; the pilot responded, "we're goin' around." She acknowledged instructions to climb to 4,000 feet, but after reaching 1,600 feet at 1745:52, the airplane descended to 1,500 feet at 1745:56. No further radar targets were observed.
Personnel Information
The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with multi-engine land rating and a private pilot certificate with single-engine land rating. She obtained her private certificate in 1984, instrument rating in 2000, commercial certificate in 2001, and received SIC type ratings in LR-45 and BE-400 in 2007, and a PIC type rating in BE-400/MU-300 in 2008. She was hired by the operator in March 2010 with 2,590 total hours (770 PIC). She received training in the accident airplane and was found proficient as PIC on March 30, 2010. The operator provided 6 hours of flight training for her LR-JET SIC type rating, including precision, non-precision, circling, and missed approach procedures. She completed a required instrument proficiency check on October 26, 2010. At the time of the accident, she had 2,884 total hours (856 PIC), with 117 hours in the accident make/model (95 PIC). Since October, she logged 4 instrument approaches and 5 hours of instrument experience in the accident airplane, plus two ILS approaches earlier on the accident day.
Aircraft Information
The airplane was a 1975 Beech 58 with two 285-horsepower Teledyne Continental Motors IO-520 reciprocating engines. Its most recent annual inspection was November 8, 2010. It was equipped with a Garmin GNS 530W multi-function navigation and communication system featuring a non-certified terrain awareness system (not TAWS-certified). The system could issue a Premature Descent Alert (PDA) between 0.5 and 15 miles from the runway threshold. The airplane's radar height profile showed it never descended low enough to activate a PDA. The terrain system could be inhibited; no information on the pilot's use of the system or satellite weather data was available.
Meteorological Information
The 1745 GSO observation reported wind from 050° at 8 knots, visibility 1/4 statute mile in light drizzle and fog, overcast ceiling 100 feet, temperature 6°C, dew point 5°C, altimeter 29.84 inHg. The 1745 INT observation reported wind 050° at 5 knots, visibility 1 statute mile in mist, overcast ceiling 100 feet, temperature and dew point 6°C. The TAF for GSO at the time of the accident (amended at 1652) forecast low IMC with visibility 1/2 statute mile in light drizzle and fog, ceiling overcast at 100 feet, with temporary conditions of 2 miles visibility in mist and overcast 400 feet between 1700 and 2100.
Airport Information
Piedmont-Triad International Airport has two parallel runways. Runway 5L is 9,000 ft long by 150 ft wide, with an ILS capable of Category II approaches. The ILS approach to runway 5L has a glideslope intercept altitude of 2,500 ft msl at the final approach fix (CIVES), 4.7 nautical miles from the threshold. The decision altitude is 1,117 ft msl (200 ft agl) for Category I, and 113 ft agl for Category II with RVR 1,200 ft.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The initial impact point was about 1,780 ft from the final radar target, about 2 nautical miles southwest of the runway 5L threshold, displaced 800 ft left of the extended centerline. A 600-ft wreckage path oriented 45° magnetic extended through a wooded area. The airplane struck numerous trees up to 12 inches in diameter. Fragments of both wings, empennage, control surfaces, and landing gear were found along the path. The fuselage came to rest inside a residence and was largely consumed by post-impact fire. Flight control continuity could not be determined due to damage. The landing gear actuator indicated retracted position; one flap actuator indicated retracted flaps. Trim actuators showed various positions but were not considered reliable. Fuel selectors were in the "ON" position. Instruments recovered included an airspeed indicator showing approximately 110 knots. Both engines separated; examination revealed rotational signatures and normal operating signatures on spark plugs and fuel injectors.