2 fatalities

Firefighting Aircraft Collides with Power Cables in Italy (I-DPCK)

Forte dei Marmi, ItalyFlight

On March 18, 2005, a Canadair CL-415 (registration I-DPCK) operated by SOREM - Società Ricerche Esperienze Meteorologiche was involved in an aviation accident near Forte dei Marmi, Italy in flight. 2 people were killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The accident was the consequence of an in-flight collision with a power line because the crew adopted a wrong approach configuration to the fire area. This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A); 3 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A)Primary reportUpdated 2026-06-11Data APIEditorial standards
Aircraft registered I-DPCK
Aircraft registered I-DPCK. Photo: © Ra Boe / Wikipedia / CC BY-SA 3.0 de, via Wikimedia Commons

A firefighting aircraft collided with power cables during a mission near Forte dei Marmi, Italy, leading to a crash. The official investigation cited wrong approach configuration and contributing factors.

Incident Details

The aircraft departed Rome-Ciampino Airport in the afternoon for a firefighting mission in Forte dei Marmi, north of Pisa. After completing two successful missions, the crew was attacking a fire in hilly terrain at low altitude when the aircraft collided with power cables. A fire erupted on the right side of the aircraft, and the crew lost control, resulting in a crash in a residential area. Both pilots were killed; no injuries occurred on the ground.

Probable Cause

The official investigation determined that the accident was the consequence of an in-flight collision with a power line because the crew adopted a wrong approach configuration to the fire area.

Contributing Factors

The following contributing factors were identified:

  • Poor decision making in attacking the fire, causing the crew to focus their attention on obstacles (pylons) of power line n°500, without considering the presence of the cable guard line n°550.
  • The reduced visibility of obstacles resulting from the smoke of the forest.
  • The inadequate reporting of electricity pylons and associated overhead lines.
  • Non-activation of the required radio links, so the crew could not receive reports on the presence of obstacles.
  • Short and discontinuous experience of the captain in that role, coming from the institution of the "PIC Frozen".
  • The combination of two similarly qualified pilots ("PIC Frozen") in the cockpit for the operation of a flight, one just rehabilitated to a high command function, the other still employed in the role of co-pilot: This condition could have a negative impact in terms of crew integration, obscuring decision making.
  • The existence of criticality in corporate manuals used at the date of the accident.
  • Reduced operational capacity of the crew in the last phase of flight, resulting from the strong heat of the fire under the left wing which penetrated the airplane through an opening created by the separation of a porthole.