Incident Overview
On the day of the accident, the flight crew conducted taxi drills, with the First Officer and Flight Engineer performing them. After the Commander turned the aircraft through 180 degrees near the threshold of runway 28, aligned it on the runway centerline, and selected the wheel brakes to park, the crew completed the runway items. A power setting of 100 percent thrust was made, all engine indications were checked as correct, and the engine relight switches were selected 'ON'. The wheel brakes were then released, and the takeoff run commenced at about 13:46, with the Commander piloting.
Sequence of Events
The aircraft accelerated normally. The First Officer called out indicated airspeeds at 80 knots and 100 knots and made a call of 'Wet V1' at 117 knots, then removed his hand from the throttles. At or just after the 'Wet V1' call, the Flight Engineer and the First Officer heard a noise, which the latter attributed to the aircraft's entry into standing water. According to the Flight Engineer, the aircraft appeared to decelerate at the same time. The Commander felt a marked deceleration consistent with a loss of engine power, whereupon he immediately closed the throttles, called "Abandon", deployed the airbrakes and lift dumpers, and applied the wheel brakes fully. However, the Flight Engineer stated that all engine indications had been normal prior to the closing of the throttles. On seeing a hand close the throttles, the First Officer selected emergency reverse thrust on the pod engines, checked the engine indications were correct, and maintained the application of emergency reverse thrust until the aircraft eventually came to rest.
The First Officer and the Commander checked the indicated pressures on the wheel brake gauges, which showed the wheel brakes were fully applied. The initial deceleration felt satisfactory to the crew, then quickly deteriorated, and the First Officer formed the impression that the aircraft was aquaplaning. The Flight Engineer then noticed that the aircraft had begun to drift gradually to the left of the runway centerline, apparently as the result of a deliberate action by the Commander. Subsequently, it became evident to the Commander that he could not bring the aircraft to a halt within the runway confines. Some 200 to 300 meters before the end of the runway, he turned the aircraft to the left using nose-wheel steering and applied full left rudder. As the nose wheels ran off the runway onto the grass, the aircraft slewed to the left, then skidded broadside to the right for a short distance before it came to an abrupt stop at the side of the runway in a right wing down attitude, with the right wing tip close to the threshold lights of runway 10.
Evacuation
Evacuation drills were initiated, and the passengers left the aircraft in a reasonably orderly manner, the majority by slide from the main exit doors and the foremost right overwing emergency exit. Catering equipment in the galleys came out of stowage during the accident, obstructing access to the forward emergency exit door and preventing use of this exit and its slide during the evacuation. All 117 occupants escaped uninjured, while the aircraft was considered damaged beyond repair.
Probable Cause
The official investigation stated that the accident was caused by the Commander's decision to abandon take-off on a wet runway at or close to V1. Contributory factors were the low effective braking coefficient of friction achieved by the aircraft and the failure of the Commander to ascertain the extent and depth of water present on the runway prior to takeoff.