Douglas DC-3 accident at Wichita, Kansas, 1 Jun 1941

Accident narrative

On June 1, 1941, at approximately 2:25 a.m., two Douglas DC-3 airliners collided on the ground at the Wichita Municipal Airport in Kansas. Transcontinental and Western Air (TWA) Flight 6 was taking off when it struck Braniff Airways Flight 2, which was parked on the field awaiting a flight clearance. Both aircraft sustained major damage. None of the 15 passengers and three crew members aboard the Braniff flight, nor the 15 passengers and four crew members aboard the TWA flight, were injured.

### The flights

Braniff Flight 2 was a scheduled service from Brownsville, Texas, to Chicago, Illinois. It was crewed by Captain Vernon I. Powers, who had logged approximately 10,984 flying hours, and First Officer Oliver M. Huff.

TWA Flight 6 was a scheduled service from Los Angeles, California, to New York, New York. Captain Edward E. Boqua, who had accumulated approximately 7,600 flying hours, was in command, accompanied by First Officer David W. Richwine and a third captain riding in the jump seat.

The Board noted that both aircraft were loaded within their approved limits.

### Sequence of events

An extensive construction program was underway at the Wichita airport, requiring the use of temporary white boundary lights that were frequently moved. The airport control tower was not operated between 8:00 p.m. and 6:15 a.m., though an interphone system connected the airline offices, the Civil Aeronautics Administration, and the Weather Bureau.

TWA Flight 6 had originally departed Wichita for Kansas City at 11:06 p.m. but returned due to thunderstorms. It was redispatched at 2:03 a.m.

Braniff Flight 2 landed at Wichita at 2:03 a.m. and parked near the TWA airplane. Captain Powers wished to change his flight plan to Kansas City to fly at "minimum altitude." At 2:16 a.m., the Braniff aircraft taxied away from the ramp. Captain Powers taxied approximately 700 feet south, close to the temporary boundary lights on the west side of the usable area. He turned the airplane into the southeast wind, switched off his landing lights, and waited for approval of his new flight plan. He remained in this position for approximately eight minutes.

Inside the terminal, Captain Boqua of TWA saw the Braniff airplane preparing to leave. He waited a few moments to establish a time-separation between the flights. When he walked out to his aircraft, he could no longer see the Braniff plane and concluded it had taken off.

At 2:21 a.m., Captain Boqua taxied TWA Flight 6 to the west end of the loading ramp, about 750 feet behind the parked Braniff aircraft. He switched on his landing lights and began his take-off roll toward the southeast.

As the TWA airplane accelerated and Captain Boqua raised the tail, both he and First Officer Richwine saw the Braniff airplane almost directly in their path. Captain Boqua immediately closed the throttles, applied full left brake and rudder, and rolled the control wheel fully to the left. The TWA airplane swerved left, its right wing rising, but struck and passed over the left wing of the Braniff airplane.

### What the investigation found

The collision occurred in a moderate rain, though visibility was better than two miles and was not considered a contributing factor. The TWA aircraft's right wing was seriously damaged, with broken structure and a broken aileron. The Braniff aircraft's left wing tip and aileron were broken off. Investigators found that the Braniff airplane's navigation, tail, and landing lights operated normally.

It seems that Captain Boqua exercised good judgment. He had looked for the Braniff airplane and failed to see it. The Board noted he could not be criticized for mistaking the Braniff airplane's tail light for a temporary boundary light, as it was the same color, nearly the same size, and positioned where it appeared to be the last in a row of boundary lights.

It seemed that Captain Powers was careless in parking 700 feet from the ramp with his landing lights off for eight minutes without requesting his ground personnel to notify TWA of his position. Furthermore, his request for "minimum altitude" was confusing because it did not specify whether he intended to fly by contact or instrument rules, which delayed his clearance.

The ground personnel of both airlines were also faulted. Braniff personnel did not remain on the ramp to signal the airplane until it took off, as required by their operations manual. Neither airline's radio operator used the interphone system to notify the other of their aircraft's status, despite knowing the schedules and the delays.

The Board noted that if the control tower had been in continuous 24-hour operation, the accident would not have occurred. Additionally, the accident accelerated research into developing an aircraft tail light that could be easily distinguished from ground lights or stars.

### Probable cause

The Board found that the probable cause of the accident was "the action of the captain of Braniff Flight 2 in remaining in the take-off area of the airport for an abnormal length of time without requesting the Braniff ground station to inform TWA that he had not yet taken off."

Contributing factors included the failure of both Braniff and TWA ground personnel to ascertain the status of the flights and advise each other, the failure to establish an adequate interphone procedure to coordinate activities, and the ease with which the required white tail light could be confused with ground lights.