History of Flight
On August 27, 2015, at approximately 0200 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-44-180, registration N553MD, was destroyed by impact with trees and terrain during an instrument approach procedure to Houlton International Airport (HUL), Houlton, Maine. The pilot, an airline transport pilot, was fatally injured. The flight had departed Goose Bay Airport (CYYR), Goose Bay, Labrador, Canada, about 2115 the previous evening. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The flight was conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.
The accident flight was the third leg of a ferry flight that originated from Keflavik International Airport (BIKF), Keflavik, Iceland, on August 26, 2015, about 0428. The airplane was scheduled to be delivered to a customer in Merritt Island, Florida.
As the airplane approached HUL, the pilot contacted Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center and requested vectors to AHOLA, the final approach fix for the RNAV (GPS) Runway 5 approach. The controller explained that the pilot could not proceed directly to the final approach fix but must choose between two initial approach fixes: WATAN or CIYEP. The airplane was instructed to maintain 3,500 feet mean sea level (msl) until reaching CIYEP and was cleared for the approach. The airplane descended to about 3,000 feet msl, crossed CIYEP, reversed course, and tracked approximately along the final approach course of 049 degrees. The intermediate minimum descent altitude prior to CIYEP was 3,000 feet msl; however, the airplane passed CIYEP at about 2,500 feet msl. The airplane continued descending inbound, and the final radar target was at 1,500 feet msl about 2.5 nautical miles from the runway.
Data from a Garmin GPSMAP 696 receiver showed a descending, S-shaped track along the final approach course. The last data point was at 869 feet msl, 103 knots groundspeed, on the right side of the published approach course, near the accident site.
United States Customs and Border Protection agents awaiting the airplane's arrival heard it approach. One agent reported that the engine noise was smooth and continuous until impact sounds were heard. He stated that the runway lights were never illuminated and that it was foggy, misty, with poor visibility. According to the agent, "It was so foggy you couldn't see 200 feet. It was wicked low."
Personnel Information
According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine and multiengine land. His most recent FAA first-class medical certificate was issued on April 15, 2014. On that date, he reported 1,460 total hours of flight experience. On an insurance application dated August 8, 2015, he declared 3,000 total hours, of which 1,400 were in multiengine airplanes. He reported 45 total hours in the prior year and 15 hours in the previous 90 days.
Aircraft Information
The four-seat, twin-engine, low-wing, retractable-gear airplane was manufactured in 1980 and equipped with two Lycoming 180-horsepower reciprocating engines and Hartzell controllable-pitch propellers. The maintenance records were not recovered. The hobbs meter indicated 4,766.6 total aircraft hours at the accident site.
Meteorological Information
At 0153, recorded weather at HUL included wind from 230 degrees at 3 knots, 10 statute miles visibility, and an overcast ceiling at 400 feet. Temperature was 18°C, dew point 17°C, altimeter 29.89 inches of mercury. At 0217, visibility decreased to 1-3/4 miles in fog, and the ceiling lowered to 300 feet overcast.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The accident site was in a wooded, rural area at about 570 feet elevation. The wreckage path was approximately 360 feet long on a magnetic heading of about 014 degrees. The airplane struck trees and terrain, broke into several pieces, and came to rest submerged in a pond. Pieces of angularly-cut wood consistent with propeller contact were found along the path.
Prior to investigators' arrival, the wreckage was recovered by local law enforcement and first responders and moved to HUL. During recovery, 15 gallons of fuel were recovered.
The wreckage was examined in a hangar on August 29, 2015. All major components were accounted for except the left flap, whose fractured hinge points remained attached. The fracture surfaces were consistent with overload.
Examination showed the engines were separated from their nacelles, but each three-bladed propeller remained attached. Four of six blades were fractured from their hubs, with twisting, bending, leading edge gouging, and chordwise scratching. One blade tip was fractured and not recovered; the fracture surface was consistent with overload.
The nose and right main landing gear were separated. The right main landing gear and left and nose gear actuators were in the down position.
The left wing was separated at its root, and the right wing separated outboard of the engine nacelle. Each wing had concave dents perpendicular to the spar, consistent with fractured tree trunks. Control cable continuity was established from the cockpit flight controls through several breaks to the flight control surfaces; breaks were consistent with overload or cutting by first responders.
In the cockpit, both fuel selectors were in the on position, and the flap handle was at 40 degrees.
The left engine had impact damage to the No. 1 intake pushrod tube. The crankshaft was rotated by hand; continuity was established through the powertrain, valvetrain, and accessory section. The dual magneto remained attached and contained pond water; two towers sparked when rotated. The carburetor was intact with fuel in the float bowl.
The right engine had impact damage to the No. 4 intake and exhaust pushrod tubes. The crankshaft was rotated via the vacuum pump drive pad; continuity was established. The dual magneto was impact-damaged and could not be rotated. The carburetor was impact-damaged and separated from the engine.
Additional Information
Fatigue considerations: The pilot departed BIKF and arrived in Greenland 5.3 hours later, where he remained on the ground for 1.7 hours before departing for Newfoundland. Operational duties would have limited restorative sleep. He then departed Greenland and arrived in Newfoundland 5.8 hours later, where he was on the ground for 3.8 hours; the investigation could not determine his activity during that time. Total duty time from departure until the accident was 21.6 hours, including 16.6 hours of flight time.
FAA Advisory Circular 120-100 describes concepts of cognitive fatigue, conditions contributing to it, and mitigation. It states that fatigue from extended work hours, time of day, and shift work reduces vigilance and reaction time and increases risks of poor decisions, human error, incidents, and accidents.
Medical and Pathological Information
An autopsy was performed by the Office of Chief Medical Examiner, Augusta, Maine. Toxicological testing by the FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory was negative for drugs and ethanol.