No fatalities

27 May 2012: BEECH B36TC (N8234M) — Santa Ynez, CA

Santa Ynez, CA, United States

On 27 May 2012, a BEECH B36TC (registration N8234M) was involved in an aviation accident near Santa Ynez, CA. No fatalities were reported. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: A loss of engine power during initial climb due to fuel starvation. Contributing to the accident were the pilot’s inadequate preflight inspection, his failure to properly diagnose the loss of engine power, and his failure to follow the appropriate emergency… This summary draws on records from NTSB; 12 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

SourcesNTSBPrimary reportUpdated 1778583330Data APIEditorial standards

On May 27, 2012, a Beech B36TC (N8234M) experienced a total loss of engine power and made a gear-up landing in a field near Santa Ynez, California. The pilot was uninjured; the airplane sustained substantial damage.

History of Flight

On May 27, 2012, about 0810 Pacific daylight time, a Beech B36TC, N8234M, experienced a total loss of engine power and landed gear-up in a field near Santa Ynez, California. The pilot/owner was operating the airplane under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The private pilot was not injured, and the airplane sustained substantial damage to the lower fuselage structure during the landing. The cross-country personal flight departed Santa Barbara Municipal Airport, California, about 0750, with a planned destination of Mammoth Yosemite Airport, Mammoth Lakes, California. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a visual flight rules flight plan had been filed.

The pilot reported taking off from Santa Barbara and initiating a climb to the northwest. He was subsequently cleared by air traffic control to climb to 8,500 feet mean sea level. During the initial climb, he completed his cruise-climb checklist as the airplane reached 4,500 feet. As he continued climbing, he noted that the ground was obscured by clouds in the Santa Ynez area. About the time the airplane reached 8,500 feet, the engine lost all power. He immediately configured for best glide airspeed and turned west. He followed the emergency checklist from memory, then from the flight manual. He switched the fuel selector valve to the left tank and cycled the auxiliary fuel pump from LOW to HI multiple times. On the third attempt, he surmised he may have flooded the engine, turned off the auxiliary pump, and adjusted the mixture. Concerned about a hot start, he cycled the throttle. He then switched the fuel selector back to the right tank and repeated the checklist. With no response, he turned on the auxiliary pump, applied forward throttle and rich mixture; the engine restarted briefly then lost power. He descended below the broken cloud layer and performed a forced landing into a plowed field.

Personnel Information

A review of Federal Aviation Administration airman records revealed that the pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, issued 19 days before the accident. He reported a total flight experience of 131.7 hours, with 36.7 in the accident make and model. His total flight time as pilot-in-command was 24.8 hours, 14.4 of which were in the accident airplane. He was issued his high performance and complex airplane endorsements on May 21.

Aircraft Information

The single-engine airplane was manufactured in 1991 and powered by a Teledyne Continental Motors Inc. model TSIO-520-UB turbocharged, fuel-injected engine. The fuel system consisted of two interconnected bladder-type fuel cells per wing, each located in the leading edge. Each wing contained a total of 54 gallons, with a usable supply of 51 gallons. The tanks were filled via a single filler neck on the outboard fuel cell. The thickness and interconnected design prevented fuel quantity determination by dipping. Each wing had a fuel quantity sight gauge. According to the flight manual, the gauge is for partial filling or off-loading and is to be used only when reading within the calibrated area of 25 to 35 gallons. The gauge was radial with a float-operated needle; the upper segment showed 25, 30, and 35 gallons, with the lower uncalibrated segment painted black. Total fuel quantity per wing was measured by two float-operated electrical fuel sensors in series with a cabin indicator.

Tests and Research

The airplane was examined by the NTSB investigator-in-charge at a repair facility in Chino, California. None of the fuel cells were breached. Recovery personnel reported about 42 gallons of fuel recovered from the left tank and about 1/4 gallon from the right tank. The external surfaces had no fuel stains or leak indications. Examination revealed about 2 teaspoons of fuel in the fuselage drain and about 6 drops in the line from the drain to the auxiliary fuel pump. No fuel was present from the pump to the fuel injection servo. Fuel lines from both tanks to the auxiliary pump were clear. The fuel selector valve handle rotated with well-defined detents. The fuselage drain screen was clean. The right wing fuel cap was intact and locked.

Fueling history: On May 23, the pilot asked for 15 gallons per tank. Records showed the left tank received 18.8 gallons, and none was added to the right. A receipt note stated, "Right wing was already past (30) only fueled left wing." On May 24, after a flight, the pilot's wife checked sight gauges (right 32, left 25) and requested 12.5 gallons per tank. Receipts showed left received 25 gallons, right none. The pilot was unaware until reviewing receipts after the accident. On the accident day, the pilot preflighted and observed via sight gauges: right about 32 gallons, left about 45 (estimated from uncalibrated area). He asked an FBO ramp agent to confirm; the agent agreed. Cabin gauges indicated left 3/4, right just over 1/4. He estimated this as about 27 gallons.

Calibration tests: The right wing fuel indication system was tested per Beech maintenance manual. The tank was filled and incrementally emptied; sensor resistance was within tolerance, and gauges indicated correctly. The right tank sensors were sent to Rochester Gauges; they were within specifications with no malfunctions. The right wing sight gauge indicated appropriate values within its calibrated range; when tank was at 1/4 capacity or less, the needle pointed to the uncalibrated segment but the tail pointed to about 32 gallons.

Engine examination: The engine appeared undamaged, with about 11 quarts of dark oil. Throttle and mixture cables were continuous. Top spark plugs exhibited light grey coloring and normal wear. Cylinder chambers examined via borescope showed intact valve heads and piston crowns with grey deposits, no catastrophic damage. A new propeller was mounted, and a fuel canister with 100LL was connected to the right wing supply line. The engine was primed, started immediately, ran at idle for 1 minute, then a magneto check showed normal rpm drop. Throttle and propeller were advanced to 2,600 rpm and 36 inches manifold pressure for 30 seconds; the engine responded smoothly. The auxiliary fuel pump was off during the test.

Additional Information

The Beech B36TC emergency procedures checklist warned: "The only purpose for the Aux Fuel Pump HI position are: 1) To prime the engine prior to starting. 2) To provide an alternate source of fuel pressure if the engine-driven fuel pump fails. DO NOT USE THIS POSITION FOR ANY OTHER REASON. If HI position is selected when the engine-driven pump is operating, the engine will run rich and may quit depending on the throttle setting, temperature and altitude." For loss of engine power due to fuel depletion, the checklist stated: "FUEL DEPLETION Characterized by an empty indication on the Fuel Quantity Gauge and zero fuel flow: 1. Fuel Selector Valve.......SELECT OTHER TANK 2. Aux Fuel Pump...........................LOW" The Pilots Operating Handbook limitations stated that takeoff is not permitted when fuel quantity gauges indicate a quantity in the yellow arc (1/4 tank or less) or with less than 13 gallons in each tank.

Contributing factors

Causes

Fluid level

Other contributing factors

PilotIncorrect use/operation