Incident Overview
On an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight from Montréal/Pierre Elliott Trudeau International Airport to Montréal/St-Hubert Airport, Quebec, a Beechcraft King Air 100 (registration C-GJLP, serial number B 148) operated by Propair Inc. as Flight PRO101 experienced a complete loss of electrical power generation shortly after takeoff. The aircraft carried two pilots and four passengers. The power loss led to failures of radio navigation equipment, some flight instruments, most engine instrument panel indicators, and radio communication. The crew descended to the minimum sector altitude, broke through clouds, and continued under visual flight rules (VFR) to land without further incident at St-Hubert. No injuries or aircraft damage occurred.
Flight Crew Qualifications
The pilot-in-command held approximately 5500 total flying hours, including 300 hours as pilot-in-command on the King Air 100. The copilot had about 2200 total hours, including 200 hours as copilot on the same type. Both were certified and qualified per regulations. The pilot-in-command had completed cockpit resource management (CRM) training in March 2005; the copilot, newly hired, had not. CRM training was not mandatory for the operator under Canadian Aviation Regulations Part VII, Subpart 3.
Sequence of Events
Before departure, the crew completed flight planning and filed an IFR flight plan with fuel endurance of about 5.5 hours. The planned route included stops after St-Hubert. Engine start and taxi were normal. During line-up checklist on Runway 24L, the pilot-in-command mistakenly placed the ignition and engine start switches to the start position instead of the auto-ignition switches. The master caution light illuminated momentarily but no other annunciations appeared.
After takeoff at 0918 eastern daylight time, the landing gear did not retract normally, and the in-transit light remained on. The crew recycled the gear and noticed the auto-ignition warning lights were still on. Simultaneously, radio navigation instruments failed. Functional instruments were limited to the copilot's artificial horizon, pitot-static instruments (altimeters, airspeed indicators, vertical speed indicators), compass, and turn coordinator.
The air traffic controller made three unsuccessful attempts to communicate with the flight. The crew acknowledged by pressing the transponder IDENT button. The controller assigned a heading of 050° for radar vectoring to Runway 24R at St-Hubert. The crew received instructions to switch frequency but did not hear the clearance for approach and landing.
Descent and Landing
Based on visual contact with the ground during initial climb at about 2000 feet, the crew decided to leave the assigned altitude of 3000 feet and descend to the minimum sector altitude (MSA), believed to be 2200 feet. At 2200 feet, the pilot-in-command saw the ground and made a steep left turn while maintaining visual reference. The crew estimated the ceiling at approximately 200 feet above ground level and visibility at ½ mile. The aircraft landed without incident at St-Hubert.
Technical Findings
Investigation revealed that the pilot-in-command selected the ignition and engine start switches instead of the auto-ignition switches shortly before takeoff. The switches have distinct operating mechanisms but were located close together. The line-up checklist did not require a load indicator reading to confirm generators were online. On later King Air 100 models (serial B 224 onward), generator warning lights illuminate when switches are left in ignition/start, but this modification was not available for earlier models. The ignition/start switches lack a return spring in the start position, so they remain engaged if inadvertently placed there.
Emergency procedures exist for electrical failure, but the crew did not recognize the source of the anomalies. The white auto-ignition warning lights indicated system activation rather than an anomaly, so the crew did not prioritize checking them. The landing gear recycling checklist did not account for electrical failure. The overlapping anomalies (gear in-transit, warning lights, instrument failures, communication loss, GPS failure) focused crew attention and prevented identification of the electrical power loss as the root cause. The crew's decision to descend was based on familiarity with the area and approximate position from radar vectors received before communication failure.