Accident Overview
On 0659 local time, a twin-engine airplane departed Villavicencio-La Vanguardia Airport Runway 05 for a training flight conducting a proficiency check of the captain. On board were one instructor, one captain, and one mechanic. Approximately 10 minutes after takeoff, while cruising at 6,000 feet over mountainous terrain in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), the airplane struck trees and crashed on a slope in the Restrepo region. The wreckage was located three days later. All three crew members died.
Investigation and Probable Cause
The official investigation determined the probable causes as controlled flight into terrain during the execution of the IFR departure procedure VVC2A. The crew mistakenly turned left, contrary to the procedure, directing the aircraft toward mountainous terrain in the foothills of the eastern range. Additionally, the crew lost situational awareness and executed a controlled left turn contrary to the departure procedure indications, despite being an experienced crew familiar with the area. The specific reasons for the loss of situational awareness could not be determined.
Contributing factors were also identified. The operator lacked detailed, organized instructional plans and syllabi for maneuvers such as the VVC2A departure. There was no specific syllabus for the recurrent check, especially given the crew composition of two instructor pilots, one of whom was conducting the check on the other. The operator inadequately planned and supervised the flight, failing to conduct a risk analysis or monitor preparation and execution. The crew's flight planning was deficient; they informally changed the VFR flight plan to IFR, did not conduct a complete briefing, and omitted several IFR procedures. The crew neglected to specify a route and IFR departure in the flight plan, did not request proper ATC authorization, did not define a standard departure procedure, and failed to activate a transponder code. Inaccurate phraseology was used. The crew had insufficient experience and training in IFR flights, as most of their DC3 experience was in VMC and VFR conditions. Overconfidence was influenced by their high flight experience, instructor status, and familiarity with the area.
Air traffic control also failed to observe IFR procedures. ATC did not issue complete authorization for the IFR flight, did not provide a standardized instrument departure (SID) or other safe departure procedure, and did not assign a transponder code before takeoff, delaying radar contact. Control transfer from the tower to approach control occurred late (3 minutes 35 seconds after takeoff) despite IMC conditions. The approach control radar display was incomplete with insufficient symbology. ATC did not follow radar surveillance techniques and used non-standard phraseology. Both the crew and ATC lacked situational awareness during what seemed a routine flight in IMC conditions near mountainous terrain.