Background
On 19 December 2013, at about 1645 hours, a Boeing 777-200 aircraft, registration 9V-SRP, operated by Singapore Airlines, ingested an empty cargo container into its left engine while docking at Bay F37 at Changi Airport after a flight from Mumbai. The engine sustained serious damage and was replaced. There were no injuries.
Sequence of Events
The aircraft’s estimated time of arrival was 1634 hours. At about 1610 hours, an arrival crew from a ground service provider (GSP1) arrived at Bay F37 to prepare for the aircraft. The crew included a certifying technician (CT1) and a lead technician (LT) who was training to become a certifying technician. They completed pre-arrival checks, including verifying the Aircraft Docking Guidance System (ADGS) and inspecting the equipment restraint area (ERA), which was clear at that time. They then waited for the aircraft.
Meanwhile, an equipment operator (EO) from another ground service provider (GSP2) brought two baggage trailers to the adjacent Bay F42, which was scheduled to receive an Airbus A330. The equipment staging area (ESA) at F42 was full, so the EO left the trailers in the ERA of Bay F37. He then added an empty cargo container on a dolly, connecting it to the trailers. He intended to move them after the A320 then at F42 departed. After waiting about 10 minutes and attempting to fix a faulty tractor headlamp, the EO left the equipment in the ERA and went to another bay to rearrange equipment. He did not see or hear the arriving aircraft at F37.
Shortly after the aircraft was sighted, the ADGS display did not activate properly. The pilot-in-command stopped the aircraft until the display returned to normal about 20 seconds later. As the aircraft approached, the EO drove away, leaving the cargo container and trailers in the ERA. The lead technician noticed the obstruction and tried to alert the certifying technician, but engine noise prevented communication. The cargo container was ingested into the left engine as the aircraft reached the stop line.
Personnel
CT1 had been with GSP1 since 1998 and was experienced in arrival crew leadership. LT was understudying CT1 for nine months and had operated the ADGS about 10 times before the incident. EO joined GSP2 in March 2013 and had completed equipment operator training. The flight crew held valid licenses from the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore.
Aircraft Docking Guidance System
Bay F37 had a 30-key ADGS operator panel. LT initially failed to select the correct aircraft type, causing the display to malfunction. After CT1 corrected the selection, the ADGS worked properly. LT had not received formal ADGS training but learned through on-the-job experience.
Safety Actions and Recommendations
The report notes safety actions taken by involved parties but does not specify a probable cause for the ingestion. The occurrence was classified as a serious incident by the Air Accident Investigation Bureau of Singapore.