On December 26, 2007, a Canadair CL-604 Challenger (registration D-ARWE) operated by Jet Connection Businessflight was involved in an aviation accident near Almaty, Kazakhstan during takeoff. One person was killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The accident involving a CL-604 aircraft registered D-ARWE was caused by the asymmetric lift loss at takeoff which led to aircraft stall right after the liftoff, collision with the ground and obstacles, aircraft destruction and ground fire. This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A); 3 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.
On Dec 25, 2007, a CL-604 (D-ARWE) operated by JetConnection Businessflight AG diverted from Astana to Almaty due to no fuel. After refueling and anti-icing, the flight was preparing for departure to Macao.
Flight Overview and Diversion Details On December 25, 2007, JetConnection Businessflight AG flight JCX826, a CL-604 aircraft with registration D-ARWE, departed Hannover Airport at 12:10 UTC. The flight was a charter operation routed to Astana, Kazakhstan, and then to Macao, China, carrying a crew of three (pilot-in-command, co-pilot, and flight attendant) and one passenger. During the flight, the crew was informed that no fuel was available for refueling at Astana Airport. Consequently, the crew decided to divert to Almaty International Airport in Kazakhstan to refuel. The flight from Hannover to Almaty was reported as normal, with no faults detected in the aircraft's systems or equipment. The aircraft landed at Almaty Airport at 18:46 UTC. ## Ground Handling and Refueling Ground handling and servicing at Almaty Airport were provided by Bercut Air Services KZ. The departure from Almaty to Macao was scheduled for 20:50 UTC on December 25, 2007. In accordance with the work order, Almaty ground services conducted refueling and anti-icing. The pilot-in-command (PIC) conducted the pre-flight check and monitored the refueling and anti-icing of the stabilizer and wings. The PIC reported no faults in the operation of the aircraft's systems and equipment. A total of 8,460 liters (6,827 kg) of TC-1 condition fuel was refueled, bringing the estimated total fuel on board to 7,605 kg. The refueled fuel was distributed in the fuel tanks in accordance with the CL-604 Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM). The estimated aircraft weight was 20,659 kg, with a center of gravity (CG) at 33.1%, which was within the CL-604 AFM limitations. ## Meteorological Information and Anti-Icing Procedure During the pre-flight preparation for the flight to Macao, the crew did not receive meteorological consultation or documentation at the Almaty Meteorological Center. However, the crew had received integrated meteorological consultation for the flight to Macao before takeoff from Hannover. In Almaty, the PIC received updated data via the internet from the German Meteorological Service (DWD) website and from the PPS provider of JetConnection Businessflight AG in Billund, Denmark. According to ATC tape recorder data, at 20:17:55 UTC, the crew informed Ground Control that they were ready to start up and taxi after the completion of the anti-icing procedure. At 20:18:24 UTC, Ground Control instructed the crew to expect start-up in five minutes. At 20:20:48 UTC, in reply to the controller's request, the crew reported that they were expecting anti-icing, which was about to start. While waiting for anti-icing, the crew received the ATC clearance for departure. The de-icing/anti-icing request, signed by the PIC and the Bercut Air Services KZ manager, specified that processing with Type 1 and Type 2 fluids would be conducted in two steps. On the first stage, Type 1 deicing fluid (Killfrost DF Plus) was applied to remove icing with an estimated fluid-to-water ratio of 70/30%. The temperature of the Type 1 fluid in the tank of the SIMON GLOBAL 2110 machine was about +80°C, and at the outlet of the sprayer, it was not less than +60°C. A post-accident check by the investigation team revealed that the temperature of the Type 1 fluid at the sprayer outlet was +66°C, which complied with the CL-604 Operations Manual (OM). On the second stage, Type 2 anti-icing fluid (Killfrost ABC 2000) was used with an estimated fluid-to-water ratio of 100/0%. A delivery receipt mistakenly showed an unreal concentration of 70/00 for the Type 2 fluid instead of the real concentration of 100/00. The CL-604 OM does not suggest preliminary heating or heating monitoring of Type 2 fluid. The amount of Type 2 fluid applied was 250 liters, which was sufficient for the anti-icing of the CL-604, as the recommended minimum for the wing and stabilizer was 100 liters. Laboratory analysis of the fluid samples revealed that the Type 1 fluid had an actual fluid-to-water ratio of 67/33%, and the Type 2 fluid had a ratio of 99/1%. Given the outside air temperature (OAT) at Almaty Airport of minus 13°C at the time of fluid application, these ratios were within the requirements of the CL-604 OM. ## Weather Conditions and Anti-Icing Execution The actual weather at Almaty Airport at 20:49 UTC, as requested by Approach Control, was: surface wind 360° at 2 m/sec, RVR 2,900 m, light snow, mist, clouds 8 oktas (nimbostratus, fractonimbus), cloudbase 150 m, QFE 718 mm mercury, OAT minus 12.9°C, dewpoint minus 13.7°C, and moisture content 93%. The de-icing/anti-icing procedure was conducted in compliance with the CL-604 OM recommendations, in the following order: stabilizer, left wing, right wing. Each surface was first applied with Type 1 fluid and then with Type 2 fluid. The time between the completion of Type 1 application and the beginning of Type 2 application did not exceed 1.5 to 2 minutes, as suggested in the CL-604 OM. The investigation team estimated that the application of Type 2 fluid started at 20:37 UTC. The holdover time of Type 2 fluid with a 100/0 ratio in the OAT range of -3°C to -20°C, with precipitation in the form of snow and snow grain, is 15 to 30 minutes according to the CL-604 OM. During the de-icing/anti-icing, the aircraft's flaps were retracted, and the stabilizer deflection was minus 4.7°, according to FDR information. The de-icing/anti-icing procedure was completed by 20:43 UTC. Upon leaving the aircraft, the PIC made a visual and tactile inspection of the anti-icing quality, deeming it satisfactory, and signed the de-icing/anti-icing receipt. The PIC then returned to the aircraft, and the crew began engine start-up. ## Engine Start-Up and Pre-Departure Checks According to FDR information, by 20:46 UTC, the crew had started up the right engine first, followed by the left engine. The N2 of the right and left engines in idle mode was 61.5% and 62.0%, respectively. Ten seconds after the left engine start-up, the Cowl Anti-Ice was engaged. CVR information indicated that a check at the 'After Engine Start' stage was performed by the flight crew in accordance with the JetConnection Businessflight AG 'ABBRIVIATED CHECKLIST'. However, a comparison of this checklist with the CL-604 D-ARWE AFM checklist (Chapter 4, 'Normal Procedures', Section 'Consolidated Checklists', Item L, 'After Engine Start Check') revealed the absence of checks for the Wing Anti-Ice (WAI) and Cowl Anti-Ice (CAI) systems. The JetConnection Businessflight AG 'ABBRIVIATED CHECKLIST' also did not cover all procedures stipulated by the CL-604 AFM for several other pre-flight preparation stages. At 20:47:42 UTC, the crew reported to Ground Control that they were ready for taxiing. At 20:48:25 UTC, Ground Control cleared the aircraft for taxiing.