History of Flight
On February 6, 2020, about 1110 Alaska standard time, a Piper PA-32R-300 airplane, registration N7632C, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Tuntutuliak, Alaska. The commercial pilot and four passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was operated by Paklook Air Inc., doing business as Yute Commuter Service, as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 scheduled passenger flight.
The flight originated from Bethel Airport (PABE), Bethel, Alaska, about 1040, and was destined for Kipnuk Airport (PAKI), Kipnuk, Alaska, a distance of about 82 nautical miles. According to the company flight following log, the pilot reported that he was outbound at 1034. A pilot from another company stated that the accident airplane departed right before his airplane under a special visual flight rules (VFR) departure clearance and that the cloud ceiling at the time was overcast at 600 ft above ground level (agl).
According to the company's flight-following notes, the village agent from PAKI called the company flight follower at 1140 and reported that the airplane was overdue. The company president, who was exercising operational control over flights at the time of the accident, initiated overdue airplane procedures. About 1315, the company dispatched two airplanes to search for the missing airplane. A crew located the wreckage along the route from PABE to PAKI.
There was no radar coverage in the area of the accident site, and the airplane was not equipped with any GPS devices that recorded nonvolatile memory; therefore, flight track information for the accident flight was not available.
Personnel Information
According to the operator, the pilot had a total of 645 hours of flight experience, of which 34 hours was in the accident airplane make and model. The pilot began initial training with Paklook Air on January 7, 2020, completed a pilot competency check ride on January 28, and completed initial operating experience requirements on January 30. The accident flight was his fourth line flight.
Meteorological Information
The 1043 weather observation at PABE included 1 ¼ miles visibility, a runway 19R visual range of 2,200 ft to better than 6,000 ft, unknown precipitation and mist, and an overcast ceiling at 600 ft agl. The 1105 observation, closest to the accident time at 1110, indicated 3 miles visibility, mist, and an overcast ceiling at 500 ft agl. Between the departure time and the accident time, instrument flight rules or low instrument flight rules conditions prevailed at PABE.
The destination airport, PAKI, was located about 39 miles southwest of the accident site. The 1056 weather observation included wind from 020° at 17 knots; 9 statute miles visibility in light snow; overcast clouds at 600 ft agl; temperature -8°F; dew point -11°F; and an altimeter setting of 29.70 inches of mercury.
In the hour after the accident, both the departure and intended destination airports reported low instrument flight conditions, with visibility as low as ½ statute mile in light snow, mist, and freezing fog; and cloud ceilings as low as 400 ft agl.
An upper air sounding indicated a stable atmosphere with cloud bases around 700 ft agl. A frontal inversion was collocated between the lifted condensation level around 700 ft agl and 3,000 ft. The wind profile suggested the potential for low-level turbulence based on the low-level wind maximum and the strong vertical shear near the inversion. The RAOB algorithm indicated a 77% probability of moderate to severe turbulence at 700 ft due to the strong vertical wind shear. The table also indicated that light to moderate rime icing conditions were likely in clouds and in precipitation.
The area forecast for the region included an AIRMET for IFR conditions with occasional visibility below 3 miles in light snow and mist, and an AIRMET for mountain obscuration conditions in clouds and precipitation, with conditions expected to improve with time.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The wreckage was highly fragmented and extended about 390 ft along a west-southwesterly heading on level, snow-covered tundra at a GPS elevation of 37 ft. All major components of the airplane were located at the scene. The wings were separated from the fuselage, with extensive damage to the right wing, which was in three sections. The main wreckage was located at the west end of the debris pattern and comprised the upright fuselage, empennage, and engine sections. The engine and forward fuselage were displaced 80° to the right with extensive fore-to-aft crush damage.
The airplane was recovered from the site and examined at a secure facility. Control cable continuity was established from the cockpit controls through impact and overload separations to the control surfaces.
The engine displayed significant impact damage but remained attached to the crushed engine mount. Additional impact damage was observed to the oil sump and the No. 2 cylinder head. The fuel servo was impact separated from the engine. The dual magneto, vacuum pump, and propeller governor remained mounted to their respective mounting pads and appeared undamaged.
An Electronics International CGR-30P engine monitor was recovered and sent to the NTSB Recorders Laboratory for download. Review of the data for the accident flight revealed nominal engine operation with no evidence of any mechanical malfunctions or anomalies. Engine rpm, manifold pressure, and fuel flow values for the last approximate 20 minutes of recorded data were all consistent with cruise flight.
Additional Information
The FAA pamphlet on flying in flat light and whiteout conditions describes flat light as an optical illusion that causes pilots to lose depth-of-field and contrast, often accompanied by overcast skies. Whiteout is defined as a uniform white glow with no shadows, horizon, or clouds, leading to complete loss of visual references.
Organizational and Management Information
The operator’s general manager stated that newly-hired pilots were usually subject to limitations set by the director of operations or chief pilot, but there was no procedure for recording or communicating these limitations to dispatchers. He noted that on the morning of the accident, forecast conditions were marginal VFR or VFR throughout the area. The company conducted only VFR flights with minimums of 500-ft ceiling and 2 miles visibility, but the manager considered 1,000-ft ceiling and 5 miles visibility more appropriate for new pilots.
The director of operations stated that the accident pilot was not subject to any limitations at the time of the accident. No risk assessment form was found associated with the accident flight. The flight follower who dispatched the accident flight did not recall whether the pilot completed a risk assessment form, nor could he recall the weather conditions at departure or along the route.
According to the company’s General Operations Manual, the director of operations was responsible for operational control and could delegate tasks. The pilot-in-command was required to obtain weather information and complete a flight risk assessment before departure.