History of Flight
On January 4, 2021, about 0933 central standard time, a Hawker Beechcraft G58 airplane, N325GC, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Credit, Arkansas. The private pilot and passenger sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 business flight.
According to flight track data, the airplane departed from JBR at 0924. After departure, the airplane flew southwest, climbed to about 2,300 ft above mean sea level, and started to descend. The flight continued to track southwest until 0932, when it turned right to the northwest. The flight track data was lost about 0933, which coincided with the accident site location.
A witness who departed behind the airplane reported that everything seemed normal with the airplane during its runup and departure. Several witnesses reported seeing and hearing the airplane shortly before the accident. One witness, about 1 mile from the airport, reported the airplane was flying in a southwesterly direction at an altitude of 500 to 800 ft above ground level. This witness reported the engines did not “sound good” and were making a “popping” noise as if they were not firing on all cylinders. A third witness reported seeing the airplane flying parallel to high-tension powerlines at an altitude of an aerial application airplane. This witness reported it sounded like one engine was operating normally and the other was “sputtering,” before both engines quit.
The airplane impacted a flat muddy rice field about 16 miles southwest of JBR. The airplane was destroyed from a postimpact fire.
Personnel Information
The pilot’s flight logbooks were not available for review during the investigation. According to the autopsy issued by the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory, the cause of death was multiple blunt force injuries, and the manner of death was accident. No significant natural disease was identified.
Toxicology tests performed by the Federal Aviation Administration Forensic Sciences Laboratory identified ethanol at a variety of levels in blood samples, but none in liver. N-propanol was also identified in the blood samples. In addition, butalbital was identified at 21,493 ng/mL in blood and 11,617 ng/g in liver. Temazepam (72 ng/ml) and its psychoactive metabolite oxazepam (12 ng/ml) were identified in blood and in liver. All of these are considered potentially impairing. Benzoylecgonine, an inactive metabolite of cocaine, and acetaminophen were also identified in blood and in liver.
Aircraft Information
According to the pilot’s father, the airplane was purchased in July 2020. It was equipped with a Garmin G1000 all-glass avionics suite, a Garmin GFC 700 autopilot system, onboard weather (satellite weather and a weather radar), a stall warning system, and a terrain avoidance and warning system (class B). An examination of the airplane’s maintenance records revealed no evidence of outstanding mechanical discrepancies with the airframe, the propellers, or the engines.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The airplane impacted terrain in an approximate 45°, nose-low, right wing-low attitude south of transmission lines on a 235° heading. Wire strike signatures were observed on the lower side of the left horizontal stabilizer. The left elevator balance weight was found about 200 ft from the wreckage with wire striations. All the major structural components were found at the accident site. Most of the airframe was consumed by a postimpact fire. Flight control cable continuity was confirmed from each flight control to the center section of the fuselage. Continuity to the cockpit could not be established due to the extent of thermal damage sustained. The flap position was undetermined due to the thermal and impact damage. Most of the fuel system was destroyed due to thermal damage and no fuel samples were available. The fuel selectors were disassembled, and each valve contained light debris, but did not appear to be obstructed. Each selector valve was selected to its respective engine.
The left propeller was separated from the engine at the crankshaft propeller flange. Blade A was separated at the root of the blade approximately 6 inches outboard of the hub. The features on the blade A fracture surface were consistent with fracture of the propeller in bending overstress and the fracture direction was consistent with bending aftward. The pin on the inboard face exhibited features consistent with having fractured from shear overstress. Blade B and C were straight and unremarkable. The left propeller was against the start lock, at approximately 18° of pitch, at impact.
The right propeller remained attached to the engine. Blade A was curved opposite the direction of rotation and the leading edge was unremarkable. Blade B was bent aft midspan and there was an area of leading-edge deformation approximately 4 inches in length near the tip that had signatures like wire striations. Blade C exhibited “S” bending midspan to the tip and the leading edge of the blade was unremarkable.
An examination of the engines revealed all the fuel lines were thermally damaged. No residual fuel was found in the engines. The left and right fuel servos were disassembled. The left screen was found about halfway obstructed and contaminated with an unknown black debris. The right screen was found to be clear of debris. Postaccident testing of the left screen debris revealed similarities to several fluorocarbon materials/polymers including polytetrafluorethylene, which is a common polymer used in aircraft fuel system components, particularly with hoses.
Additional Information
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) pamphlet Flying Light Twins Safely FAA-P-8740-66 states in part: The major difference between flying a light twin and a single-engine airplane is knowing how to manage the flight if one engine loses power. Safe flight with one engine inoperative (OEI) requires an understanding of the basic aerodynamics involved as well as proficiency in single-engine flight.
The Hawker Beechcraft Corporation G58 Pilot’s Operating Handbook discusses one engine inoperative procedures and states in part: Airspeed is the single most important factor in maintaining airplane control during single engine operations. The airplane can be safely maneuvered or trimmed for normal hands-off operation and sustained in this configuration by the operative engine AS LONG AS SUFFICIENT AIRSPEED IS MAINTAINED. This document also discusses engine failure procedures while in flight and states in part: The most important aspect of engine failure is the necessity to maintain lateral and directional control. If airspeed is below VMCA (84 kts), reduce power on the operative engine as required to maintain control.