Casualties unknown

1997-01-28: Beechcraft Super King Air 200 C-GCEV — Propair Inc. — Sept-Îles Airport, Quebec, CA

Sept-Îles Airport, Quebec, CA

On January 28, 1997, a Beechcraft Super King Air 200 C-GCEV operated by Propair Inc. was involved in an aviation accident near Sept-Îles Airport, Quebec, CA. This summary draws on records from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB); 5 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB)Primary reportUpdated 1785068748Data APIEditorial standards

A Propair Super King Air 200 veered left during take-off in low visibility and blowing snow at Sept-Îles, Quebec, striking snow north of the runway. The pilot-in-command was slightly injured; aircraft substantially damaged.

Accident Details

On a charter flight from Sept-Îles to Dorval, Quebec, a Propair Inc. Super King Air 200 (serial number BB-153) with two pilots and ten passengers prepared for departure under instrument flight rules. The take-off began on runway 09 at 1700 eastern standard time. The co-pilot, occupying the left seat, initiated the take-off roll. At approximately 90 knots indicated airspeed, 5 knots below rotation speed (VR), the aircraft began to drift left. The co-pilot applied right rudder without success. As the aircraft reached 100 knots, just before exiting the runway, the co-pilot pulled the elevator control full aft to initiate a climb. Simultaneously, the pilot-in-command reduced power, believing a collision with a snowbank at the runway edge was inevitable. The aircraft struck the snow-covered surface north of the runway, slid on its belly, and came to rest facing opposite the take-off heading. The pilot-in-command sustained minor injuries; the aircraft incurred considerable damage. Occupants evacuated via the main door.

Crew and Operational Background

The co-pilot, under the pilot-in-command’s supervision, was authorized to perform the take-off from the left seat per company policy. Before departure, the co-pilot briefed the pilot-in-command on task division, critical speeds, and anomaly procedures. The critical engine failure speed (V1) and rotation speed were equal; the co-pilot selected a V1 of 105 knots, 10 knots higher than the Beechcraft recommendation and 5 knots higher than the pilot-in-command recalled hearing. No specific discussion of environmental conditions occurred during the briefing. The pilot-in-command held over 1,300 hours on the aircraft type. Both pilots had limited experience with take-offs in runway visual ranges (RVR) below 2,600 feet. Neither had undergone cockpit resource management training.

Weather and Runway Conditions

At departure time, light snow and blowing snow were reported. Wind was from 140 magnetic at 20 knots, gusting to 30 knots. RVR was 1,600 feet. Runway 09 measured 6,572 feet long and 200 feet wide, asphalt surfaced. A four-foot-high snowbank lined the runway edges. The runway had been partially cleared: a 100-foot-wide center strip was 60% bare and dry, 15% packed snow, and 25% snow drifts under one inch. The remaining width on each side held 8 to 12 inches of snow.

Take-off Sequence

With flaps up, the aircraft aligned on the centerline. The co-pilot advanced throttles; the pilot-in-command set take-off power when torque reached 1,000 foot-pounds. At 80 knots, both pilots confirmed airspeed indicators and stable power. The roll was punctuated by bumps attributed to snow drifts. At 90 knots, the aircraft began drifting left. The co-pilot applied increasing right rudder until full deflection, but the drift continued. At 100 knots, the pilot-in-command called "V1." The co-pilot did not hear the call, announced "J'ai la vitesse," removed his hand from the throttles, and pulled the control column fully aft. The pilot-in-command, now seeing the aircraft heading off the runway, reduced power without warning, hoping to minimize impact forces. The aircraft became airborne briefly, then descended and struck the snow. The stall warning never activated. The aircraft slid and stopped facing opposite the take-off direction.

Aftermath and Investigation

No pre-impact mechanical failures were found; aircraft weight and center of gravity were within limits. The take-off minimum for runway 09 was RVR 2,600 feet, but Transport Canada had authorized Propair to operate with RVR 1,200 feet. The co-pilot lacked the required training for such low-visibility take-offs; the company and pilots mistakenly assumed authorization extended to the co-pilot. The investigation noted that the loss of directional control likely resulted from runway contamination, crosswind conditions, and delayed corrective actions.