Incident Overview
On 22 October 2024, at Katowice-Pyrzowice Airport (EPKT), ground handling personnel from LSAirport Service S.A. provided the flight crew of an Airbus A320-214, registration LZ-FSD, operated by Fly2Sky, with a loading instruction (LIR). The document contained baggage distribution guidelines previously determined by the crew: 900 kg in compartment 1, 1000 kg in compartment 3, 330 kg in compartment 4, and nil in compartment 5.
After completion of aircraft servicing, including loading and passenger boarding, the flight coordinator went to the cockpit to collect the load sheet (LS) prepared by the crew. The crew was responsible for preparing both the LIR and LS, with no involvement from LSAirport Service S.A. According to the coordinator's statement, the crew prepared the LS, but distribution issues arose. The captain provided the document in electronic form (a photo) sent to the coordinator's private phone. The coordinator did not verify the form (photo instead of PDF) and did not cross-check the LS against the LIR. Consequently, the discrepancy between the documents went undetected. The LS data differed from the LIR, showing: nil in compartment 1, 900 kg in compartment 3, 1000 kg in compartment 4, and 330 kg in compartment 5.
About 15 minutes after departure, the Shift Manager of the Operations Control Center (OCC) received information about the inconsistency in the LS. He contacted the air traffic control tower, requesting that the crew be instructed to establish communication on the operator's frequency. The crew soon contacted the OCC on the specified frequency, and the OCC Shift Manager informed them of the LS irregularities and provided the actual baggage distribution. The crew acknowledged receipt of the message. The OCC then notified the operator by sending an incident report. The flight continued without further issues and landed at the destination airport with no consequences.
Findings
- The crew and ground handler did not perform a verification check between the Loading Instruction (LIR) and the Load Sheet (LS).
- The LS was distributed as a photo rather than a PDF file, which was not verified by the coordinator.
- The discrepancy in baggage distribution data was discovered after departure by the Operations Control Center.
- The crew was notified and acknowledged the correct distribution; the flight proceeded normally.
Cause and Contributing Factors
The direct cause of the incident was the lack of a verification check between the Loading Instruction (LIR) and the Load Sheet (LS). A contributing factor was technical issues related to the distribution and receipt of the LS document.
Preventive Actions
LSAirport Service S.A. conducted additional training for flight coordinators on supervision and aircraft loading/unloading procedures. No safety recommendations were issued by the investigation commission.