History of Flight
On January 8, 2022, about 1919 central standard time, a Beech B58 airplane, registration N585CK, was destroyed in an accident near Defiance, Missouri. The two commercial pilots sustained fatal injuries. The flight was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 positioning flight. The flight had contacted air traffic control at Spirit of St. Louis Airport (SUS) at about 1859 and received an IFR clearance to Centennial Airport (APA), Denver, Colorado. At 1901, the ground controller issued taxi instructions for runway 26L, and at 1908, takeoff clearance was given with an instruction to turn right after takeoff to a heading of 310°. ADS-B data indicated the airplane departed at 1910, leveled off at 8,000 feet msl on a westerly heading, then made a gradual left turn toward the southeast, followed by a rapid descent. The controller queried the airplane about its altitude and direction; a jumbled radio transmission from the copilot was received, and no distress call was heard. In the final 10 seconds of ADS-B data, the airplane descended from 7,500 to 4,700 feet msl. The airplane impacted forested terrain about 0.40 mile northwest of the last recorded ADS-B point. Two audio surveillance systems near the accident site recorded engine noise increasing and the ground impact.
Personnel Information
According to the company chief pilot and director of operations, the copilot was qualified to act as pilot in command (PIC) on all Part 135 flights in the B58. The pilot had not obtained the required experience for Part 135 PIC operations and was serving as PIC on Part 91 flights to gain that experience. Both pilots were instrument current at the time of the accident. An FAA interview with the pilot’s boyfriend on January 11 revealed that the pilot had expressed concerns via text message about the flight due to weather and the other pilot’s IFR skills. Before their employment with AirNet II, both pilots’ flying experience was predominantly in visual flight rules operations.
Aircraft Information
The airplane was equipped with a “throw-over” type control column for elevator and aileron control. An optional dual control column, required for flight instruction, was not installed. Flight instruments were located on the left side of the panel directly in front of the pilot’s seat, including attitude and directional gyros, airspeed, altimeter, vertical speed, and turn coordinator. A magnetic compass was mounted above the center of the instrument panel. Vacuum pressure for the attitude gyro was supplied by two engine-driven dry pressure pumps interconnected as a single system. The directional gyro was electrically powered. The airplane also had a Bendix King KFC-200 autopilot.
Meteorological Information
A warm frontal boundary existed at the accident site, with IFR conditions at SUS. Clouds likely extended from 1,000 feet above ground level through 10,500 feet msl over the accident site based on satellite data and an upper air sounding. No non-convective or convective SIGMETs were valid for the area at the accident time. Icing conditions were not present below 11,000 feet msl. An AIRMET for IFR conditions and an AIRMET for low-level wind shear were valid. Strong low- and mid-level wind conditions existed, with moderate turbulence likely at 8,000 feet msl.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The airplane impacted forested terrain. The debris path was on a westerly heading and highly fragmentary. Broken tree limbs indicated a steep descent with a left-wing-low attitude at impact. All flight control cable separations exhibited tension overload signatures. One flap actuator was recovered and appeared to be in the retracted position. No signs of heat distress were observed on the cabin heater. Both three-blade propeller assemblies were highly fragmented; recovered blades showed chordwise/rotational scoring, leading edge gouging, bending, and twisting. The cockpit was fractured with no intact flight instruments or identifiable switch positions. The vacuum-powered attitude gyro rotor and housing were found outside the instrument case with indications of rotation at impact. The electrically powered heading gyro rotor was also outside its case with rotation indications. No preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions were observed that would have precluded normal operation.
Additional Information
Spatial Disorientation: FAA Publication (OK-11-1550) describes that false visual reference illusions may cause pilots to orient relative to a false horizon, such as when flying over banked clouds or at night over featureless terrain. It advises reliance on flight instruments and confidence in them to avoid accidents. AirNet II’s B58 training curriculum included ground training, at least six sessions in a Frasca fixed training device (FTD), and at least five sessions in a B58. Among the six FTD sessions, five included unusual attitude maneuvers; of the five B58 sessions, three included unusual attitude maneuvers. The director of operations stated that briefing and debriefing sessions accompanied each lesson to discuss spatial disorientation and unusual attitudes.