Aviation Incident: 5N-BMM Crash During ILS Approach at Port Harcourt

Flight Operations and Approach Sequence 5N-BMM departed Lagos at 1856 hrs for Port Harcourt under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR), with an estimated arrival at 1940 hrs. The aircraft was cleared to maintain FL330. At 1914 hrs, the pilot reported maintaining FL330 with six souls onboard, four hours of fuel endurance, and an estimated arrival at POT VOR at 1940 hrs. The aircraft was cleared to POT, to maintain FL330, with no delay expected for the ILS Approach Runway 21, QNH 1011, and to report when released by Lagos. At 1921 hrs, the pilot reported 100 NM to POT and requested descent. The aircraft was cleared to descend to FL150. At 1927 hrs, the pilot requested further descent and was cleared to 3,300 feet on QNH 1011, but acknowledged 3500 feet. At 1931 hrs, the aircraft was re-cleared to FL090 due to departing traffic on Runway 03. At 1934 hrs, 5N-BMM reported maintaining FL090 and was re-cleared to FL050. At 1936 hrs, the aircraft was re-cleared to 2,000 feet on QNH 1011 and cleared for the straight-in ILS Approach Runway 21, with instructions to report on the localizer. At 1947 hrs, the pilot reported final for Runway 21 and was asked to contact Tower on 119.2. The Tower asked 5N-BMM to report on the glide slope Runway 21. At 1950 hrs, the Tower asked 5N-BMM to confirm on the glide slope, and the crew confirmed “Charlie, we have three miles to run”. The Tower cleared 5N-BMM to land with surface wind calm but advised caution due to the wet runway surface. 5N-BMM responded “wind calm”. At 1952:26 hrs, the auto voice callout “minimums minimums” alerted the crew. At 1952:40 hrs, the pilot flying (PF) said “I am not on the centerline”. At 1952:48 hrs, he said “I can't see down”. At 1952:55 hrs, the pilot monitoring (PM) said to the pilot flying, “I am telling you to go down”, and the pilot flying replied “I will go down”. Five seconds later, the aircraft crashed. ## Post-Crash Events and Investigation Findings The crew exited the aircraft without completing the Emergency Evacuation Checklist, leaving the right engine running for about 28 minutes after the crash. The Fire Service eventually used their water hose to shut down the running engine. At 19:54 hrs, the Tower called 5N-BMM to pass on the landing time as 19:53 hrs, but received no response. There was no indication that the aircraft was taxiing on the runway because it was dark and no light was visible, prompting the need to alert Fire personnel. The watch room was asked to provide the Tower with information, but they could not do so due to the lack of two-way contact with the Fire trucks. The Tower could not raise the Fire truck due to the absence of two-way communication; however, the Fire truck was later cleared to proceed to the runway as the Tower could not ascertain the aircraft's position. The aircraft was turned 90° because of a large culvert that held the right wing, causing the aircraft to spin and turn 90° facing the runway, two meters from the active runway. The culvert was uprooted due to the aircraft's impact forces. The wheel broke off because of the gully that runs parallel to the runway. ## Probable Cause and Contributory Factors The official findings identified the probable cause as the decision of the pilot to continue the approach without the required visual references. Contributory factors included poor crew coordination (CRM), pairing two captains together, and marginal weather conditions.