72 fatalities

Manchester–Palma Flight Crash in Stockport (G-ALHG)

Manchester-Ringway, United KingdomLanding (descent or approach)

On June 4, 1967, a Canadair C-4 North Star (registration G-ALHG) operated by British Midland International - BMI was involved in an aviation accident near Manchester-Ringway, United Kingdom during landing or approach. 72 people were killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The immediate cause was loss of power of both engines on the starboard side, resulting in control problems that prevented the pilot from maintaining height on the available power with one propeller windmilling. This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A); 5 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A)Primary reportUpdated 2026-06-12Data APIEditorial standards
Aircraft registered G-ALHG
Aircraft registered G-ALHG. Photo: RuthAS / CC BY 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons

A non-scheduled international flight from Manchester to Palma crashed in Stockport after losing power on both starboard engines during approach, killing 72 people.

Flight Details and Initial Approach The aircraft was operating a non-scheduled international flight from Manchester to Palma and return. It landed at Palma at 0220 GMT, refuelled, and departed for Manchester at 0406 GMT. The co-pilot was flying from the right-hand seat, and the flight was uneventful until the aircraft began descending for approach and landing between 0856 and 0900 GMT while being vectored toward the ILS localizer. ## Engine Power Loss At 0901:30 GMT, the flight was informed it was 9 miles from touchdown and well left of the centre line. The pilot-in-command confirmed he was receiving the ILS and would turn right slightly. Shortly afterward, one engine—most probably No. 4—ceased to deliver power, followed about 15 seconds later by the other engine on the same side. The pilot-in-command took over the controls. ## Controller Communications and Descent Just after 0903 GMT, the controller reported the aircraft was 6 miles from touchdown and asked if it was established on the ILS localizer. The flight did not acknowledge, and seven seconds later the controller asked if it was still receiving. The pilot-in-command replied, “Hotel Golf is overshooting, we’ve got a little bit of trouble with rpm.” The aircraft’s indicated airspeed was 116 kt and its height 1,838 ft AMSL. The controller ordered a left turn onto 160° and a climb to 2,500 ft QNH. The pilot-in-command asked what the left turn was onto. The controller noted the aircraft had already turned 25° to the right instead of left and ordered it to continue turning right onto 020° and climb to 2,500 ft QNH. The co-pilot acknowledged. By 0904:41 GMT, the controller asked when the flight would be ready to recommence the approach. The aircraft’s indicated airspeed had dropped to 111 kt and its height to 1,287 ft QNH. It had broken cloud and was seen by an eyewitness, flying below cloud in reasonable visibility. ## Emergency Declaration and Final Approach At 0905:26 GMT, the controller reported the aircraft was 7 miles from the airfield on a bearing of 040° and requested its height. The flight reported 1,000 ft. This was the first indication to the controller that the aircraft faced an emergency. After confirming the height, the controller initiated full emergency procedures at the airfield and ordered the aircraft to turn right onto 180° to close the ILS localizer. At 0905:47 GMT, the controller asked if the flight could maintain height. The pilot-in-command, at 981 ft AMSL and only about 800 ft above the ground, replied “just about.” He was told he was 8 miles from touchdown and should continue his right turn onto 200° and maintain as much height as possible. At that point, the aircraft lost 341 ft in 10 seconds after its indicated airspeed fell to 100 kt, and the pilot-in-command said he was not able to maintain height at the moment. At 0907:09 GMT, the controller informed the flight that radar contact had been lost due to the aircraft’s low height and asked the pilot to adjust his heading on the ILS and report when established. The co-pilot replied that they had “the lights to our right” and were at 800 ft, just maintaining height. The pilot-in-command asked for the emergency to be laid on. At 0907:35 GMT, the pilot-in-command requested his position and was told 7 miles to run to touchdown. Half a minute later, the controller repeated that he had no radar contact and cleared the flight for landing, with the surface wind 270°/12 kt. The PAR controller, who had overheard the loss of radar contact, saw a contact at the bottom of his elevation display and told the flight it was 6 miles from touchdown. The co-pilot reported an altitude of 500 ft. ## Impact The terrain clearance was only 300 ft, and the indicated airspeed was below 105 kt and falling. The aircraft was approximately on the line of the ILS localizer and heading for the centre of the built-up area of Stockport. A few seconds after 0909 GMT, the aircraft struck the ground more or less level in pitch, slightly right wing down, and slightly yawed to the right. Two eyewitnesses who saw the aircraft just before the crash indicated that the pilot-in-command deliberately cut the power very shortly before impact and deliberately put the aircraft down on the only pocket of relatively open space available, immediately before tall blocks of flats, the town hall, the police station, and Stockport Infirmary. ## Casualties Three crew members and 69 passengers were killed, while 12 other occupants were injured.

Probable cause

The immediate cause was loss of power of both engines on the starboard side, resulting in control problems that prevented the pilot from maintaining height on the available power with one propeller windmilling. The first engine’s loss of power was due to fuel starvation from inadvertent fuel transfer in flight. The second engine’s loss of power was due either to fuel starvation from inadvertent fuel transfer in flight or to misidentification by the crew of which engine had failed, followed by failure to restore power in time to the engine misidentified as having failed. Contributory causes included the design of the fuel valves and the location of their actuating levers in the cockpit, which allowed a small positioning error to cause inadvertent fuel transfer sufficient to empty a tank expected to contain sufficient fuel after a long flight; failure of those responsible for the design of the fuel system or fuel valves to warn users of this risk; failure of British Midland’s air crew or engineers to recognize the possibility of inadvertent fuel transfer in the air from evidence available in previous incidents and fuel logs; and failure of other operators of Argonauts who had learned of the possibility of inadvertent fuel transfer in flight to inform the Air Registration Board, the Directorate of Flight Safety of the Board of Trade or its predecessors, or the United Kingdom Flight Safety Committee of the facts they had learned, so that these might be communicated to other operators of Argonauts and other aircraft equipped with similar systems and fuel cocks.