History of Flight
On September 27, 2018, about 1346 eastern daylight time, a Dassault Falcon 50, registration N114TD, was substantially damaged after it departed the runway at Greenville Downtown Airport (GMU), Greenville, South Carolina. The two occupants in the cockpit received fatal injuries, and the two passengers sustained serious injuries. The flight was conducted under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 as an on-demand air taxi operation. The airplane had departed St. Pete-Clearwater International Airport (PIE), Clearwater, Florida, at 1230.
According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), during the approach to GMU, the flight crew had difficulty understanding the navigation fixes provided by air traffic control. The CVR also indicated that the crew did not use any prelanding checklist or discuss that no braking was available with the brake system in the "#1-ON" position, a condition present during the preceding four flights when the pilot acted as copilot. At 1345:34, the CVR recorded the sound of touchdown. At 1345:38, the pilot stated that the brakes were not operating, and both pilots commented on the lack of brakes before the airplane went over an embankment and came to a stop.
Air traffic controllers reported that the airplane touched down normally at a standard touchdown point. They observed the thrust reverser deploy and saw the airplane continue down the runway without decelerating. Airport security video captured the touchdown, showing the thrust reverser and airbrakes deployed, and the airplane proceeding to the end of the runway before going over the embankment.
Personnel Information
The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with a type rating for the Dassault Falcon 50, limited to second-in-command privileges, and also held type ratings for Learjet and Westwind business jets. The copilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for single- and multiengine land airplanes but no type ratings or instrument rating.
Aircraft Information
The Dassault Falcon 50 is a midsize long-range business jet with three rear-mounted engines. The No. 2 engine featured a thrust reverser. The airplane had two independent hydraulic systems; System 1 supplied normal braking (with antiskid), and System 2 supplied emergency braking and parking brake. Selection was via a switch labeled "BRAKE" with positions "#1-ON" (normal) and "2-OFF" (emergency).
Maintenance records showed a 12-month avionics check completed on August 13, 2018, at 14,003 total hours and 7,541 cycles. The airplane had been stored for about 4 years, and a work order in June 2018 aimed to return it to service, including multiple inspections and addressing 103 discrepancies; the work order was about 60% complete, with no log entries indicating the airplane was airworthy. The landing gear had not been overhauled since July 23, 2002; the overhaul interval was 12 years (plus 5 months) or 6,000 landings, and was overdue since December 23, 2014.
Wreckage and Impact Information
Wreckage and tire tracks showed the airplane departed the left edge of the runway near the departure end, crossed a grassy area, descended a 50-foot embankment, and came to rest on the airport perimeter road about 425 ft from the runway, oriented on a heading of about 160°. There was no fire, but fuel leaked from the wings. The nose landing gear separated and was found midway down the embankment. The fuselage separated immediately aft of the cockpit. Slats and flaps were extended, both airbrakes (spoilers) were extended, and both main landing gear were fractured at the trunnion and displaced aft into the flaps.
Examination of braking system components revealed the parking brake handle stowed and the brake switch in the "#1-ON" position. A sticker near the switch read "ATA# 32-5 'INOP' DATE: 9/27/18" (ATA 32-5 concerns the antiskid system). Wheel speed transducers showed field splices on the right-side inboard and outboard units, but none on the left-side units. Computed tomography found a broken solder joint on the left-side inboard transducer and a bent pin connection on the right-side inboard transducer. Functional tests revealed failure of the left-side inboard wheel speed transducer; the other three passed. Visual inspection of right-side wiring found the right outboard transducer wires reversed.
Medical and Pathological Information
Autopsies determined the cause of death for both pilots as multiple blunt force injuries. Toxicology testing of the pilot was negative for carbon monoxide, ethanol, and drugs; testing of the copilot was negative for carbon monoxide and ethanol, but ketamine (used during attempted resuscitation) was detected.
Additional Information
A pilot who flew the accident airplane on four flights before the accident (with the accident pilot as copilot) reported that, with the brake switch in "#1-ON," braking was normal at low speeds (15-20 knots) but unavailable at higher speeds; braking was restored in the "#2-OFF" position. This pilot reported the brake issue to the director of maintenance after the first two flights in late August and early September 2018, believing the antiskid system was the source. No maintenance records documented the brake issue or any corrective actions. The flight manual abnormal procedures specified that a normal brake failure or inoperative antiskid required moving the brake switch to "#2 / OFF"; if both normal and emergency braking were inoperative, the thrust reverser and parking brake could be used.
Probable Cause
No probable cause was stated in the source material.