Summary
On 1 March 2019 at 2020 UTC, an Airbus A320-214, registration OE-LOA, experienced a serious incident during takeoff from Runway 22 at London Stansted Airport. The aircraft was on a scheduled passenger flight to Vienna International Airport, Austria. During the takeoff roll, the left engine suffered a contained failure, prompting the commander to reject the takeoff. The senior flight attendant subsequently ordered an evacuation, during which ten passengers sustained minor injuries. The investigation determined that the engine failure resulted from high-cycle fatigue cracks in first-stage high-pressure compressor blades, initiated by an improperly assembled inlet guide vane lever arm.
History of the Flight
The aircraft had arrived from Vienna about an hour earlier. The commander was the pilot flying, and the co-pilot was undergoing line training. There were five flight attendants, including an additional crew member. After pushback and taxi, the aircraft received clearance to take off. Conditions were dark and clear with a 5 kt wind from 160°. The commander set full power and began the takeoff roll. At a groundspeed of 31 kt, a loud bang was heard, and the aircraft veered left. The commander immediately rejected the takeoff, bringing the aircraft to a stop on the runway.
Flight Crew Actions
The commander set the parking brake and announced “attention crew: on station” twice over the public address system. The co-pilot informed air traffic control and completed the electronic centralised aircraft monitor actions for left engine failure and reverser unlock. The left engine was shut down at 2006:23 hrs. The commander contacted the Rescue and Fire Fighting Service on frequency 121.6 MHz; they confirmed no visible fire. The commander then planned to vacate the runway using the right engine, but at 2007:21 hrs, an amber caution for the left forward cabin door illuminated, and he saw the evacuation slide deployed. The senior flight attendant believed the commander had ordered the evacuation, which he denied. The auxiliary power unit was started, and the still-running right engine was shut down at 2009:38 hrs. The co-pilot then entered the cabin, finding no passengers but baggage near exits and only three flight attendants present (two had left to assist passengers). The commander requested their return.
Flight Attendant Actions
All flight attendants heard the loud noise and felt the aircraft drift left before stopping. All except the senior flight attendant heard the “attention crew: on station” announcement. They stood at their assigned positions. The senior flight attendant stood in the aisle facing rear; the other flight attendants looked out windows but saw no danger. The senior flight attendant attempted to contact the flight attendant at Door 3R (FA3) via interphone, but FA3’s crew seat had displaced the handset, and its cable became trapped, suppressing the chime. An exchange between them resulted in the senior flight attendant ordering an evacuation over the public address system. Upon hearing the command, flight attendants and passengers began evacuating. When FA3 opened Door 3R, the escape slide inflated but floated horizontally, so he blocked the exit. Door 3L’s slide inflated correctly. Passengers brought hand baggage, which was removed and placed aside. The evacuation was later found to be unnecessary.
Emergency Evacuation and Injuries
Ten passengers were treated for minor injuries; two were taken to hospital. The airport’s Rescue and Fire Fighting Service and local ambulances attended. Passengers were taken to the terminal by buses, and most continued to Vienna later that evening on a replacement aircraft. The aircraft was towed to a remote parking position.
Investigation Findings
The investigation determined that the left engine contained failure resulted from the rupture of several blades in the first stage of the high-pressure compressor. The blades fractured due to high-cycle fatigue loading initiated in the dovetail root, caused by a once-per-revolution aerodynamic excitation. An improperly assembled inlet guide vane lever arm led to this excitation, producing forces exceeding the blades’ design loads. The operator has taken safety actions, primarily regarding flight attendant training. Two safety recommendations concerning passenger evacuation were issued.