Accident at Charleston, West Virginia, 12 May 1959

Accident narrative

On May 12, 1959, at 1529 eastern standard time, Capital Airlines Flight 983, a Lockheed Constellation L-049, landed on a wet runway at Kanawha County Airport in Charleston, West Virginia. Unable to decelerate, the captain intentionally ground looped the aircraft to avoid a sharp drop-off at the runway's end. The Constellation skidded off the runway and slid down a steep embankment, where it was destroyed by fire. Of the 44 people on board, one passenger and one crew member died, and one passenger was seriously burned. The remaining occupants escaped with little or no injury.

### The Flight Flight 983 originated in Washington, D.C., destined for Atlanta, Georgia, with several intermediate stops. A scheduled crew change occurred in Buffalo, New York, where Captain R. Ohm, First Officer C. Spoth, Flight Engineer John Howanski, Flight Engineer-Trainee B. J. Morrison, and Hostesses N. F. Marshall and E. Viera took over the flight. Captain Ohm had 4,966 total piloting hours, including 293 as a Constellation captain. First Officer Spoth had 2,321 total hours, with 822 as a Constellation copilot.

The flight departed its Pittsburgh stop at 1433 on an instrument flight rules plan. At takeoff, the aircraft weighed 81,253 pounds, well under the maximum allowable landing weight of 83,000 pounds for Charleston's runway 32. There were 38 passengers, including two nonrevenue company employees and one infant, and six crew members on board.

### The Approach and Landing At 1518, the flight received a special weather report for Charleston indicating scattered clouds at 600 and 1,500 feet, an estimated 3,000-foot overcast, five miles visibility, light rain showers, ground fog, and a three-knot wind from the east-northeast. The Charleston tower cleared the flight for an instrument approach to runway 23, to circle visually to runway 32.

The crew shortly advised they were abandoning the approach, then reported they were in the clear and would cross the airport to enter a downwind leg. Captain Ohm took control of the aircraft. Tower personnel noted the flight momentarily disappeared behind scud or ground fog while turning to base leg, but remained in clear sight thereafter.

Rain was falling, and the runway was thoroughly wet with localized areas of standing water. Kanawha County Airport is built on a mountain with terrain slanting abruptly downward at the runway ends. Runway 32 was 4,750 feet long.

Eyewitnesses described the approach as appearing normal, with the aircraft touching down 800 to 1,000 feet from the approach end, within the first third of the runway. The crew stated that flaps were extended late in the final approach and were fully down at touchdown, which witnesses corroborated. The crew also reported carrying an airspeed of 105 knots during the final portion of the approach; the company's flight manual specified a boundary crossing speed of 95 knots.

Following touchdown, the aircraft did not appear to decelerate. The crew stated that brakes were applied immediately and the system appeared to function normally, with normal pressure and hard pedals, but the aircraft did not slow. The captain stated he ordered the first officer to raise the flaps early in the landing roll to put weight on the wheels and increase traction, but the first officer did not hear the command.

Realizing the airplane could neither be stopped on the runway nor safely flown out, the captain decided to initiate a left ground loop. He called for full power on the number 4 engine. The flight engineer misunderstood the command and applied power to all four engines. When the aircraft did not respond as intended, the captain saw all throttles were forward and quickly closed throttles one, two, and three.

Witnesses heard a blast of engine power as the aircraft veered left near the intersection of runways 32 and 23. It left the paved surface about 600 feet from the far end of the runway, crossed a sodded area and a two-foot ridge, and disappeared over the steep embankment right wing first. The aircraft came to rest 200 feet down the 32-degree slope and immediately caught fire. Passengers evacuated through the left wing emergency exit and the rear door, while the crew escaped through the cockpit windows.

### What the Investigation Found Investigators found the first tire marks 3,450 feet from the approach end of runway 32. The marks indicated the aircraft was skidding with the nose gear slightly to the left. All tire marks were a whitish discoloration on the runway surface, which the Board noted is definitely associated with aquaplaning, rather than the dark marks usually found on a dry runway.

The investigation determined the aircraft's nose was turning left, but its forward movement was a gentle left curve. When it went over the embankment, the nose was heading 180 degrees while the direction of travel was 290 degrees. During the slide down the slope, the right main landing gear collapsed, and the number 3 engine was torn from its mounts and reversed position. A broken propeller blade penetrated the left main fuel tank, and the fuselage broke open.

Fire destroyed the entire structure except the empennage, outer wing panels, and nose gear. Because of the severe fire damage and the crew's statement that the engines functioned normally, a teardown examination of the powerplants was not made. All propeller blades were found bent forward and counter to rotation.

The Board reviewed NASA test data on wet runway surfaces, which indicated that under certain conditions, an aircraft can ride on a film of water—aquaplane—making its brakes completely ineffective. Three other aircraft landed at Charleston near the time of the accident; one reported normal braking, one reported poor braking, and a light airplane experienced difficulty.

The Board determined the aircraft did aquaplane during a portion of the landing roll. The Board believed the approach speed was faster than recommended, partially caused by lowering the flaps on the final approach. The Board further believed that under the wet, windless conditions, the landing should have been made closer to the approach end.

The Board noted that when the captain faced a real emergency, delegating the power controls to the flight engineer was not optimum procedure, and that handling the throttles himself might well have resulted in less disastrous results.

### Probable Cause The Civil Aeronautics Board determined that "the probable cause of this accident was the pilot's action of landing the aircraft too fast on the wet runway under conditions conducive to aquaplaning, making early deceleration impossible. An additional factor was the poor coordination of the crew throughout the approach and landing."