What happened
On 4 February 2020, an Airbus A350-900, registered F-HREV, operated by French Bee, was on final approach to Paris-Orly. While the aircraft was stabilized for landing, a predictive windshear warning was suddenly triggered. The captain ordered an immediate go-around, which was executed manually by the copilot.
During the climb, the aircraft deviated significantly from the published missed approach path. The copilot, who was acting as the pilot flying, failed to respond to altitude alerts, instructions from the captain, or communications from air traffic control. The aircraft climbed well above the required 2,000 ft altitude and drifted to the right of the runway centerline, passing over the control tower.
As the aircraft descended, the situation became further complicated by a low energy alert triggered by the extension of the speedbrakes. The aircraft also entered a potential conflict with a departing aircraft. The captain eventually took control of the aircraft, stabilized the flight path, and completed a second approach, landing safely without further incident.
The investigation
The BEA examined flight data, radio communications, and crew statements to reconstruct the sequence of events. The investigation focused on the sudden change in workload following the windshear warning and the unusual behavior of the copilot. Investigators analyzed the aircraft's flight parameters, including pitch, airspeed, and altitude deviations, as well as the interaction between the crew and air traffic controllers. The investigation also reviewed the cockpit's automation usage and the impact of the sudden, uncoordinated go-around maneuver on the crew's situational awareness.
Findings
- The primary cause of the flight path deviations was the cognitive incapacitation of the copilot, which prevented him from responding to critical flight parameters and instructions.
- The sudden triggering of the predictive windshear warning created a significant surprise effect, which, combined with the high workload of a manual go-around, destabilized the pilot.
- The captain's decision to initiate the go-around without prior coordination with the copilot may have contributed to the pilot's incapacitation.
- The low stabilization altitude of 2,000 ft at Orly provided insufficient time for the crew to manage the complex configuration changes and flight path corrections.
- The copilot's lack of awareness led to unannounced interventions, such as the extension of speedbrakes, which triggered a low energy alert.