Accident at Kansas City, Missouri, 29 Jan 1963

Accident narrative

**The Crash of Continental Air Lines Flight 290**

On January 29, 1963, Continental Air Lines Flight 290, a Vickers Viscount 812, crashed while attempting to land at Municipal Airport in Kansas City, Missouri. After flying the length of the runway without touching down, the aircraft nosed over sharply from an altitude of 90 feet and dived into the ground. All eight occupants—three crew members and five passengers—received fatal injuries, and the aircraft was destroyed by impact and subsequent fire.

**The Flight**

Flight 290 was a regularly scheduled operation from Midland, Texas, to Kansas City, with several intermediate stops. The flight departed its final stop in Tulsa, Oklahoma, at 2154. The crew consisted of Captain Joseph W. Smith, who had 18,611 flying hours including 3,409 in the Viscount, and First Officer Sherl C. George, who had 5,761 hours with 2,648 in the Viscount. Both were properly certificated and currently qualified.

Weather forecasts provided to the crew predicted moderate to heavy mixed icing below 5,000 feet in southern Kansas and Oklahoma, and cloudiness with sub-freezing temperatures in the Kansas City area.

The flight proceeded normally under Instrument Flight Rules. Approaching Kansas City, the crew received radar vectors to the Instrument Landing System (ILS) final approach course. The local controller cleared the flight to land and advised that they could make a straight-in landing if they wished. The crew replied that they would land straight-in on runway 18. This was the last transmission received from the aircraft.

**The Approach and Crash**

The flight recorder indicated that during the descent, the aircraft's airspeed erratically decreased from 255 to 198 knots. The aircraft stabilized on the inbound ILS localizer heading, but flew significantly below the glide path until shortly before reaching the runway.

Witnesses observed the aircraft cross the runway threshold at approximately 80 feet above the ground. The flight recorder showed the airspeed was approximately 132 knots at this point. Instead of touching down, the aircraft flew over the 7,000-foot runway in a nose-up climbing attitude, accompanied by engine sounds normally associated with a go-around or takeoff. The main landing gears were observed in the down position.

About 700 feet past the threshold, the aircraft decelerated to 118 knots with no loss of altitude. The altitude remained nearly constant until about 3,000 feet down the runway, where the aircraft descended to about 50 feet. It then ascended to an altitude of 90 feet. During this time, the airspeed steadily increased, reaching 138 knots.

Near the south end of the runway, the aircraft nosed over sharply into a steep dive, wings level. The flight recorder's acceleration trace showed a negative excursion terminating at -0.9G at impact. The aircraft struck a dirt blast mound 284 feet beyond the south end of the runway at an attitude more than 22 degrees below the horizon. The main fuselage and major wing portions skidded over a river dike and came to rest 680 feet beyond the runway.

**What the Investigation Found**

Investigators found all major components of the aircraft in the wreckage area. The control surfaces were properly attached and operational, with no evidence of binding or interference. The elevator trim was near neutral. The engines showed no evidence of pre-impact fire or operational distress. Propeller slash marks at the initial impact point indicated all four propellers were rotating at 15,000 RPM.

The landing flaps were found at 32 degrees, and examination of the mechanisms revealed they had been retracted from a more extended position. The landing gear handle in the cockpit was in the "up" position. The nose gear was just out of the down-and-locked position, and the main gears were down, though the left gear locks were slightly withdrawn. Investigators found broken bolts on the high-pressure hydraulic filter caps, which showed evidence of fatigue failure and fire, indicating a possible hydraulic leak.

Weather data and pilot reports confirmed an icing layer existed in the Kansas City area between 6,000 and 3,500 feet, with temperatures ranging from -2 to -12 degrees Celsius. Flight 290 was in this region for 8 to 10 minutes. Continental Air Lines procedures required the airfoil anti-icing system to be turned on prior to entering icing conditions, while the windshield anti-icing was to be kept on "low" at all times.

The Board reviewed a similar incident involving a Continental Air Lines Viscount in February 1963. In that event, the aircraft became extremely nose-heavy when 40 degrees of flaps were selected. After a safe landing, a one-inch thick buildup of rough, horn-shaped rime ice was found on the horizontal and vertical stabilizers. The crew had not used the airfoil anti-icing system because they saw no ice on the heated windshield.

Wind tunnel tests by the manufacturer demonstrated that horn-type ice could form on an unheated airfoil in 10 to 20 minutes under the temperatures present in Kansas City. The tests showed that this ice shape drastically reduces the maximum negative lift of the horizontal tailplane. When flaps are lowered or airspeed increases, the tailplane approaches a stall condition, producing a severe nose-down pitching moment.

Investigators found no evidence that a pilot-induced maneuver caused the sudden dive. A Vickers representative testified that the elevator trim and servo tabs could not provide enough deflection to force the aircraft into a 22-degree dive in the available altitude, nor could the autopilot. Tests also proved the propellers would not go into flat pitch during a go-around.

The Board analyzed the aircraft's deceleration over the runway and concluded it was not generated solely by flap selection, but likely by a reduction in power combined with flap extension, probably to 40 degrees. The Board believed the crew initiated a go-around but did not follow prescribed procedures, which called for flaps at 20 degrees and gear retracted. The gear may have remained extended due to the hydraulic system failure indicated by the broken filter bolts.

The Board believed that Flight 290 accumulated ice during its descent. Because the windshield anti-icing system was used continuously, the crew was likely unaware of the accumulation and did not turn on the airfoil anti-icing system. When the crew applied power for a go-around, raised the flaps to 32 degrees, and actuated the gear handle, the airspeed increased to 138 knots. At this point, the combination of airspeed and flap position resulted in an angle of attack at which the tailplane down loading was lost, and the aircraft pitched over.

**Probable Cause**

The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was an undetected accretion of ice on the horizontal stabilizer which, in conjunction with a specific airspeed and aircraft configuration, caused a loss of pitch control.