Casualties unknown

2024-10-03: Airbus A320 (TS-INF) — TMA EPZG / CTA07 / TS07, PL

TMA EPZG / CTA07 / TS07, PL

On October 3, 2024, an Airbus A320 (registration TS-INF) was involved in an aviation accident near TMA EPZG / CTA07 / TS07, PL. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The incident resulted from a series of coexisting factors: the aircraft's departure route was modified due to adverse weather; communication between pilot and controller was hindered, likely due to pilot stress and unfamiliarity with the airspace; the… This summary draws on records from the Polish State Commission on Aircraft Accidents Investigation (PKBWL); 8 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Polish State Commission on Aircraft Accidents Investigation (PKBWL)Primary reportUpdated 1785092869Data APIEditorial standards
Airbus A320
Photo: Tosaka / CC BY 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons

On 3 October 2024, an Airbus A320 (TS-INF) on a flight from Zielona Góra to Monastir violated active airspace TSA07 while avoiding clouds. The incident involved communication difficulties, procedural control limitations, and lack of voice communication system.

Incident Overview

On October 3, 2024, at 12:16 UTC, an Airbus A320 with registration TS-INF, operating flight LBT7545 from Zielona Góra (EPZG) to Monastir (DTMB), encroached into the active TSA07 airspace south of the Zielona Góra Terminal Manoeuvring Area (TMA) during a cloud avoidance maneuver. No other aircraft were present in the airspace at the time.

Circumstances and Contributing Factors

The planned departure route from EPZG required modification due to adverse weather, including the need to circumvent hazardous cloud formations. Communication between the pilot and the Zielona Góra air traffic controller (ATC) was occasionally challenging; the pilot appeared to misunderstand some ATC instructions, likely due to stress from the weather conditions and unfamiliarity with the local airspace.

At the time, the TSA07 area adjacent to the Zielona Góra TMA was active, but the tower controller at EPZG was not directly informed of its activation. ATC services at EPZG were provided procedurally without radar surveillance, making it difficult to determine when the aircraft exited the TMA and entered TSA07. During heightened coordination needs, the controller operated alone (single-person operations) without an assistant. Additionally, the absence of a Voice Communication System (VCS) hampered coordination with adjacent ATC units, including Poznań Approach (APP PO). When the EPZG tower controller attempted to contact the appropriate APP PO executive controller, all positions in the APP operations room were ringing simultaneously, and the returning call encountered a busy signal from the EPZG tower line, delaying effective coordination.

Findings and Actions

The investigation identified the incident as resulting from a combination of these coexisting factors. The operator's SMS department recommended disseminating the report to relevant ATC units, emphasizing the need to transfer aircraft to APP PO upon reaching the boundary of responsibility. It was also discovered that audio alerts for incoming calls from EPZG had been deactivated on the APP PO sector S VCS display; local technicians committed to removing the EPZG tile from that display, ensuring that future calls from EPZG tower would be directed to sector N, the appropriate coordination sector.

Recommendations

The commission recommended considering the installation of a VCS at the EPZG tower position and exploring the provision of radar surveillance or equivalent measures to improve situational awareness for single-person operations. In response, the Polish Air Navigation Services Agency reported that a VCS replacement program (VoIP-based, centralized system) already included Zielona Góra. Additionally, a functional change to provide radar-controlled approach services by APP Poznań for aircraft arriving and departing EPZG was planned for implementation by 2027.

No safety recommendations were issued by the commission.

Probable cause

The incident resulted from a series of coexisting factors: the aircraft's departure route was modified due to adverse weather; communication between pilot and controller was hindered, likely due to pilot stress and unfamiliarity with the airspace; the controller was not directly informed of TSA07 activation; procedural control without radar did not allow clear detection of the airspace boundary; the controller worked alone without support; the lack of a Voice Communication System delayed coordination, and an attempted phone call was disrupted by simultaneous ringing and a busy signal.

Investigation report by the Polish State Commission on Aircraft Accidents Investigation (PKBWL). Original record: https://pkbwl.gov.pl/raporty/2024-0103/. This page is a structured re-presentation; facts and quotes are in the Panstwowa Komisja Badania Wypadkow Lotniczych (PKBWL), Poland.