Incident Overview
On February 24, 2025, at 0848 eastern standard time, Delta Air Lines flight 876, a Boeing 717-200 (registration N942AT), encountered smoke in the cabin and cockpit during takeoff from Atlanta Hartsfield/Jackson International Airport (ATL), Atlanta, Georgia. The flight was a scheduled domestic passenger service under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, destined for Columbia Metro Airport (CAE), Columbia, South Carolina. The aircraft carried 99 passengers and crew. After experiencing smoke, the flight crew returned to ATL, landed safely, and executed an emergency evacuation. Two passengers sustained minor injuries during the evacuation.
Cabin Crew Observations
During the takeoff roll, flight attendants in both the forward and aft sections of the cabin observed smoke. In the forward section, smoke was first noticed emanating from the area above the L1 door. The aft flight attendant saw smoke “coming out of all the vents.” Both the aft flight attendant and the lead forward flight attendant attempted to contact the pilots using the emergency call button, but received no response. They also used the interphone to announce the smoke to the pilots. After takeoff, the lead flight attendant knocked on the cockpit door.
The aft flight attendant made a public address announcement, advising passengers that the crew were aware of and trained for the situation, and instructed them to remain calm. The lead flight attendant recalled that the smoke was very thick, impairing visibility beyond the first row of seats. A non-revenue flight attendant who occupied a jumpseat self-deployed to an exit row to prevent an unanticipated evacuation or to assist if one ensued.
Pilot Actions
As the aircraft rotated for takeoff, the pilots heard a flight attendant call chime and knocking on the flight deck door. Shortly thereafter, smoke became visible rising from the floor near the rear of the cockpit. The pilots donned their oxygen masks. The captain focused on flying the aircraft, while the first officer declared an emergency with air traffic control, initially delaying response to the flight attendant calls.
Shortly after takeoff, a master caution alert for smoke detected in the forward lavatory activated. The first officer initiated the quick reference handbook (QRH) checklist for this alert and attempted to communicate with the cabin crew using the handset phone. He could hear the cabin crew, but they could not hear him. As the lead flight attendant began unlocking the cockpit door, he heard the first officer on the interphone advising that the pilots were aware and returning to the airport. The lead flight attendant relayed this information to the other crew members and passengers.
Soon after, a low oil pressure warning for the right engine occurred. The crew performed the QRH procedure, which led to shutting down the right engine.
During the return to the airport, the captain changed the approach from runway 27R to 27L to obtain glidepath guidance, as visibility was restricted due to smoke and the facemask. The approach and landing were uneventful.
Evacuation
After landing, the crew stopped the aircraft on the runway. Airport rescue and fire fighting vehicles arrived shortly. The pilots opened the flight deck door, observed a “tremendous” amount of smoke in the cabin, and the captain ordered an immediate evacuation. The aft flight attendant coordinated evacuation through the tailcone door without issues. The lead flight attendant managed door 1L, which initially was difficult to open but succeeded on the third attempt. The third flight attendant managed door 1R without anomalies.
The non-revenue flight attendant managed the overwing emergency exits. She remained on the wing with some passengers unable to jump from the wing to the ground. The aircraft has no evacuation slides for the overwing exits; egress is via sliding down the trailing edge of the wing. The wing flaps were extended to 25° before the evacuation, in accordance with the checklist, to reduce the height from the wing to the ground.
She coordinated with the three other flight attendants, and they determined that, because no remaining risks existed inside or outside the cabin, the passengers on both wings could reenter the cabin and evacuate using the three usable deployed door slides.
Post-Incident Examination
The aircraft was equipped with Rolls Royce model BR715-C1 engines. During a post-incident examination, maintenance personnel found no oil visible in the sight glass of the right engine oil reservoir, indicating the quantity was at or near zero. Examination of the right engine’s components continues.
Qualified parties, including the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Delta Air Lines, and Boeing Commercial Airplanes, were invited to participate in the investigation. In accordance with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, an Accredited Representative from the Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Investigation (BFU) of Germany—the State of Manufacture for the engines—was appointed, with Rolls Royce as a technical advisor. An NTSB flight data recorder specialist has been assigned. The investigation continues.