Fairchild Industries Inc SA227-DC accident at Mackay Airport, Queensland, 12 Nov 2025 (VH-HPE)

Accident narrative

Introduction This analysis will discuss the readability of the radio broadcasts from the Sharp Airlines Fairchild Industries SA227 and why neither the pilot or the driver of the safety vehicle heard each other’s transmissions or saw each other, prior to the near collision. This section will further examine Mackay Airport’s procedures regarding the use of electronic devices for airside safety officers and Sharp Airlines’ hazard identification process. CTAF radio transmissions The recordings of the CTAF broadcasts, made on the ground by the pilot of Sharp 161 using COM 2, ranged from unreadable to readable with considerable difficulty. However, once the aircraft became airborne, the transmissions were clear and readable and after the incident, no faults were found with the radio or the antenna.While the reduced quality was due in part to the pilot’s rapid speech, the variation in quality between the ground and airborne transmissions indicated that the use of the ground facing antenna (COM 2) also contributed by reducing the signal strength. That conclusion was consistent with previous ATSB investigations that identified that using an antenna positioned underneath the aircraft may not allow optimal ground‑based transmission or reception strength and clarity due to airframe shielding. In addition, the information in the broadcasts from Sharp 161 was not transmitted in the expected order which required that the location be stipulated at the beginning and end of each call. Contributing factorCommon traffic advisory frequency radio transmissions from the aircraft were of poor quality. This was due to a combination of the pilot’s rapid speech, non-standard phraseology and interference caused by use of the VHF COM 2, the radio with the ground‑facing antenna. Unidentified safety car The pilot taxied from the western general aviation apron to holding point Juliet without observing Car 1 at holding point Bravo. This may have been influenced by their focused attention on taxiway Juliet during the night manoeuvring followed by looking for any airborne traffic approaching runway 14 prior to backtracking that runway. In addition, they did not hear the driver of Car 1 transmit on the CTAF to advise they were about to enter the runway. While the recording of that transmission was of high quality, it is likely that the reception quality of this incoming broadcast was also reduced to the pilot of Sharp 161 due to it being received via the antenna on the underside of the aircraft. At the time of the driver’s broadcast, the pilot was increasing engine power and focusing on pre-take-off tasks. In addition, other transmissions were being made on the Brisbane Centre frequency. The pilot confirmed they could hear both transmissions in the aircraft when this occurred, however, the high overall transmission activity likely reduced the ability of the pilot to identify the driver’s broadcast.While the pilot did not see the car, they saw a flash of light, which was likely the vehicle’s headlights turning on to the runway, however, they did not question on the radio if there was something on the runway prior to commencing the take-off.Contributing factorWhile the pilot did not hear the transmission from the driver of Car 1, likely due to the reduced reception strength of the radio broadcast and concurrent transmission on the Brisbane Centre frequency, the pilot did not confirm the runway was clear after seeing a flash of unidentified light prior to commencing their take-off run. Unidentified aircraft While the airport safety officer (ASO) was holding on Bravo for an extended period, they did not observe aircraft 2 depart or Sharp 161 enter runway 14 and backtrack to the runway threshold. The ASO heard the clear departure broadcast from aircraft 2 but did not hear any of the 5 radio broadcasts, made on both the CTAF and area frequency, by the pilot of Sharp 161. While the 3 broadcasts on the CTAF were of poor quality and key words were not audible, radio transmissions on the frequency could clearly be heard, indicating that an aircraft was operating within the CTAF area. Additionally, the 2 broadcasts made by the pilot on the Brisbane Centre frequency, which the ASO was also monitoring, were readable.The evidence showed that the ASO opened the runway inspection form 1 second prior to the lining up call made on the Brisbane Centre frequency. While they could not specifically recall doing so on this occasion, they reported that they routinely used their iPad to gain situation awareness of the arriving and departing aircraft before entering the runway. As such, it is possible that the driver had also used the iPad prior to the lining up call. Further, the driver was not expecting the aircraft to be on the runway at that time, due to its delayed departure time.Research has shown that when a person’s attention is diverted to a different task, unless a meaningful phrase is used, information such as that contained in a radio transmission, may no