No fatalities

Flight KU32 Crash: High Descent Rate and Procedure Violations (9K-ACG)

Kuwait City, KuwaitLanding (descent or approach)

On June 30, 1966, a Hawker Siddeley HS.121 Trident (registration 9K-ACG) operated by Kuwait Airways was involved in an aviation accident near Kuwait City, Kuwait during landing or approach. No fatalities were reported. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: High rate of descent and non-observance of Company's regulations. Corrective action carried out in calling for 10 500 rpm was not sufficient to re-establish level flight. A further demand for additional power was too late to be of any use. This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A); 2 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A)Primary reportUpdated 2026-06-12Data APIEditorial standards

Flight KU32 crashed 4 km short of the runway at night due to a high rate of descent and failure to follow company approach procedures.

Flight Profile and Approach Initiation Flight KU32 was a scheduled international service from Beirut, Lebanon, to Kuwait. The flight departed Beirut at 1855 GMT and proceeded without significant incident, aside from a noted tendency for the autopilot pitch lock to disconnect. At 2028 GMT, the aircraft was cleared to descend from flight level 300 to flight level 95 via the DY NDB. The pilot-in-command elected to conduct a visual approach and informed the co-pilot of this decision. The aircraft reached flight level 95 approximately three minutes before the DY NDB and maintained that level until passing the beacon at 2039 GMT, when it was cleared to descend to 3,000 ft. The crew agreed to report on left base for runway 33R.

Probable cause

High rate of descent and non-observance of Company's regulations. Corrective action carried out in calling for 10 500 rpm was not sufficient to re-establish level flight. A further demand for additional power was too late to be of any use. The pilot-in-command did not follow the procedures laid down in the operations manual for approach and landing of the aircraft type. The cockpit check for the approach and landing was still being carried out when the aircraft hit the ground and the pilot-in-command's altimeter was set on the QNH instead of the QFE.