History of Flight
On January 13, 2021, about 1033 eastern standard time, a Beech F33A, N266DC, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Columbia, South Carolina. The private pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. Radar and air traffic control voice communication data from the FAA indicated that the airplane departed runway 19 at Greenville Downtown Airport (GMU), Greenville, South Carolina, about 0959 under visual flight rules. The pilot was cleared to climb to 5,500 ft mean sea level (msl). About 1006, while airborne, the pilot requested an instrument flight rules clearance and continued southeast toward Jim Hamilton – L B Owens Airport (CUB), Columbia. The controller provided the clearance, and the pilot descended to 5,000 ft. Soon afterward, the pilot requested and was cleared to descend to 3,000 ft. About 1015, the controller asked the pilot to advise receipt of weather information for CUB and the desired approach. The pilot requested the RNAV runway 13 approach and a pilot report (PIREP) and weather minimums for CUB. The controller stated a PIREP was received about 0930 and that the pilot of that report was unable to land. The controller cleared the pilot for the RNAV approach. About 1030, the controller advised of alternate missed approach instructions (heading 050°, climb to 2,500 ft). The pilot announced a missed approach and was instructed to fly heading 360° when able and climb to 2,500 ft. The pilot acknowledged and requested weather at Columbia Metropolitan Airport (CAE), about 6.5 nautical miles west of CUB. About 1033, the controller provided CAE weather. The pilot did not acknowledge, and radar contact was lost. ADS-B data showed that during the approach, the airplane remained about 3/4-mile left of course until about 1 1/4 miles from the runway, then made a right turn, descended to 325 ft msl, then a climbing left turn to 800 ft msl before descending into a residential neighborhood. The airplane descended below the minimum descent altitude (780 ft msl) three times. Witnesses heard the engine sounding normal; one saw the airplane emerge from fog in a left-wing-low attitude and impact a roof. The airplane came to rest in a backyard against a fence, and a postimpact fire ensued.
Meteorological Information
The 0953 weather observation at CUB included calm wind, visibility 1/4-mile in fog, vertical visibility 200 ft agl, temperature 2°C, dew point 2°C, altimeter 30.20 inHg. The 1053 observation at CUB: wind 240° at 5 knots, visibility 1/4-mile fog, vertical visibility 200 ft, temperature 3°C, dew point 3°C, altimeter 30.20 inHg. The 1029 observation at CAE (about 6 miles southwest): wind 240° at 3 knots, visibility 1/2-mile, fog, vertical visibility 200 ft, temperature 3°C, dew point 2°C, altimeter 30.18 inHg. These observations indicated low IFR conditions with light and variable wind. AIRMET Sierra, issued at 0945, was valid for the accident site and indicated IFR conditions due to fog and mist. The pilot did not request or receive weather information from Leidos Flight Service or ForeFlight; no record of weather retrieval was found.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The airplane impacted a tree before hitting the ground at an elevation of 270 ft msl. The postimpact fire consumed most of the fuselage. All major components were located near the main wreckage. Left wing sections and the pitot tube were near the initial tree impact. The right wing separated from the fuselage and showed thermal damage. The vertical stabilizer and rudder separated. The cabin and seats were consumed by fire; the instrument panel was fragmented; avionics showed thermal damage. Landing gear and flaps were retracted. Flight control cables were examined, but continuity could not be confirmed due to fragmentation and thermal damage. The gyro and housing showed rotational scoring. The engine remained partially attached; both magnetos had separated; ignition leads were consumed. The No. 5 cylinder rocker assembly had separated. Nos. 1, 3, and 4 rocker covers had impact damage. The fuel injection mixture control was separated; the throttle butterfly housing was fragmented. The propeller had separated; all three blades remained attached with tip curling and chordwise scratching.
Medical and Pathological Information
An autopsy performed by Professional Pathology Services in Columbia, South Carolina, determined the pilot's cause of death as massive blunt force injuries. Toxicology testing by the FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory detected no drugs, carboxyhemoglobin, or ethanol in the pilot's specimens.
Additional Information
The FAA's Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge stated that under normal flight conditions, the inner ear helps identify pitch, roll, and yaw when there is a visual reference to the horizon. When visual contact is lost, the vestibular system becomes unreliable, and convincing illusions can occur. The handbook advised avoiding flight in reduced visibility unless well-trained in instrument flight. The FAA's Airplane Flying Handbook described that the vestibular sense cannot detect slight or uniform attitude changes and can generate false sensations leading to spatial disorientation. The FAA publication "Spatial Disorientation Visual Illusions" noted that false visual references may cause orientation to a false horizon and advised relying on flight instruments in reduced visibility. The publication also stated that if a pilot experiences a visual illusion, they should have confidence in instruments and ignore conflicting signals. The FAA publication "Medical Facts for Pilots" described the somatogravic illusion and the graveyard spiral, where a prolonged bank turn leads to a sensation of turning in the opposite direction when leveling wings, causing the pilot to re-enter the original turn.
Pilot Reports: Between 0945 and 1015, the controller provided services to at least five aircraft at CUB or CAE and one overflight. No PIREPs were solicited; one unsolicited PIREP was not entered into the Aeronautical Information System and was only relayed to one aircraft when asked. FAA Order JO 7110.65Y emphasizes solicitation and dissemination of PIREPs, stating controllers must provide sufficient detail to assist pilots in safety decisions. The order also states that controllers should solicit PIREPs when requested, deemed necessary, or when ceilings are at or below 5,000 ft or visibility at or less than 5 miles. Approach Information: Paragraph 4-7-10 of FAA Order JO 7110.65Y states that controllers must provide current approach information to aircraft destined to airports they serve, including surface wind, ceiling and visibility (if below 1,000 ft or less than 3 miles), and altimeter setting for the intended airport.