Incident Overview
On December 14, 2016, about 1743 Pacific standard time, a runway incursion occurred at San Francisco International Airport (SFO) when SkyWest Airlines flight 5086, a CL-600-2B19, crossed the runway hold short line for runway 28L at the taxiway Juliet (J) intersection while another air carrier flight, a Boeing 737, was on takeoff roll. No injuries were reported to crew or passengers of either flight. The SkyWest flight was operating under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 from SFO to Ontario International Airport. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time.
According to the pilots, the incident flight was an Initial Operating Experience (IOE) flight for the first officer. Prior to pushback, the captain, who was to be the pilot flying, provided a briefing using the SkyWest acronym WANT, which covered the takeoff briefing, potential taxi route, hot spots, weather, and NOTAMs. After pushback, the ground controller initially issued taxi instructions via Alpha, Foxtrot, crossing runways 1L and 1R to runway 28L, but later modified them to Alpha, Delta, Bravo, Foxtrot to runway 28L. The crew briefed the modified clearance and proceeded.
While taxiing on Bravo, the first officer announced approaching taxiway Foxtrot. The captain, who had taxied via the modified route many times, briefed a slight right turn onto Foxtrot but erroneously turned left onto taxiway Juliet. He estimated going about 5 feet over the hold short line, stopped because something did not feel right, observed a white light off the right side, and then heard the controller say "stop." After the departing aircraft became airborne, the ground controller gave modified taxi instructions to runway 28L, and the flight departed for its destination. The crew of the departing aircraft did not observe the incursion.
Flight Crew Information
The captain, aged 47, held an Airline Transport Pilot certificate with type rating on the CL-65 and a first-class medical certificate dated November 10, 2016, with a requirement to wear corrective lenses. He was based at Los Angeles International Airport, served as assistant chief pilot and line check airman, and had been employed at SkyWest Airlines for about 17 years. He estimated that approximately 10 percent of his line check airman flights were into and out of SFO.
The first officer, aged 27, held an Airline Transport Pilot certificate with type rating on the CL-65 and a first-class medical certificate dated May 16, 2016, with a limitation to wear corrective lenses. He was based at Fresno Yosemite International Airport.
Meteorological Conditions
The aviation routine weather report (METAR) for SFO, issued prior to the incident, indicated wind from 170 degrees at 9 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, few clouds at 2,100 feet, ceiling broken at 2,700 feet, overcast at 4,600 feet, temperature 14°C, dew point 12°C, and altimeter 29.99 inches of mercury. Official sunset was at 1652, end of civil twilight at 1721, moonrise at 1809, with a waning gibbous moon at 99% illumination.
Air Traffic Control Information
Radar data recorded that the departing Boeing 737 passed approximately 188 feet laterally in front of the CRJ.
Additional Information
SFO had three charted hot spots on the airport diagram (HS 1, HS 2, HS 3). The incursion occurred in the area designated HS 1, which included the textual description: "Pilots instructed to follow Twy B south sometimes continue onto Twy J or Twy F by mistake."
SkyWest Airlines procedures included the Departure WANT Briefing: Weather, Airport/Area departure, NOTAMs, and Threats. Runway Status Lights (RWSL) training had been conducted in 2005 and 2011; the captain received this training. Taxiway Juliet was not equipped with Runway Entrance Lights, as it was a high-speed exit taxiway designed for exiting the runway only. It had a "Do Not Enter" sign and painted red box markings with white numbers at the hold short line.
FAA Advisory Circular 150/5300-13A defines high-speed exit taxiways and recommends the "three-node concept" to keep intersections simple, noting that complex intersections increase the possibility of pilot error. The advisory circular includes illustrations of taxiway designs not recommended, such as intersections exceeding three choices.