Casualties unknown

2017-03-13: The Boeing Company 737-838 (VH-VZZ) — Qantas Airways — near Canberra Airport, Australian Capital Territory

near Canberra Airport, Australian Capital Territory

On March 13, 2017, a The Boeing Company 737-838 (registration VH-VZZ) operated by Qantas Airways was involved in an aviation accident near near Canberra Airport, Australian Capital Territory. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: These findings should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual. This summary draws on records from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB); 8 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB)Primary reportUpdated 1779789442Data APIEditorial standards
Aircraft registered VH-VZZ
Aircraft registered VH-VZZ. Photo: Ben Neale ben_neale / CC0, via Wikimedia Commons

A Qantas internal investigation found 47 overspeed events in six years, with a common practice of descending at 320 kt. A modified autopilot on one flight prevented manual override, leading to injuries.

Investigation Findings

A Qantas internal investigation into a recent occurrence revealed that over the past six years, there had been 47 previous overspeed events involving the airline's Boeing 737-800 fleet. Of those, 20 were managed through manual intervention by overriding the autopilot into CWS-P mode.

The investigation also uncovered that it was common practice among Qantas Boeing 737-800 flight crews to descend at 320 knots (20 knots below the maximum operating speed, VMO) when cleared by air traffic control for a high-speed descent.

Procedural Gaps

This common practice was not documented as a standard procedure by either Qantas or Boeing. Consequently, the potential consequences of this practice were not considered when the autopilot was modified on some aircraft.

Flight Crew Information

Qantas advised that the flight crew of the aircraft involved, designated VZZ, had no information indicating a risk of turbulence. The wind information in the flight plan did not show a significant change in wind direction during descent. Therefore, descending at 320 knots was not considered to present an increased risk.

Incident Sequence

The first officer of VZZ responded to an increase in speed toward VMO consistent with training, experience, and observations of other crew members. However, because VZZ had a modified autopilot, it was not possible to override it into CWS-P. When sufficient force was applied to the control column, the autopilot disengaged, resulting in abrupt elevator deflection and pitch change. This led to injuries among the cabin crew.