History of Flight
On July 17, 2022, about 1203 Pacific daylight time, a Piper PA-46-350P (converted to a Piper JetProp DLX), N97CX, and a Cessna 172N, N160RA, were destroyed when they collided in flight while maneuvering to land at North Las Vegas Airport (VGT), North Las Vegas, Nevada. The pilot and copilot in the low-wing airplane and the flight instructor and student pilot in the high-wing airplane were fatally injured. The low-wing airplane was operating under 14 CFR Part 91 as a personal flight; the high-wing airplane was conducting a Part 91 instructional flight.
The low-wing airplane was returning from an instrument-flight-rules (IFR) flight originating from Coeur d'Alene Airport, Idaho. The high-wing airplane was performing visual flight rules (VFR) training, conducting takeoffs and landings in the right traffic pattern for runway 30R. At 1156:08, Nellis Radar Approach Control cleared the low-wing airplane for a visual approach with instructions to overfly VGT at midfield for left traffic to runway 30L. Air traffic control responsibility was transferred to VGT tower at 1158:26. At 1158:43, the copilot reported descending out of 7,600 ft msl for landing on runway 30L. At 1200:03, the high-wing airplane requested a short approach and was cleared for the option on runway 30R. At 1201:36, the low-wing airplane was cleared to land on runway 30L; the copilot acknowledged. At 1201:57, the controller confirmed the clearance, and the copilot replied affirmatively. No further transmissions were made. The airplanes collided about 0.25 nautical miles from the approach end of runway 30R. Neither airplane received advisory information about the other from the controller. ADS-B data showed that after acknowledging the clearance, the low-wing airplane flew a close-in downwind and turned left through the final approach path to runway 30L, rolling out aligned with runway 30R's final approach.
Aircraft Information
The low-wing airplane was a Piper JetProp DLX, an aftermarket turbine engine conversion of a single-engine, pressurized Piper PA-46-350P (Malibu Mirage). The high-wing airplane was a Cessna 172N.
Personnel Information
The low-wing airplane's pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with instrument and flight instructor ratings. He had about 6,643 total flight hours. The copilot held a private pilot certificate with instrument rating and about 1,536 total hours, of which 280 were in the accident make and model. The pilot and copilot were married and often flew together; the pilot had provided instruction to the copilot. After the accident, the pilot was recovered from the left front seat and the copilot from the right front seat. It could not be determined who was manipulating the controls.
The high-wing airplane's flight instructor held a commercial pilot certificate with instrument and flight instructor ratings and about 850 total hours. The student pilot held a student pilot certificate and had about 57 total hours, all in the accident make and model. It could not be determined who was controlling the airplane at the time of the accident.
Meteorological Information
Weather at VGT at 1153 included wind from 320° at 4 knots, 10 miles visibility, clear skies, temperature 38°C, dew point 12°C, and altimeter setting 29.91 inches of mercury.
ATC and Controller Information
The local control (LC) controller, working both LC positions and local assist, reported being assigned to VGT since 2009. His normal schedule was four 10-hour shifts but he regularly worked six-day weeks, with about 300 hours overtime per year. When asked if he was fatigued on the day of the accident, he said yes, but felt it had not affected his work. He described the traffic as light and not complex. He did not provide traffic advisories because he expected the high-wing airplane would be over the numbers before the low-wing airplane could visually acquire it. He stated he issued traffic advisories only if he thought aircraft could see each other and might be concerned about proximity. He considered traffic advisories for VFR aircraft an “additional duty” and was unclear about when they were required. He recalled that as the low-wing airplane entered the downwind, their position “seemed off,” but before he could transmit, the collision occurred.
The VGT air traffic manager (ATM) reported that four controllers were on duty, but only two were working positions, which did not meet facility expectations. She stated that total facility staffing was 11 controllers, considered “fully staffed” but deficient. The ATM recalled a previous incident where the LC controller admitted to not paying attention. The facility had experienced several wrong-surface events earlier in 2022, documented in a Systemic Issue Review Report. After the accident, the FAA implemented mitigations including mandating traffic advisories for opposing base legs and updating controller training.
FAA Order JO 7110.65Z required traffic advisories when aircraft proximity may diminish below separation minima. The controller did not issue such advisories to either accident aircraft.
Wreckage and Impact Information
Examination of the low-wing airplane revealed no preimpact failures or malfunctions. The landing gear was down. The right wing displayed impact separation around wing station 93. The leading edge had crush impressions with flakes of green primer and de-ice boot cuts. Paint transfer and de-ice boot material were found on the high-wing airplane's left wing and flap. The high-wing airplane impacted terrain left-wing-down, nose-low, and came to rest inverted. A post-impact fire consumed much of the cabin and fuselage. Impact marks correlated between the high-wing airplane's left flap and the low-wing airplane's right wing leading edge, and between the high-wing airplane's left wing trailing edge and the low-wing airplane's right horizontal stabilizer.
Additional Information
Audio recordings showed that the controller working the LC position before the accident had provided regular traffic advisories. The VGT SOP handbook stated the local assist position should be staffed to minimize potential for surface errors and land-over incidents, but it was not staffed at the time of the accident. A delivery test period for routing IFR aircraft over midfield had been conducted in May 2022, but no updated letter of agreement had been documented.