Casualties unknown

2023-10-04: EMBRAER ERJ 190‐100 IGW (YV2966) — CONVIASA — En ruta SVMI ‐ SVMT, VE

En ruta SVMI ‐ SVMT, VE
Sourcesthe Venezuelan Civil Aviation Accident Investigation Board (JIAAC Venezuela)Primary reportUpdated 1781150548Data APIEditorial standards
Aircraft registered YV2966
Aircraft registered YV2966. Photo: Colin Cooke Photo / CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons

An Embraer 190-100 IGW operating for CONVIASA was forced to divert back to Maiquetía after a slat-flap configuration error occurred during approach to Maturín.

What happened

On an Embraer 190-100 IGW, registration YV2966, operated by CONVIASA, a flight was underway from Maiquetía International Airport to José Tadeo Monagas International Airport in Maturín. The aircraft was carrying 77 people, including 70 passengers and 7 crew members, including technical staff.

During the approach phase to Maturín at 13:16 UTC, while flying at 3,000 feet, the flight crew attempted to configure the aircraft for landing by selecting flap position 03. During this process, the Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) displayed a "SLAT-FLAP LEVEL DISAG" message. This failure prevented the crew from extending the flaps to position 02.

Following established Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) procedures, the pilot in command canceled the approach. The crew requested authorization for a holding pattern at the MEREY position to attempt to troubleshoot the flap configuration. While testing the movement between positions 0 and 02, the crew confirmed that the flaps would not extend to position 03. Due to the limited runway length at Maturín compared to Maiquetía, the pilot decided to return to the origin airport. The aircraft landed safely at Maiquetía at 13:54 UTC with no injuries to the passengers or crew.

The investigation

The JIAAC investigation included interviews with the flight crew and a review of various operational documents, including licenses, maintenance logs, and flight plans. Investigators also examined the aircraft's airworthiness certificates and maintenance records from the operator's maintenance organization (OMAC-N 431).

A joint inspection was conducted between the JIAAC and the airline's maintenance technicians to perform a fault isolation process according to the manufacturer's maintenance manual. The inspection focused on the root cause of the slat-flap asymmetry error.

Findings

  • The investigation identified the malfunction of the SLAT POSITION SNSR UNIT as the primary cause of the incident.
  • A contributing factor was the degradation of this component prior to its scheduled maintenance inspection interval.
  • Environmental conditions, specifically high humidity exposure, were identified as a contributing factor to the component's premature degradation.

Probable cause

The probable cause of the incident was the malfunction of the slat position sensor unit due to component degradation occurring before its scheduled maintenance interval, exacerbated by constant exposure to high humidity.

Investigation report by the Venezuelan Civil Aviation Accident Investigation Board (JIAAC Venezuela). Original record: https://www.mppt.gob.ve/download/179430/. This page is a structured re-presentation; facts and quotes are in the Junta de Investigacion de Accidentes de Aviacion Civil (JIAAC), Venezuela - MppT.