1 fatality

14 Jun 2015: GRUMMAN AMERICAN AVN. CORP. AA-5 (N6552L) — Fredericksburg, TX

Fredericksburg, TX, United States

On 14 Jun 2015, a GRUMMAN AMERICAN AVN. CORP. AA-5 (registration N6552L) was involved in an aviation accident near Fredericksburg, TX. One person was killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The pilot's failure to maintain adequate airspeed following a partial loss of engine power during initial climb, which resulted in the airplane exceeding its critical angle of attack and experiencing an aerodynamic stall. This summary draws on records from NTSB; 12 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

SourcesNTSBPrimary reportUpdated 1778583330Data APIEditorial standards

A Grumman AA-5 (N6552L) was substantially damaged after impacting terrain shortly after takeoff from Gillespie County Airport. The pilot was seriously injured; his passenger was fatally injured.

History of Flight

On June 14, 2015, at approximately 1127 central daylight time, a Grumman American Aviation Corporation AA-5 single-engine airplane, registration N6552L, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain shortly after takeoff from Gillespie County Airport (T82) in Fredericksburg, Texas. The private pilot sustained serious injuries, and his passenger was fatally injured. The airplane was registered to a private individual and operated by the pilot under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 without a flight plan. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local flight, which was originating at the time of the accident.

On the morning of the accident, the pilot and his aviation mechanic were at the airport to complete an annual inspection of the airplane. Although the pilot was an automotive mechanic, he reported that he did not participate significantly in the inspection. The mechanic removed several inspection panels to observe the flight control system; verified operation of an avionic device installed in the rear fuselage; completed a compression check of each engine cylinder; removed, inspected, and replaced some spark plugs; and drained and replaced the engine oil. The pilot recalled that the mechanic collected a fuel sample from at least one drain on the left wing. The airplane had four fuel drains (two per wing); however, the pilot could not recall if a sample was obtained from all four drains during the annual inspection, nor if the mechanic examined the auxiliary electrical fuel pump, drained the pump reservoir, or inspected the pump filter screen. The annual inspection took a couple of hours to complete.

After the inspection, the pilot and mechanic decided to conduct a local flight in the airport traffic pattern. The pilot completed a normal preflight inspection, including obtaining fuel samples from all four drains. He did not see any water or particulate contamination. The left wing tank was nearly full (about 19 gallons), and the right wing tank contained 2 to 4 gallons. No fuel was added before the flight. The pilot observed no anomalies during the preflight. He completed an engine runup before taxiing to runway 14, during which the engine developed maximum static rpm, both magnetos functioned correctly, and fuel and oil pressures and oil temperature were normal.

The pilot did not recall all portions of the accident flight. He remembered that the engine lost power shortly after takeoff from runway 14, and he had a brief memory of the airplane pointing nose-down toward the ground. He did not recall any corrective actions following the loss of engine power or the impact. His next full memory was waking at the hospital. At the hospital, he apparently told his wife that the engine lost power shortly after takeoff and that he had pushed the nose down to regain airspeed. There were no witnesses. The wreckage was located by the property owner about 1245.

Personnel Information

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the 51-year-old pilot held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on May 22, 2014, with limitations prohibiting night flying and color signal control due to color blindness. No previous accidents, incidents, or enforcement proceedings were found in FAA records.

The pilot's flight experience was established using his pilot logbook. The final logbook entry was dated November 15, 2014, at which time he had accumulated 214.1 hours total flight time, all in single-engine airplanes. He had 34.6 hours in the accident airplane make/model. He flew 33.4 hours in the 12 months before the accident but none in the 6 months before the accident. His last flight review was completed on June 13, 2014, in the accident airplane.

Aircraft Information

The airplane was a 1974 Grumman American Aviation Corporation AA-5, Traveler, serial number AA5-0652, a single-engine, low-wing monoplane of conventional aluminum construction. It was powered by a 150-horsepower Lycoming O-320-E2G reciprocating engine and a fixed-pitch McCauley propeller. The airplane had fixed tricycle landing gear and could seat the pilot and three passengers. Maximum allowable takeoff weight was 2,200 pounds. The FAA issued a standard category airworthiness certificate on October 8, 1974.

The recording tachometer indicated 7,846.59 hours at the accident site; however, the original tachometer had been replaced, and the current tachometer indicated 814 hours more than actual time. Postaccident calculations showed total airframe and engine time of 7,032.59 hours. The engine had accumulated 492.59 hours since last major overhaul on August 2, 2000. The last documented annual inspection was May 10, 2014, at 7,010 total airframe hours. The pilot reported an annual inspection completed immediately before the accident flight, but the maintenance logbooks did not contain an entry for that inspection or any associated work. No history of unresolved airworthiness issues was found.

The fuel system consisted of two fuel tanks outboard of each wing root fairing, two smaller sump tanks within each wing root fairing, an engine-driven mechanical fuel pump, an auxiliary electric fuel pump, a selector valve, and fuel gauges. Each tank had a total capacity of 19 gallons, with ½ gallon unusable. Fuel from the tanks flowed to the sumps before being directed to the selector valve and pumps. The mechanical pump transferred fuel to the carburetor during normal operations. The auxiliary electric pump supplemented the mechanical pump during low altitude operations. The auxiliary pump had a screen filter that could be removed for inspection and cleaning. The airplane was not equipped with a gascolator or engine compartment fuel drain because the fuel system sloped downward toward the sumps. The system had four drains: one in each fuel tank and one in each sump tank. According to the Grumman AA5 Owner's Manual, a fuel sample should be collected from all four drains during preflight. According to the Maintenance Manual, during an annual inspection, the auxiliary electric fuel pump should be disassembled and its filter inspected/cleaned, the fuel tanks and sumps inspected, and the carburetor bowl drained.

Meteorological Information

At 1115, the T82 automated surface observing system reported wind from 170° at 7 knots; broken ceilings at 2,100 feet and 2,700 feet above ground level; 10 miles surface visibility; temperature 26°C; dew point 21°C; and an altimeter setting of 29.93 inches of mercury.

Wreckage and Impact Information

The wreckage was located in an open pasture about ¼ mile from the departure threshold of runway 14, along its extended centerline. The airplane was oriented on a 350° magnetic heading and had impacted in a nose-down attitude with no appreciable wreckage propagation. The main wreckage included the entire airframe, all structural components, and flight control surfaces. Flight control continuity was established from the cockpit controls to the rudder and elevator. Right aileron continuity was confirmed; the left aileron torque tube separated consistent with impact damage. Wing flaps appeared fully retracted. The fuel system was compromised. A first responder reported that the cockpit fuel selector was initially found in the RIGHT position and was turned to OFF during rescue efforts. Fluid was present in both supply lines to the fuel selector; the outflow line was fragmented. Fluid from the right tank supply line was consistent with 100 low-lead aviation fuel, with no water or particulate contamination. Fluid from the left tank supply line contained a mixture of fuel and water. The auxiliary electric fuel pump contained a mixture of fuel and water; its filter screen was corroded and partially obstructed by particulate contamination.

The engine remained partially attached to the firewall by mounts and control cables. Mechanical continuity was confirmed from engine components to cockpit controls. Internal engine and valve train continuity was confirmed as the crankshaft was rotated; compression and suction were noted on all cylinders. Spark plugs exhibited features consistent with normal operation. Both magnetos provided spark on all leads. No obstructions were found between the air filter housing and the carburetor. The carburetor fuel bowl contained a trace amount of brown/tan fluid that smelled like aviation fuel and tested positive for water. Several water droplets drained from the number 2 cylinder when its lower spark plug was removed. The propeller remained attached, with blades showing aft bending, chordwise scratches, and polishing. Postaccident engine examination revealed no evidence of a mechanical failure that would have precluded normal operation.

Two handheld GPS devices were recovered. A Garmin GPSMap 396 was functional and recorded external power interruptions at 1119:38 and 1127:12, but was not configured to record historical position/track data. A second Garmin GPSMap 296 was damaged beyond repair and not examined further.

Additional Information

National Transportation Safety Board Safety Alert No. SA-019 states that many aerodynamic stalls occur in visual meteorological conditions when a pilot becomes distracted, such as while maneuvering in the traffic pattern, during an emergency, or when fixating on ground objects, and that reducing angle-of-attack by lowering the nose at the first stall indication is the most important immediate response for stall avoidance and recovery.

Contributing factors

PilotAirspeed — Not attained/maintainedAngle of attack — Not attained/maintainedMaintenance personnelInadequate inspectionFluid condition