Accident Overview
On January 16, 2025, at about 1530 central standard time, a Piper PA-24 airplane, registration N6799P, was substantially damaged in an accident near Bentonville, Arkansas. The pilot and copilot sustained minor injuries. The flight was conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a ferry flight.
Flight History
The copilot had recently purchased the airplane and obtained an FAA special flight permit to ferry it for an overdue annual inspection. The pilot, also an airframe and powerplant mechanic, assisted with the prebuy inspection and completed a 100-hour inspection. Before the first leg of a planned three-leg ferry flight, the copilot filled both wing tanks with 29.26 gallons of 100 low-lead aviation fuel each, for a total of 60 gallons. After takeoff, they climbed to 4,500 ft mean sea level and circled the airport briefly, then proceeded west at that altitude. The copilot's father flew in another airplane and received VFR flight following from air traffic control.
During the first leg, the pilot noted elevated cylinder head temperatures on cylinders No. 3 and No. 4, so he did not lean the mixture. About one hour into the flight, they switched fuel tanks, planning to switch every hour. Fuel consumption displayed about 20 gallons per hour (gph), prompting them to change their first fuel stop to a closer airport. After landing, they added 20 gallons to each tank, confirming a fuel consumption rate of about 20 gph.
Second Leg and Power Loss
For the second leg, they cruised at about 6,500 ft msl with a lower engine rpm setting. The copilot stated they departed with the fuel selector on the left tank, and he remembered switching to the right tank during the flight. The pilot reported switching to the right tank about one hour into the leg. Cylinder head temperatures remained high, preventing significant mixture leaning. The flight was uneventful until the descent into the destination airport. With landing gear and flaps extended, the pilot adjusted the throttle, and the engine immediately lost all power. Restart attempts failed; the starter would not engage, and the propeller had stopped rotating. The copilot switched from the right to the left tank at the pilot's request, but the engine did not restart.
Forced Landing and Damage
Unable to reach the runway, the pilot conducted a forced landing in a field. The airplane came to rest upright. The landing gear collapsed, and the fuselage and right wing sustained substantial damage. Flight track data from the copilot's father's aircraft indicated a flight time of 1 hour 44 minutes, slightly longer than the accident airplane's approximate 1 hour 37 minutes.
Postaccident Examination
An FAA inspector examined the wing fuel tanks, which remained intact. The left tank was empty, and the right tank contained about 27.5 gallons. The inspector removed a JPI EDM-700 engine data management system and a Shadin Microflo-L digital fuel management system. The JPI unit had no recording capability. Shadin unit data showed a maximum usable fuel value set to 56 gallons, a fuel used reading of 219 gallons, and fuel remaining of 0.0 gallons. The Shadin unit calculates remaining fuel by subtracting fuel used (tracked) from initial fuel (manually input), indicating dependence on accurate manual entries.
Engine examination revealed the carburetor impact-separated from its mounting point on the induction plenum and resting on the lower cowling. The mixture lever was halfway between full rich and idle cut-off. The mixture control cable was not attached to the lever; the hardware on the arm remained installed but was incorrect. The mixture cable moved normally when the cockpit control was manipulated. No other mechanical malfunctions were found.
Airframe fuel system inspection showed both wing tanks had no unusable fuel, were intact, and free of leaks or contaminants. The fuel strainer bowl was removed; the cork gasket was intact, but the bowl was empty except for a white and blue substance at the bottom—the white layer was hard and calcified, the blue layer was soft and wet. Electric fuel boost pumps operated on battery power; filter screens were clear, and pumps contained fuel. A small amount of fuel drained from the lines at the pumps. The fuel selector valve operated normally with no obstructions. No anomalies other than the fuel strainer bowl contaminant were noted that would have precluded normal operation.