Background
The aircraft was operating a scheduled international flight from Buenos Aires to Rio de Janeiro (Galeao Airport) and onward to Lisbon. It arrived at Galeao following an uneventful flight, and a different crew took over for the final segment to Lisbon. The takeoff began at 2303 hours GMT from runway 14, with acceleration appearing normal.
Takeoff Attempt
Between 100 and 135 knots (V1), the pilot-in-command noted the control column was too far back and pushed it forward. At this point, the co-pilot released the controls, as is normal at V1. An attempt to rotate the aircraft was believed to have been made around 132 knots. The aircraft continued to accelerate. When the co-pilot announced 148 knots (rotation speed VR), the pilot pulled back on the control column, but the aircraft did not respond, prompting him to push it forward again. The flight recorder showed no indication of this rotation attempt. Both pilots then pulled back, but the nose did not rotate, as the pilot had reduced power 14 seconds after reaching VR. Brake application was recorded for 5 seconds prior to any power reduction, with the first braking marks found approximately 2300 meters from the runway threshold.
Abort and Collision
Realizing the aircraft could not stop on the remaining runway, the pilot turned off the runway to the right and fully reduced power. Brakes were applied, but reverse thrust was not used. Heavy and steady braking marks began 2600 meters from the threshold. On his own initiative, the co-pilot applied full power and attempted to deploy the spoilers, but was unable to due to bumps. The right wing lowered, causing engines No. 3 and 4 to drag. The left landing gear wheels sank into sand, dragging engines No. 1 and 2. All four engines lost their ejectors and reversion cones, causing the aircraft to accelerate. It continued at high speed, struck the airport wall, crossed an adjoining highway, lost engines No. 1 and 2 and the left landing gear, and finally came to rest in the sea 50 meters from shore. The aircraft drifted 100 meters while floating and sank to a depth of 8 meters.
Evacuation and Outcome
When the aircraft stopped, the automatic emergency lighting system did not function, leaving no lights on board. One cabin attendant used one of two available flashlights. The darkness increased panic and confusion. Passengers could not use the main door as an exit because it would open into the sea, and they did not know the locations of emergency exits. Ultimately, the exits were opened, and most passengers left on the starboard side. The four exits, all located in the central part of the fuselage, hampered evacuation given the 94 passengers. The crew exited via the cockpit windows. No emergency instructions had been given; passengers and most crew did not take their life jackets when leaving. Although the aircraft had six life rafts, no crew member attempted to use them. The aircraft drifted 330 feet downstream and submerged in 25 minutes. One crew member and 14 passengers were killed, 46 occupants were wounded, and 44 were uninjured.
Probable Cause
The take-off was discontinued when the aircraft would not rotate at a speed of 175 kt because the stabilizer setting had switched from 3° nose-up to 1-3/4° nose-down. Contributing factors to the accident were the delayed decision of the pilot to abort the take-off and the incorrect compliance with the standard procedures used for emergency stopping.