Douglas DC-4 accident at Sandspit, British Columbia, 19 Jan 1952

Accident narrative

On January 19, 1952, Northwest Airlines Flight 324, a Douglas DC-4, crashed in Hecate Strait less than a mile offshore following an attempted precautionary landing at the Sandspit, British Columbia, airstrip. Of the 40 passengers and three crew members aboard, only seven passengers survived. The aircraft was substantially damaged upon impact and subsequently destroyed by the action of tides.

**The flight**

Flight 324 was a military contract flight originating in Tokyo, Japan, destined for McChord Air Force Base in Tacoma, Washington, via Shemya and Anchorage, Alaska. At Anchorage, a new crew took over: Captain John J. Pfaffinger, First Officer Kenneth H. Kuhn, and Stewardess Jane Cheadle. The 40 passengers were all military personnel.

The pilots were briefed on weather and route information prior to departure. Forecasts for the planned 10,000-foot cruising altitude indicated instrument conditions, broken to overcast skies, occasional light aircraft icing, light turbulence, and snow showers.

The aircraft departed Elmendorf Air Force Base at Anchorage at 2111 on January 18. It carried 2,600 gallons of fuel and 100 gallons of oil, with a gross takeoff weight of 68,275 pounds, well below the permissible 71,800 pounds. The flight climbed to 10,000 feet and later requested and received clearance to descend to 8,000 feet.

**The emergency and attempted landing**

The trip was uneventful until 0003 on January 19, when the pilot reported opposite Sitka, Alaska, that the No. 1 propeller had been feathered. In a later transmission, the pilot ascribed the trouble to a "broken" oil cooler and advised they were proceeding to Sandspit. Annette Airport was slightly closer, but weather conditions there were below minimums.

First Lieutenant Donald E. Baker, a passenger who had been invited to the cockpit, advised that the pilot noted a drop in oil pressure and a rapid loss of oil in the No. 1 engine before shutting it down. Shortly after the propeller was feathered, a small amount of ice formed on the forward cockpit window. The aircraft was climbed 1,000 feet, stopping further ice accretion. According to Lt. Baker, the aircraft flew well on three engines. The captain flew from the left seat while the first officer made radio contacts.

Local weather at Sandspit at 0130 was overcast with an estimated 2,500-foot ceiling, 10 miles visibility, a temperature of 34 degrees, and a 10-knot south-southwest wind. The landing strip had been cleared with snowplows, leaving a thin coating of packed snow and ice with fair braking action. It was lighted with kerosene flarepots because plowed snow covered the electric lights.

Lt. Baker stated the descent appeared normal in light turbulence, though he thought the approach was somewhat high and touchdown was made with little flare-out. Ground witnesses—the airstrip radio operator and a Canadian customs official—watched the aircraft touch down approximately one-third of the distance down the runway. After a short roll, power was applied near the mid-point of the strip. The aircraft took off without striking the snow banks on either side and cleared a two-foot driftwood fence at the end of the runway. Witnesses noted that acceleration appeared slow, and the aircraft entered a slight left bank before being lost to sight.

Lt. Baker, who had returned to the cabin, heard the hydraulic pumps operating and felt vibrations he associated with an impending stall. He felt the aircraft settling. At the first impact with the water, all cabin lights went out. The aircraft bounced, slipped to the left, and struck the water a second time with the left wing slightly down. Survivors stated deceleration was rapid but not violent.

**Evacuation and rescue**

Northwest Airlines considered three-engine operation a potential, not an actual, emergency. Because no ditching was anticipated, passengers had not been instructed to don life vests or prepare for an abnormal landing. The aircraft carried sufficient vests and three life rafts, but passengers had been given pamphlets describing a collar-type vest, whereas the aircraft carried vest-type jackets. No rafts were launched; the first officer and others made strenuous but futile attempts to push a 15-man raft through the astrodome opening. Emergency lighting in the cabin was not utilized.

Survivors evacuated through the left cabin emergency exit, the main cabin door, and the astrodome, clustering on the right wing tip as the aircraft settled to the bottom. The Sandspit radio operator heard shouting, launched a small boat with the customs official, and rescued seven people who had been in the near-freezing water for about an hour and a half. Drownings and exposure accounted for 36 fatalities.

**What the investigation found**

Recovery attempts were abandoned after a few days due to tides and corrosion. Divers estimated by feel that the wing flaps were extended zero degrees. When the control pedestal was later located, the landing gear handle was "up" and the flap handle was "neutral," suggesting the pilot moved it from the full down position to retract the flaps during acceleration.

The nose gear washed ashore and was examined by Board engineers, who found it was retracted when torn from the airframe. However, the Board noted that a review of DC-4 service difficulties disclosed instances where the nose gear failed to retract fully during cold weather and crosswind takeoffs. A partially retracted nose gear could cause failure of the rods actuating the nose wheel well doors, creating the buffeting noticed by Lt. Baker, and would deteriorate climb performance.

Maintenance records revealed that the No. 1 engine had exceeded its permissible 1,500 hours between overhauls by 225 hours. The Board found this was due to a clerical error of omission between Northwest Airlines and Trans World Airlines, without intent to exceed limitations. The oil cooler reported as "broken" had been in service for only 93 hours, though there was no positive means of ascertaining it caused the oil loss.

The Board analyzed the aircraft's climb capabilities. Douglas Aircraft Company performance curves showed a climb would have been possible with flaps extended 0 to 15 degrees if proper airspeeds were maintained, three engines continuously developed rated takeoff power, the airplane was free of ice, and the landing gear retracted without malfunction. The Board noted that directional controllability of the DC-4 during three-engine takeoffs is such that pulling the nose wheel off the ground at low speeds results in veering. Because the aircraft did not strike the snow banks, it was apparent the takeoff was not made at a speed appreciably lower than recommended.

However, the Board noted that possible ice accretion could have lowered airfoil efficiency, or the engines might not have been developing the same power as during the earlier climb. The Board found that the captain's decision to land at Sandspit conformed with good operating procedures, and the attempted go-around may have been necessary given the marginal runway distance remaining. The Board noted it would have been highly desirable for the captain to have prepared the passengers for a possible ditching, which probably would have resulted in less loss of life.

**Probable Cause**

The Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was "a nose gear retraction difficulty in connection with an icing condition or a power loss, which made the aircraft incapable of maintaining flight."