What happened
On February 19, 1999, at 20:48 UTC, a Beech 1900D performing a ferry flight from Düsseldorf landed at Frankfurt/Main with its landing gear retracted. The flight, operated by a two-person crew, was conducted under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) and utilized the Instrument Landing System (ILS) for the approach to runway 25L.
During the approach, the crew configured the aircraft with 17° of flaps. Upon touchdown, the aircraft struck the runway with the gear up, causing the propellers to make contact with the surface approximately 1,100 meters from the threshold. The aircraft traveled about 1,160 meters along the runway before coming to a stop. There were no injuries to the crew, but the aircraft sustained heavy damage, and runway 25L was closed for several hours.
The investigation
The BFU investigation included an on-site examination, an analysis of the Flight Data Recorder (FDR), and a review of radio communications between the crew and Frankfurt Tower. Technical inspections of the aircraft's landing gear systems, including the extension/retraction mechanisms and the warning signals, revealed no mechanical defects; all systems were functioning according to specifications.
Investigators focused on the crew's actions and the configuration of the aircraft. The FDR showed that the approach parameters for speed and altitude were maintained. However, the investigation revealed that the crew had chosen to land with a flap setting of 17° rather than the standard 35° (LDG) setting.
Findings
- The primary cause of the accident was the failure to extend the landing gear prior to landing.
- The crew failed to follow Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), specifically neglecting to perform the "BEFORE LANDING" checklist.
- The pilot flying (PF) did not read the checklist, and the pilot not flying (PNF) failed to call attention to the omission.
- While the crew claimed they did not hear an acoustic warning, the investigation determined that because the flaps were set to 17° rather than 35°, the landing gear warning horn was not triggered. Only the red indicator lights in the gear lever were active, which the crew failed to notice or act upon.
- The crew had the opportunity to silence the warning horn after the initial alert but chose to do so instead of extending the gear.